An analysis of health service delivery performance in Rwanda by Lannes, Laurence
1 
 
The London School of Economics and Political Science 
 
 
 
 
 
 
An analysis of health service delivery 
performance in Rwanda 
 
 
Laurence Lannes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted to the Department of Social Policy of the 
London School of Economics for the degree of Doctor of 
Philosophy 
London, 2015  
2 
 
Declaration 
I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD degree 
of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work 
other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case 
the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly 
identified in it). The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it 
is permitted, provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be 
reproduced without my prior written consent. I warrant that this authorization does 
not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights of any third party. 
I declare that my thesis consists of 57,606 words including footnotes, excluding 
bibliography and appendices. 
 
 
Statement of conjoint work 
I confirm that Chapter 4 was co-authored with Prof. Bruno Meessen, Dr. Agnes 
Soucat and Dr. Paulin Basinga who provided guidance on the Rwandan context and 
the structure of the paper. The introduction, literature review, econometrics 
analysis, discussion and conclusion were all written and carried out by me.  
 
Statement of use of third party for editorial help 
I confirm that my thesis was proofread by Transformat.co.uk. 
  
3 
 
ABSTRACT 
Health systems worldwide fail to produce optimal health outcomes, and successive 
reforms have sought to make them more efficient, more equitable and more 
responsive. The overarching objective of this thesis is to explore how to motivate 
healthcare providers in improving performance in service delivery in low income 
countries. The thesis explores whether financial incentives for healthcare providers 
raise productivity and how they may affect equity in utilization of healthcare 
services and responsiveness to patients’ needs. The thesis argues that, as 
performance-based financing (PBF) focuses on supply side barriers, it may lead to 
efficiency gains rather than equity improvements. It uses data from a randomized 
controlled impact evaluation in Rwanda to generate robust evidence on 
performance-based financing and address a gap in the knowledge on its unintended 
consequences. Statistical methods are used to analyze four aspects: the impact on 
health workforce productivity; the impact on health workforce responsiveness; the 
impact on equity in utilization of basic health services; and, the impact on spatial 
disparities in the utilization of health services. Findings indicate that performance-
based financing has a positive impact on efficiency: it raises health workforce 
productivity through higher workload and lower absenteeism; and, it encourages 
healthcare providers to be more responsive which positively impacts the quality of 
care perceived by patients. Findings also indicate that the impact on equity is 
uncertain as PBF can deter equity in access for the poorest in the absence of a 
compensating mechanism; however, PBF is a powerful reform catalyzer and can 
reduce inequalities between regions and households when combined with 
appropriate reforms that control for its potential perverse effects. This thesis 
advocates that strategies aiming to raise healthcare providers’ motivation should be 
used to raise performance in service delivery in low-income countries with 
particular attention to their effect on end users.   
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PART 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. BACKGROUND 
1.1.1. HEALTH SYSTEMS’ PERFORMANCE 
Undeniable worldwide health improvements have been observed in recent history. 
In two centuries, world life expectancy rose from 25 to 65 years for men and to 70 
years for women. Before 1950, reductions in death rates at younger ages explained 
most of the gain in life expectancy. Survival improvements after age 65 drove life 
expectancy, lengthening in the second half of the 20th century (Oeppen and Vaupel 
2002). Improvements in health systems’ performance drove such reductions in 
mortality and morbidity. Nevertheless, large inequalities remain. Africa has the 
lowest worldwide life expectancy, although it rose significantly from 38 years in 
1950 to 56 years in 2012. Mortality reduction among children under-five represents 
59% of Africa’s life expectancy gains since 1950, while 12% of the gain is due to 
better survival rates of children aged 5 to 14 (African Development Bank 2013). In-
country inequalities also prevail with the poorest quintile suffering from higher 
infant and under-five mortality rates than any other quintile in low and middle 
income countries  (Wagstaff 2000). 
Why are there variations in health outcomes among countries which seem to have 
the same resources and possibilities? What causes in-country variations? These 
questions are at the center of the first World Health Report (WHR) of the 21st 
century dedicated to improving health systems’ performance. The 2000 WHR 
argues that the provision of health cannot be left to markets. As health is a merit 
good, one cannot assume that demand and incentives from the market will lead to 
optimal health. Unlike other goods, health is an inalienable asset, subject to large 
and unpredictable risks, which are generally independent of one another (World 
Health Organization 2000).  Further, Sen (2002) distinguishes health achievement 
and the capability to achieve good health, which may not be exercised. He argues 
that health achievements and failures depend on a variety of factors such as 
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genetics, income, life style, food habits, working conditions or epidemiological 
environment. This calls for interventions that go beyond healthcare and take into 
account, for instance, resource allocation and social arrangements. Understanding 
the role of health systems and raising their performance is critical to sustain and 
improve health achievements worldwide. The WHR 2000 claims that health systems 
must be more efficient, more accessible and more responsive. In other words, 
besides improving health, health systems must cut inequalities and respond to 
people’s expectations with regard to healthcare services. 
Health system reforms over past decades have aimed to strengthen health systems 
and to raise their efficiency, fairness and responsiveness. The foundation of national 
healthcare systems and social insurance systems were the first major reforms, 
which began in high income countries (HIC) to ensure universal access to basic 
health services and ensure financial protection for the population. This wave of 
reform was not implemented uniformly or at the same pace across different 
countries; implementation arrangements also varied. Tax and social health 
insurance continues to prevail in many HIC, but the reform fails to ensure universal 
access to care in poorer countries as financial and human resources and 
infrastructural limitations have also hampered progress. As a response, some 
countries like China and Mexico have put in place mechanisms to reach uninsured 
populations. In Mexico, the Seguro Popular scheme aims to provide financial 
protection to the 50 million uninsured Mexicans excluded from social insurance 
schemes. It offers free access to care for an explicit package of services. A 
randomized assessment of the program revealed that it was effective in reducing 
catastrophic and out-of-pocket expenditures among the poorest, but did not reduce 
spending on medication nor lead to increased healthcare use (King et al. 2009). In 
China, the New Cooperative Medical Scheme was put in place to protect the 
uninsured rural population from catastrophic health expenditures. An evaluation of 
the scheme revealed that out-of-pocket expenditure remained an issue for rural 
households, although the catastrophic severity of payment dropped (Sun et al. 
2009).  
The second wave of reforms encouraged primary healthcare services to ensure cost-
effective, equitable and accessible health services. The primary healthcare strategy 
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for achieving ‘Health for All’ was adopted in 1978 in formally Alma-Ata (Lawn et al. 
2008). This strategy did not achieve expected results as funding was inadequate, 
human resources insufficient, and care was of poor quality. The most recent wave of 
reforms, now under way, reflects the political and economic changes observed 
worldwide and characterized by the move toward market motivation including 
extrinsic (financial) motivation. Current reforms rely on market mechanisms, 
individual choice and responsibility rather than on public sector service provision, 
state regulation and control (World Health Organization 2000). These reforms aim 
to raise performance by borrowing market concepts and applying them to the 
provision of health services. Although the major focus is on health system efficiency, 
some attention is given to fairness and responsiveness. As discussed in section 1.1.4, 
there is a risk that fostering extrinsic motivation can harm intrinsic motivation, 
particularly within healthcare.  
1.1.2. HEALTH SYSTEMS’ CHALLENGES IN LOW INCOME COUNTRIES 
Low income countries (LIC) are characterized by health challenges that differentiate 
them from HIC and result in very poor health outcomes. Insufficient and inequitably 
distributed resources hamper service delivery while access to, and utilization of, 
services remains poor, particularly for the most vulnerable (Palmer et al. 2004).  In 
an analysis of 54 countries, Barros et al. (2012) show that the ratio that measures 
the magnitude of inequalities by intervention between the poorest and richest 
quintile can reach up to 3.2 for insecticide-treated bednets for children and 4.6 for a 
skilled birth attendant. Quality of care stands as another critical issue.  
The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) have brought the poor performance of 
health systems in LIC to the attention of the international community as maternal 
and child mortality and communicable diseases continue to plague LIC; however, 
effective interventions exist to address most health challenges of LIC. The price of 
treatments is falling and resources made available to LIC health systems have grown 
significantly over the past decades (Travis et al. 2004). Donor funding for 
reproductive, maternal and child health has doubled since 2000 but progress has 
been slower than expected and most countries remain off-track in achieving the 
MDGs (Lawn et al. 2014). The poor performance of health systems explains such 
poor outcomes (Travis et al. 2004). Table 1-1 summarizes constraints hampering 
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health systems’ performance resulting in poor health outcomes in LIC as well as the 
responses that were developed to address them. It shows that one needs to address 
a range of constraints to raise health systems’ performance including constraints at 
the community and household level, service delivery level, policy and strategic 
management level and globally. 
Table 1-1: Health systems’ constraints and responses 
Level Constraints Responses Adressed: 
Community 
and 
household 
level 
Lack of demand for 
effective 
interventions 
Financial incentives to 
encourage use of services 
Chapter 4 
Barriers to use of 
effective 
interventions 
(financial, physical, 
social) 
Expand services close to 
clients 
Remove financial barriers 
(prepayment) 
Increase responsiveness 
of providers  
Chapter 3 and 
4 
Service 
delivery 
Shortage and poor 
distribution of 
qualified staff at 
primary care level 
Increase number of 
health workers, 
implement task shifting, 
increase allowances to 
work in remote areas 
Chapter 2 
Low staff pay and 
poor motivation 
Increase pay, improve 
supervision 
Chapter 2 
Weak technical 
guidance, program 
management and 
supervision 
Strengthen training and 
supervision, contract 
management 
Chapter 2 
Inadequate drugs 
and medical supplies 
Strengthen public 
systems of supply, make 
use of private retail 
systems 
Chapter 2 
Lack of equipment 
and infrastructure, 
including poor 
accessibility to 
services 
Renovate, upgrade and 
expand public facilities, 
contract non-
governmental 
organizations to provide 
services 
Chapter 2 
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Level Constraints Responses Adressed: 
Policy and 
strategic 
management 
in the health 
sector 
Weak and overly 
centralized systems 
for planning and 
management 
Decentralize planning 
and management 
Chapter 5 
Weak drug policies 
and supply systems 
Introduce new supply 
mechanisms 
 
Inadequate 
regulation of 
pharmaceutical 
industry and other 
segments of the 
private sector 
Strengthen regulation 
through legal 
mechanisms and 
incentives 
 
Lack of cooperative 
action and 
partnership for 
health between 
government and civic 
organizations 
Engage with civic 
organizations in planning 
and service oversight 
 
Weak incentives to 
use inputs efficiently 
and to respond to 
user needs and 
preferences 
Use output-based 
payments and external 
assistance programs 
Chapter 2, 3, 4 
and 5 
Fragmented donor 
funding which 
reduces flexibility 
and ownership. Low 
priority given to 
systems support 
Implement reforms to aid 
management and 
delivery, provided 
increased financing for 
systems support 
 
Government 
policy 
Bureaucracy Make greater use of 
private sector in 
financing, management 
and service delivery, and 
move health management 
into autonomous 
agencies 
 
Political and 
physical 
environment 
Governance and 
overall policy 
framework 
(corruption, weak 
government, weak 
rule of law, political 
instability, social 
sectors not given 
priority in funding 
decisions, weak 
accountability, etc.) 
Encourage improved 
stewardship and 
accountability 
mechanisms 
Chapter 3 
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Level Constraints Responses Adressed: 
Global Fragmented 
governance and 
management 
structures for global 
health 
Improve global 
coordination (e.g. Paris 
Declaration, Accra 
Agenda for Action) 
 
Emigration of 
doctors and nurses to 
high-income 
countries 
Seek voluntary 
agreements on migration 
of doctor and nurses 
 
Source: Mills (2014) p. 554 
This thesis explores the impact of some of the proposed responses to remove health 
systems’ constraints as presented in Table 1-1. Chapter 2 focuses on constraints at 
the service delivery level, including shortages of qualified staff, poor motivation, 
weak management, inadequate availability of drugs and equipment and assesses the 
effect of increasing the number of healthcare workers, providing financial incentives 
and improving supervision for staff motivation and performance. Chapter 3 focuses 
on constraints found at the community and household level, in particular on 
barriers to effective interventions whether financial, physical or social. It also pays 
attention to the environment of healthcare services, in particular, to the governance 
framework and accountability mechanisms. Chapter 3 thus assesses the effect of 
increased responsiveness to patients’ needs and improved healthcare management 
on removing those constraints. Chapter 4 focuses on community and household 
level constraints that lead to inequalities in the use of basic healthcare services due 
to the lack of demand for effective interventions, in particular among the most 
vulnerable. It assesses the effect of removing financial barriers to healthcare for 
households and of financial incentives for healthcare workers on using healthcare 
services. Finally, Chapter 5 looks at constraints at the policy and strategic 
management level in the healthcare sector that lead to poor service delivery at the 
local level due to overly centralized systems. In particular, it assesses the impact of 
more efficient uses of human and financial resources in the context of 
decentralization on effective use of healthcare services and a reduction in 
disparities.  
This thesis also explores whether health financing reforms can contribute in 
removing systemic constraints. Health financing reforms that address constraints 
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related to financial access to healthcare services, which stand for a major 
impediment to demand, are probably the most common set of health financing 
reforms in HIC and LIC, and include risk-pooling mechanisms and exemptions. 
Health insurance mechanisms were developed in LIC to cover basic packages of 
healthcare services with varying degrees of success to reduce the financial burden 
on households and cut the risk of catastrophic expenditures. Rwanda and Ghana 
achieved remarkable progress in expanding health insurance both in terms of 
population covered and package of services. However, the limited tax base in LIC 
ensures progress toward universal health insurance remains slow in most countries.  
To respond to the increased demand for healthcare services, health financing 
reforms also looked into raising performance in the supply of healthcare through 
reforming providers’ payment mechanisms. Section 1.1.3 reports how such reforms 
can influence a health system’s performance. This thesis particularly focuses on 
performance incentives targeting healthcare providers to address the lack of 
demand for effective interventions, poor responsiveness and inadequate motivation 
of providers.  
1.1.3. REFORMING PROVIDERS’ PAYMENT MECHANISMS 
Reforming the way providers are paid can create incentives for providers to change 
their behavior. Incentives generated by payment mechanisms affect the way 
healthcare providers produce services and can influence efficiency, equity, 
consumer satisfaction and health status (Barnum, Kutzin, and Saxenian 1995). 
Provider payment mechanisms vary in the incentives they generate and in their 
potential adverse effects. In countries where the health sector is predominantly 
publicly-funded and services are provided by public providers, budgets are the most 
common mechanism. They take the form of line-item allocations from the Ministry 
of Health (MOH) to healthcare facilities. Health workers are paid on a salary basis, 
whatever the quality and quantity of healthcare services they provide. In this 
payment mechanism, the state finances, manages and provides health services. This 
creates no incentive for efficiency, cost reduction or quality.  
The need to separate health system financing functions has progressively emerged 
as a key principle and was conceptualized by Kutzin (2001). The theoretical flow of 
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funds include: the collection of funds from various sources including the 
government, employers and citizens; pooling of funds; purchasing of services by a 
ministry or a health fund holder such as an insurance fund; and, the provision of 
services by public or private hospitals, practitioners or pharmacies that are paid by 
the fund holder according to specific provider payment arrangements. Several 
arrangements exist but the tendency is to move away from input-based financing. 
Payments can be either retrospective, when incurred costs are reimbursed after the 
service has been provided, or prospective, when the payment is agreed upon prior 
to the service being delivered. Under a line-item budget arrangement, which is 
characteristic of centrally directed health systems; governments determine budgets 
according to specific line-items such as salaries, equipment or drugs. Public 
managers do not have the flexibility to switch funds across line-items but they are 
not accountable for the performance so long as the budget is executed. They have no 
incentive to improve efficiency in budget spending or to reduce costs. As a result, 
productivity is low. Despite the negative effect on efficiency and cost minimization, 
line-item budgets are common in low income countries as they often lack trained 
managers, particularly at the local level. Central management oversight thus 
appears to be the most workable option. Global budgets consist of an aggregate 
fixed advanced payment to cover expenditures during a given period, and are often 
used in decentralized health systems. Healthcare providers have flexibility on 
resource use, but they are accountable for the way resources are spent, which 
creates incentives for performance. With a global budget, providers have an 
incentive to apply fewer inputs and produce fewer services to reduce the costs. The 
downside is that a global budget can result in access problems and in providers 
exceeding their budget. Global budgets are used for the Department of Veterans 
Affairs in the United States. Some forms of global budgets are also in use in Canada 
and Western European countries. Under capitation, providers are paid a fixed 
amount per insured person to deliver a given package of services. It incentivizes 
providers to deliver cost-effective services to reduce the cost of treatment per 
person. The downside is that providers have an incentive to select low-risk patients 
to lower the costs and to reduce the quantity and quality of services. Under fee-for-
service mechanism, providers are reimbursed for the exact services delivered; a fee 
schedule can be fixed (e.g. France) or unregulated (e.g. in the US). This creates a 
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perverse incentive for supplier-induced demand so that the volume of services and 
the earnings of providers will increase. This mechanism can raise health system 
productivity but also lead to cost escalation. Finally, under case-based 
reimbursement, the provider is paid a predetermined figure that covers all services 
associated with an illness. Providers have the incentive to more efficiently produce 
thus lower the cost per case. Coding bias and case selection are important perverse 
incentives under this provider payment arrangement. The incentive to lower costs 
also raises concerns about the quality of care (Kutzin 2001, Barnum, Kutzin, and 
Saxenian 1995). The main advantages and disadvantages of each provider payment 
mechanism, as well as strategies to overcome perverse effects, are summarized in 
Table 1-2.  
Table 1-2: Advantages and disadvantages of provider payment mechanisms 
Payment 
method 
Advantages Disadvantages Minimization of 
disadvantages 
Line item 
budget 
Central control 
appropriate with 
weak 
management 
capacities at local 
level. 
No incentive for 
efficiency. 
No flexibility in 
resource use. 
Under-provision of 
services. 
Monitor performance 
for better use of 
resources. 
Global 
budget 
Predictable 
expenses. 
Low 
administrative 
costs. 
No incentive for 
efficiency. 
Monitor performance.  
Link global budget to 
performance/bonuses. 
Capitation Predictable 
expenses.  
Incentives for 
efficiency. 
No supplier-
induced demand.  
Financial risk for 
provider. 
Enrolment of low-
risk patients (cream-
skimming). 
Under-provision of 
services. 
Adjust capitation to 
risks of population 
enrolled.  
Contracts to ensure 
services are provided. 
Fee for 
service (no 
fee schedule) 
Incentive for 
efficiency. 
Unpredictable 
expenses. 
Cost escalation and 
supplier-induced 
demand. 
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Payment 
method 
Advantages Disadvantages Minimization of 
disadvantages 
Fee for 
service (with 
fixed fee 
schedule) 
Incentive for 
efficiency. 
Unpredictable 
expenses. 
Cost escalation and 
supplier-induced 
demand. 
Higher 
administrative costs.  
Cap total expenditures 
and adjust prices to 
keep expenditures 
within the limit. 
Case-based Incentive for 
efficiency.  
Unpredictable 
expenses. 
Selection of low-risk 
patients.  
Less suitable for 
outpatient care. 
Detailed case-mix 
category system. 
Mixed payment 
system. 
Source: Adapted from Barnum, Kutzin, and Saxenian (1995) 
1.1.4. SETTING INCENTIVES 
This classification of provider payment mechanisms is mainly theoretical as none of 
the mechanisms have shown superiority over others. In the real world, most 
payment systems are mixed to counter adverse effects and create the right 
incentives to raise health systems’ performance. The search for incentives capable 
to overcome health systems’ inefficiencies can be sourced back to the 1980s. At that 
time, ministries of health progressively moved away from a bureaucratic public 
management model of direct health service provision, to follow new initiatives 
embedded in New Public Management (NPM) reforms. This shift was aimed to 
overcome inefficiencies in service delivery and toward creating incentives for good 
performance. This resulted in reforms of provider payment mechanisms, enhanced 
competition through the separation of functions, contractual relationships, market-
based mechanisms for service delivery and a shift from universalism and equity to 
efficiency and individualism (Hood 1991, Russell, Bennett, and Mills 1999, Forder, 
Robinson, and Hardy 2005). In opposition to centralized management and control, 
NPM reforms promote hands-on professional management and explicit standards 
and measures of performance. They place emphasis on the control of outputs rather 
than on inputs and promote decentralization and competition. Contracting and 
other incentive mechanisms are put forward to raise performance. Finally, NPM 
reforms favor private sector management styles, in particular, in the management of 
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human resources as well as more accountability in resource use to raise efficiency 
(Table 1-3).  
Table 1-3: New Public Management doctrine 
Doctrine 
 
Meaning 
Hands-on professional management  Active, visible, discretionary control of 
organizations 
Explicit standards and measures of 
performance 
Definition of goals, targets, indicators of 
success 
Emphasis on output control Resource allocation and rewards linked 
to performance 
Disaggregation of units in the public 
sector 
Shift from centralized management 
systems to corporatized units operating 
on decentralized budgets  
Greater competition in the public 
sector 
Move to contracts and public tendering 
procedures 
Private sector styles of management 
practice 
Greater flexibility in hiring and rewards 
More discipline and efficiency in 
resource use 
Contain costs, better labor discipline 
Source: Hood (1991) pp. 4-5 
Expected outcomes of NPM reforms in health are greater efficiency and better 
quality health services, but the focus on efficiency may jeopardize equity (Preker, 
Harding, and Travis 2000). A review of NPM reform implementation in low income 
countries has shown that reforms have led to modest gains in technical efficiency 
and have had a limited or negative impact on equity. These results may be due to a 
significant cut in available resources and the parallel introduction of user fees 
(Batley 1999).  
Health systems are now characterized by a greater specialization of actors and 
separation of functions. In these more complex health systems, incentive 
mechanisms are essential to define relations between actors and ensure the 
performance of systems. Incentives aim to affect motivation which determines the 
strength and direction of providers’ behavior. Intrinsic motivation relates to the 
inherent satisfaction generated by activities, such as goals, motives and values, self-
concept and expectations about the consequences of actions (Franco, Bennett, and 
Kanfer 2002). In contrast, extrinsic motivation relates to the attainment of a 
separable outcome (financial reward). The effect of incentives will vary according to 
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cultures. The conceptual framework developed by Franco, Bennett, and Kanfer 
(2002) on public sector health worker motivation shows the different ways in which 
motivation is influenced. In addition to the above individual level determinants of 
motivation, workers’ motivation also depends upon the organizational context; 
including, structures, resources, processes and culture.  Communities also influence 
health workers’ motivation through their expectations, interactions with workers 
and feedback on health worker performance (Franco, Bennett, and Kanfer 2002).   
The interaction between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation is debated in the 
theoretical literature. The efficiency wage theory argues that increased salaries and 
intensive monitoring will raise performance but others fear that extrinsic 
motivation may crowd out intrinsic motivation. Industrial psychologists and 
sociologists argue that extrinsic incentives can be perceived as distrust from the 
employer and therefore result in demotivation (Garcia-Prado 2005). The motivation 
crowding theory suggests that financial incentives may undermine or strengthen 
intrinsic motivation. It mediates the standard economic model and the psychological 
theory by demonstrating a systematic interaction between intrinsic and extrinsic 
motivation. Crowding out or crowding in intrinsic motivation can be generated by a 
change in preferences or a change in the perceived nature of the performed task in 
the task environment or in the worker’s self-perception. External interventions may 
crowd out intrinsic motivation if perceived as controlling, or crowd in intrinsic 
motivation if perceived as supportive (Frey and Jegen 2001).  
The effectiveness of incentives will also depend on the organizational culture in 
which they are developed. The organizational culture can be defined as a set of 
shared mental perceptions that guide interpretation and action in organizations by 
defining appropriate behavior for various situations. Organizational culture relates 
to the way individuals behave within an organization and to the organization’s 
vision and values (Ravasi and Schultz 2006). If the organizational culture is strong, 
staff will align to the organizational values. In opposition, if the culture is weak, 
there will be less alignment and a need for more control. This will have an impact in 
the designing, implementing and enforcing of a performance management system as 
well as ensuring individuals adhere to it. The organizational culture is characterized 
by two competing values: control and flexibility, and the performance management 
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system of an organization needs to be adapted to the organization’s values. Control 
values refer to predictability, stability and conformity and reflect an orientation 
toward efficiency and profit, whereas flexibility values refer to change, openness 
and responsiveness which reflect adaptability and a readiness to attain growth, 
innovation and creativity. As a performance management system cannot be 
compatible with all control and flexibility values, the organization will need to 
adjust its actions to ensure the success of the performance management system. The 
organizational culture literature thus recommends that managers be aware of their 
organization’s values before designing a performance management system (Henri 
2006).  
1.1.5. AGENCY THEORY 
Agency theory enables us to understand how financial incentives help align 
contradicting interests in the health sector as patients and providers, or fund 
holders and providers, have different preferences and objectives. In a perfectly 
functioning market, optimal outcomes are achieved due to atomistic competition 
and perfectly informed consumers. However, in the real world, market failures 
hamper the achievement of optimal outcomes. In the health sector, the main issue 
comes from an asymmetry of information between the agent, who has the 
information, and the principal, who does not. Agents are liable to moral hazard; they 
have an incentive to do as little as possible since the principal cannot verify their 
actions. For instance, the patient (principal) has little information on treatments, 
their efficacy and skills of the provider (agent) and thus must rely on the provider. 
The agent may adopt a behavior that is inappropriate from the view of the principal. 
The asymmetry of information between the healthcare provider and the patient can 
result in supplier-induced demand with the supplier holding the information and 
encouraging the patient to consume more services. This results in more demand for 
healthcare services than what would have occurred in a market with fully informed 
patients. A similar principal-agent relationship occurs between the purchaser of 
healthcare services (principal) and the provider (agent) (Milgrom and Roberts 
1992b, Salanie 2005, Preker, Harding, and Travis 2000, Perrot 2004). Incentives can 
be used to control moral hazard; for instance, by rewarding good outcomes or 
outputs they ensure that the agent will take the expected action (Grossman and Hart 
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1983). Tying the agent’s reward (or part of it) to the achievement of the principal’s 
objectives enables an alignment with the agent’s objectives with those of the 
principal, since agents are risk-adverse and do not want to have their income 
dependent on random factors (Eichler 2006, Milgrom and Roberts 1992a).  
The predictive power of the principal-agent model relies on the assumption that 
providers behave rationally, that is to say, they make choices to maximize their 
earnings according to the incentive mechanism in place. However, behavioral 
economics shows that an individual’s rationality is influenced by factors that make 
them differ from perfect economic agents and enables us to understand the strength 
of performance incentives. Behavioral economics explores the effect of 
psychological, social, cognitive and emotional factors on individual and institutional 
decisions. They show how individuals systematically diverge from the behaviors 
that rational utility-maximizing models predict for three reasons: first, there is a 
bias in estimating risks, since individuals tend to overestimate the probability of 
events they have heard about; second, there is a tendency for asymmetric treatment 
of gains and losses, where individuals tend to avoid penalties before trying to obtain 
bonuses; and third, there are time inconsistencies with individuals that 
systematically misjudge how they are going to experience decision-making 
scenarios in the future (Savedoff and Partner 2010).  
1.2. PAYING FOR PERFORMANCE 
1.2.1. PUTTING THEORY TO TEST 
To understand how healthcare providers can be incentivized to modify their 
behavior and improve their performance, one must understand healthcare 
providers’ behavior and the determinants of their performance. Results achieved 
(performance) depend on factors associated with demand, and factors associated 
with the characteristics of supply. Performance will increase with higher demand, 
but demand is determined by: the environment (such as geographical access); 
income of the population (financial access to health services); perception of the 
quality of healthcare providers, as individuals will be less likely to visit a healthcare 
facility if the service is poor; and, cultural factors (such as religious beliefs). Some of 
these determinants can be influenced to raise demand for healthcare services such 
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as removing financial barriers to healthcare services for the most vulnerable. 
Factors associated with characteristics of the supply depend on available human 
and financial resources; the know-how which results from providers’ competences 
in the delivery of healthcare services; and, efforts made which are linked to 
sanctions, the level of professionalism, relative remuneration, work value, context 
and financial and non-financial incentives  (Perrot et al. 2010).  
Performance incentives result from the failure of the classical approach which 
hypothesized that the performance of a healthcare facility would be improved with 
more and better quality factors of production (input-based approach). All things 
being equal, it was assumed that providers would achieve better results with more 
and better staff, adequate equipment and technologies, available drugs at affordable 
prices and an efficient and accessible infrastructure. The rationale was that an 
adequate combination of those inputs would help achieve the best possible outputs. 
This approach was insufficient, particularly in low income countries, as they 
suffered from a critical lack of inputs. Furthermore, the practice showed that 
identical inputs did not translate into comparable results, illustrating that inputs are 
not the only determinants of healthcare providers’ performance. Incentive 
mechanisms were thus proposed as a way to enhance performance of healthcare 
providers. Incentives encourage healthcare providers to raise performance by 
enhancing the efficiency of services delivered to the population. The incentive 
provider is also called ‘purchaser’ or ‘financing agent’ in the context of financial 
incentives. The incentive beneficiary is the healthcare provider who is stimulated to 
change its behavior to raise its performance. Incentives target the performance of an 
institution but implementation arrangements may, in practice, incentivize staff 
(Perrot et al. 2010).   
1.2.2. CLASSIFICATION OF INCENTIVE MECHANISMS 
Incentives can either target healthcare providers or users of healthcare services; 
they are respectively referred to as ‘supply side’ and ‘demand side’ incentives. On 
the demand side, incentives often target individuals and aim to stimulate demand 
for healthcare services and thus raise utilization of health services. Different forms 
exist, including: price related incentives to lower the price of services for the 
poorest or penalties for those consuming healthcare services in excess; voucher 
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systems which consist of distributing vouchers to a pre-identified population that 
can be used for accessing care for free or obtaining a fee reduction; insurance or 
user fee exemption scheme aiming to remove the financial barriers to healthcare 
services and encourage populations to use healthcare providers; and, conditional 
cash transfers that consist of a financier giving money to a pre-identified population 
conditional on achieving certain goals related to health or education (Perrot et al. 
2010). Demand side incentives, such as conditional cash transfers in Mexico, 
benefited from the most rigorous evaluations (Eichler and Levine 2009b, Lagarde, 
Haines, and Palmer 2009). 
Supply side incentives are incentives to healthcare providers that encourage them 
to change their behavior and practices to raise efficiency and quality. Incentive 
mechanisms vary according to their objectives, expected results, indicators, the 
entity receiving the reward, type and magnitude of the reward, proportion of the 
reward compared to the base salary, ancillary components associated with 
performance incentives, such as the availability of resources, supplies, technical 
support or training. Most approaches provide additional financial resources based 
on results and co-exist with input-based financing (Gorter, Por, and Meessen 2013). 
Three forms of supply side incentives exist: performance-based contracting (or 
contracting-out), which is a mechanism whereby the purchaser contracts a non-
state provider (e.g. non-governmental organization) to provide a set of services in a 
specific area; performance-based financing (PBF) (or contracting-in) introduces a 
new provider payment mechanism with the performance contract existing between 
the Ministry of Health and healthcare facilities; and, results-based budgeting is a 
mechanism through which the government links budget funds to desired outputs 
rather than using inputs. Table 1-4 summarizes the principal forms of incentives 
that exist on the demand and supply sides.  
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Table 1-4: Performance incentive mechanisms according to the type of agent concerned 
Type of 
agent 
Type of 
incentive 
Performance incentive Objective 
Individuals, 
families and 
households 
Demand 
side 
Conditional cash-
transfers 
Vouchers 
Price related incentives 
(e.g. Health Equity 
Funds) 
Increase demand for 
healthcare services 
Increase intake of 
preventive care 
Remove financial barriers 
Healthcare 
providers 
Supply side Performance-based 
financing 
Performance-based 
contracting 
Performance-based 
budgeting 
Raise health workforce 
productivity 
Increase quality of 
services 
Increase delivery of 
services (e.g. preventive 
care) 
Source: Author (2015) 
This thesis focuses on supply side incentives, and more precisely on performance-
based financing in the context of LIC. Performance-based financing is the “transfer 
of money or material goods conditional on taking a measurable action or achieving a 
predetermined performance target” (Eichler 2006). A more recent and 
comprehensive definition states that “Performance-Based Financing is a system 
approach with an orientation on results defined as quantity & quality of service 
outputs and inclusion of vulnerable persons. This approach entails making facilities 
autonomous agencies that work for the benefit of health or education related goals 
and their staff. It is also characterized by multiple performance frameworks for the 
regulatory functions, the contract development & verification (CDV) agency and 
community empowerment. Performance-Based Financing applies market forces but 
seeks to correct market failures to attain health or other sector gains. PBF at the 
same time aims at cost-containment and a sustainable mix of revenues from cost-
recovery, government and international contributions. PBF is a flexible approach 
that continuously seeks to improve through empirical research and rigorous impact 
evaluations, which lead to best practices” (Cordaid-SINA Health 2014).  
The objective for the purchaser of health services is to increase the quantity and 
quality of services delivered through PBF. In HIC, performance-based financing is 
referred to as ‘Pay-for-Performance’ (P4P). It is predominantly used in the UK and 
US to link incentives to predetermined quality targets and promote evidence-based 
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medical care. Through improving the performance of providers, the final objective is 
to improve patients’ health (Greene and Nash 2009, Bell and Levinson 2007). Sub-
sections 1.2.3 and 1.2.4 briefly present Pay-for-Performance and performance-
based financing in their contexts.  
1.2.3. HIGH INCOME COUNTRIES 
P4P programs are increasingly used in high income countries. P4P in the US began 
in the late 1980s but experienced exponential growth following the report entitled 
Crossing the quality Chasm from the Institute of Medicine (Corrigan 2005) which 
identified six challenges for the health system in the US: patient safety, effectiveness, 
patient-centeredness, timeliness, efficiency and equity. The report concluded that 
provider payment mechanisms were the best entry point for effective healthcare 
reform and recommended them to motivate and reward providers to address 
identified issues. Following this report, P4P schemes were largely diffused across 
the entire US health system (Elovainio 2010). Rosenthal et al. (2007) show that 
most P4P schemes in the US target primary care practitioners, specialists (in 
particular surgeons and cardiologists) and hospitals. Specific measures include 
patients’ satisfaction, outcomes, processes, information technology and cost 
efficiency.  In the UK, P4P has been in place since the 1990s for the remuneration of 
general practitioners.  The Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF) implemented in 
2004 is considered the most comprehensive national primary care P4P program in 
the world. The QOF uses financial incentives to promote structured and team-based 
care in pursuit of evidence-based objectives. Payments are linked to clinical care, 
practice organization and patient experience (Gillam, Siriwardena, and Steel 2012). 
In Australia, the Practice Incentive Program has been implemented by Medicare 
Australia since 1998 and targets general practitioners for different clinical and 
organization practice indicators. In Catalonia (Spain), the health administration 
finances and regulates healthcare providers following contractual arrangements 
that control for the quality of care (Lopez-Casasnovas, Costa-Font, and Planas 2005). 
In France, the national health insurance organization introduced performance-
based contracts for general practitioners to improve quality and efficiency for 
preventive care and for the follow up of chronic diseases. Other schemes are found 
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in Canada, New Zealand, Germany, Netherlands, Italy and Estonia, but the most 
rigorous evaluations relate to UK and the US (Elovainio 2010). 
1.2.4. LOW INCOME COUNTRIES 
Health systems of low income countries suffer large inefficiencies (Belli 2004). 
Health systems usually lack financial and human resources and are characterized by 
poor quality control and supervision, limited managerial skills, and, poor supply 
chains and information systems. As a result, health services are underused, 
particularly by the poor, the quality of care is low and service delivery is inefficient 
(Eichler and Levine 2009a). Technical and allocative inefficiencies result from 
unreliable and insufficient funding of the key inputs and inappropriate management 
and mix of inputs with salaries tending to supplant other inputs (Levine and Soucat 
2001).  
Performance incentives where encouraged as early as 1993 by the World Bank’s 
report on Investing in Health to overcome challenges in service delivery (World 
Bank 1993). Since then, PBF has been implemented in a growing number of 
countries. The rationale behind PBF in LIC is that well-designed incentives can help 
improve the production of healthcare and foster creativity (Filmer, Hammer, and 
Pritchett 2000). PBF is expected to introduce more flexibility in the use and 
management of resources, thus improving technical efficiency by a better use of 
inputs and allocative efficiency by minimizing costs (Meessen et al. 2006).  
PBF is used for public sector contracting of health services and the pioneer 
countries were Cambodia (Soeters and Griffiths 2003) and Rwanda (Soeters, 
Habineza, and Peerenboom 2006, Meessen et al. 2006). With PBF, payments are 
made according to a pre-determined list of services, and payments are conditional 
on the quality of care. Increasing health facility autonomy and establishing effective 
planning, management and administrative systems is critical in implementing and 
supporting the schemes (Savedoff and Partner 2010). Table 1-5 summarizes the 
main evidence from LIC on the effect of PBF. More details are provided in Appendix 
1. Findings from other countries are discussed in detail in section 1.3.  
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Table 1-5: Summary of main evidence from LIC 
Country Description/ target of incentive Finding 
Afghanistan International and local Non-
Governmental Organizations 
(NGO) contracted in 8 provinces.  
Contracted facilities had large 
improvements in quality of care 
whereas quality worsened in 
facilities managed by the 
Government. 
Afghanistan EC, USAID and the WB 
implement different contracting 
mechanisms (with NGOs).  
WB incorporates performance 
bonuses and flexibility to use 
funds.  
EC and USAID apply input-based 
reimbursements.  
All contracting schemes resulted in 
better access to services, better 
health outcomes and a reduction 
of inequities among provinces. 
Better results in PBF NGOs 
Bangladesh NGOs train, supervise, pay and 
support the community nutrition 
promoters within the Bangladesh 
Integrated Nutrition Project 
Reductions in rates of moderate 
and severe malnutrition were 
slightly greater in project areas 
compared with control.  
Significant improvements in other 
health services.  
Results achieved at a high cost. 
Bangladesh NGO contracted to provide 
outreach services and to operate 
health centers. 
Significant improvements in 
maternal and child health (except 
for immunization).  
NGO was able to provide more and 
better quality health services 
Bolivia Management contract with NGO. Deliveries increased by 41% 
compared with 20% in the control 
district.  
Increase in outpatient services. 
Burundi Performance incentives with 
variable bonus for quality. 
Improved quality of care during 
prenatal care but no improvement 
in timeliness.  
Increase in institutional deliveries 
among the better off.  
Increase in probability of a child 
being fully vaccinated.  
Cambodia Government contracts NGOs in 2 
different ways: a service delivery 
contract (contracting out) and a 
management contract 
(contracting in). 
Larger improvements in prenatal 
care coverage in contracting out 
and contracting in districts.  
The poor have benefited 
disproportionately from 
contracting.  
Cost of contracting higher but led 
to savings in OOP.  
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Country Description/ target of incentive Finding 
Cambodia   Fully immunized children coverage 
increased for poorest and richest 
but the difference between rich 
and poor households decreased 
from 9.1% point to 5.7% before 
and after contracting.  
Democratic 
Republic of 
Congo 
Performance incentives with 
variable top-up for quality. 
Positive effect only on knowledge 
of HIV and institutional deliveries. 
OOP increased in treatment areas.  
Haiti A total of 3 pilot NGOs. All 3 NGOs exceeded the 
performance targets for 
immunization coverage.  
ORS increased in 2/3.  
Weak performance in ANC and 
contraceptive use.  
Availability of contraceptive 
increased.  
India 2 contracts: one with NGOs for 
training, outreach and 
monitoring and subcontracts 
between NGOs and private 
providers for changing their 
proactive behaviors.  
Large improvement in the 
management of childhood illnesses 
by private practitioners  
Madagascar 
and Senegal 
NGOs contracted to deliver 
community based nutrition 
interventions.  
Modest effect on malnutrition 
rates. 
Pakistan NGO, Punjab Rural Support 
Program, given a management 
contract to run all the basic 
health units in Punjab. 
Coverage of preventive services is 
low in both districts and the rates 
of progress are similar.   
However, contracting resulted in 
an improvement in BHU use, 
patient satisfaction, and reduced 
OOP for BHU services.  
Philippines Performance incentives. Average number of monthly 
inpatients does not increase with 
bonus but increases with health 
insurance.  
Quality of care improved with PBF 
as well as patient outcomes.  
Rwanda Performance-based financing in 
pilot districts. 
OPD, family planning, measles 
immunization and institutional 
deliveries increased in treatment 
districts.  
Better quality score.  
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Country Description/ target of incentive Finding 
Rwanda Performance-based financing in 
primary healthcare facilities to 
raise utilization and quality of 
basic health services (National 
model). 
Coverage of any prenatal care 
visits, institutional deliveries, and 
child preventive care increases. 
Quality of prenatal visits also 
higher in treatment facilities. 
Tanzania Performance incentives. Mission facilities saw a decline in 
inpatient stays, institutional 
deliveries and prenatal care 
compared to government facilities.  
Vietnam Performance incentives. Improvement in case detection in 
intervention areas.  
Zambia Performance incentives. Improvements in VCT in both 
groups.  
No change in institutional 
deliveries and ANC.  
Source: Author, adapted from Loevinsohn (2008) and Witter et al. (2012).  
The use of PBF in LIC is at the center of a heated debate in the literature. Supporters 
of the strategy claim that it can catalyze reforms and address structural problems in 
the health sector, such as low responsiveness, inefficiency and inequity (Meessen, 
Soucat, and Sekabaraga 2011, Basinga et al. 2011). Others highlight the lack of 
rigorous evidence and the bias in publishing as only positive results on PBF are 
published (Ireland, Paul, and Dujardin 2011, Witter et al. 2012, Ssengooba, McPake, 
and Palmer 2012). Most evidence concentrates on the impact of the strategy on the 
use of services and quality of care, but less is known of its cost-effectiveness, equity 
impact and potential adverse effects (Witter et al. 2012, Witter et al. 2013). It is 
however likely that the strategy will deter equity in access to services as it can 
encourage health workers to focus on targeted services at the expense of others 
(distortions) and to cherry-pick patients that are easier to reach (most likely the 
richest) (Ireland, Paul, and Dujardin 2011).  
1.3. LITERATURE REVIEW ON PERFORMANCE INCENTIVES 
Following the World Health Organization (2000) and because, by definition, 
performance incentives aim to improve performance, the below sections review the 
literature on the effect of performance incentives on performance, measured in 
terms of efficiency, equity and responsiveness to summarize the state of evidence 
and identify potential gaps in knowledge.  
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1.3.1. EFFICIENCY 
As one may expect, most evidence on the impact of performance incentives relate to 
their effect on efficiency or productivity. The productivity of an organization is the 
ratio of the outputs that it produces to the inputs that it uses. The production 
function models the maximum output an organization can produce given its level 
and mix of inputs. The middle box in the production process (Figure 1-1) cannot be 
observed as it denotes what is happening in the organization and how the 
production process is organized, although this is what determines its efficiency 
(Street and Hakkinen 2009, Jacobs, Smith, and Street 2006). Three levels of 
efficiency can be measured: technical1, allocative2 and economic efficiency3 (Jacobs, 
Smith, and Street 2006, Coelli, Rao, and Battese 1997, Liu and Mills 2007, Street and 
Hakkinen 2009). When applied to performance incentives, the efficiency of health 
facilities or healthcare providers operating under P4P or PBF schemes is measured 
in terms of efficient use of human and financial resources (inputs), efficient 
production of outputs measured by the quantity of health services produced and the 
utilization of and access to those services as well as the quality of those services.  
Figure 1-1: Simplified production process 
 
Source: Author (2015). 
The evidence on the effect of P4P on resource use is mixed (Armour et al. 2001). 
There is evidence that P4P reduces the cost of support services but there is less 
evidence on its effect on clinical services (Mills and Broomberg 1998). In a review of 
100 studies, Greene and Nash (2009) conclude that P4P leads to improved 
performance and better patient outcomes. A review of the evidence in the US also 
shows that financial incentives succeed in cutting the utilization of health services in 
managed care plans (Hellinger 1996). There is however a risk of an adverse 
selection for sicker patients (Peterson et al. 2006). Most assessments related to 
                                                             
1 Technical efficiency requires the maximization of output for a given level of inputs 
or the minimization of inputs for a given level of output. 
2 Allocative efficiency looks at the minimization of the cost of producing an output. 
3 Economic efficiency is the product of technical and allocative efficiency. 
Inputs (labor, capital, 
equipment, supplies) 
Outputs Production 
process  
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quality focus on process measures: 12 out of 15 studies reviewed by Peterson et al. 
(2006) revealed a positive effect on the quality of care. For instance, in the US, P4P 
hospitals achieved greater quality improvements for acute myocardial infarction, 
heart failure and pneumonia (Lindenauer et al. 2007). In the UK, P4P resulted in 
improved quality of care of family practitioners but some evidence was found 
showing practices excluded more than 15% of patients as they were judged 
ineligible for quality indicators (Doran et al. 2008). Other reviews report more 
mixed results on the quality of care (Armour et al. 2001, Mehrotra et al. 2008).  
The evidence on the effect of PBF on efficiency in low income countries is poor and 
shows mixed results (Liu, Hotchkiss, and Bose 2008). Witter et al. (2012) reviewed 
8 studies which assessed the effect of PBF on resource use and concluded that 
facilities’ revenues and staff pay increase with PBF, but that there is no evidence on 
other effects on resource utilization, such as patient payments or efficiency in 
service delivery. PBF experiences consistently lead to technical efficiency gains 
thanks to better flexibility in human resource management (South Africa), bonus 
payments to staff (Haiti, South Africa), better organization and innovations in 
service delivery (Haiti, Afghanistan) and greater managerial autonomy (Haiti, 
Cambodia, Afghanistan) (Mills and Broomberg 1998, England 2004, Eichler et al. 
2009, Bloom et al. 2007, Palmer et al. 2006, Sondorp et al. 2009). In two PBF pilots 
in Rwanda, health center managers developed creative strategies to spend 
resources according to their priorities and perceived needs, such as salaries, 
infrastructure, equipment or drugs (Soeters et al. 2005, Meessen et al. 2006, 
Meessen, Kashala, and Musango 2007). The evidence on allocative efficiency gains is 
even thinner: in Cambodia, contracted districts have better cost-effectiveness ratios 
than control districts; in Costa Rica, expenditures per capita in contracted facilities 
are 30% lower than in traditional public facilities; in India, contracted NGOs achieve 
better results at a lower cost; and, in rural Pakistan, outpatient visits rose 
significantly with the same budget. However, in rural Bangladesh and South Africa, 
PBF had no impact on allocative efficiency (Loevinsohn 2008, Loevinsohn and 
Harding 2005, 2004, England 2004, Liu, Hotchkiss, and Bose 2007). In the absence 
of a clear result on the impact of PBF on productivity and efficiency, Chapter 2 will 
contribute to close a gap in knowledge. By its focus on the health workforce, it will 
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enable us to generate evidence on the availability of staff, absenteeism and 
productivity.  
The effect of PBF on the utilization of health services is the aspect that is explored 
the most with findings supporting the idea that PBF is efficient in raising utilization, 
which is the main intended effect of the output-based formula of PBF schemes. In 
Burundi, PBF has led to improvements in the quality of prenatal care but the 
timeliness and number of visits did not change. PBF also resulted in an increase in 
utilization of institutional deliveries and in the probability of a child being fully 
vaccinated (Bonfrer, Van de Poel, and Van Doorslaer 2014).  Witter et al. (2012) 
reviewed 9 PBF interventions in low income countries and suggest that the poor 
quality of the evidence and the limited number of published studies does not allow 
firm conclusions to be drawn. Besides, PBF schemes vary significantly in their 
design and approaches. Two studies report a highly uncertain effect on the 
utilization of prenatal care; 4 studies report unclear results on institutional 
deliveries as the effect varies substantially from one study to another; the effect on 
utilization of preventive care for children is also unclear as in one case, attendance 
to preventive care services doubled but in another, the impact on immunization was 
negative; and, the impact on utilization of outpatient services also generated 
inconsistent results. As far as the effect on quality is concerned, evidence shows 
mixed results for coverage of tetanus vaccinations among pregnant women. There 
was also no impact on tuberculosis case detection.  
1.3.2. EQUITY AND RESPONSIVENESS 
There is no sound evidence, but mainly hypotheses, on the negative and unintended 
side-effects of PBF (Gorter, Por, and Meessen 2013). It is however important to 
understand its effect on equity and responsiveness to ensure efficiency gains are not 
achieved at the expense of equity and patients’ satisfaction.  
There is no agreement on what constitutes equity. The most popular definition of 
equity in health is that it “implies that ideally everyone should have a fair 
opportunity to attain their full health potential and, more pragmatically, that no one 
should be disadvantaged from achieving this potential, if it can be avoided” 
(Whitehead 1991). Wagstaff, Van Doorslaer, and Paci (1989) distinguish equity in 
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the finance of healthcare with payments being related to the ability to pay, from 
equity in the delivery of healthcare. Further, equity in healthcare is defined as equal 
utilization, distribution according to needs, equal access and equal health outcomes 
(Culyer and Wagstaff 1993). In empirical studies on equity, the concept of health 
inequalities is preferred. It focuses on cutting inequalities related to an individual’s 
economic status, gender, ethnic inequalities, education and occupation (Gwatkin 
2002a, 2000). To overcome such inequalities, one should aim at tackling inequalities 
in access, that is to say both inequalities in the finance4 and the delivery of 
healthcare5 (Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer 1993, 2000).  
Evidence from high income countries on the impact of P4P on equity is mixed. A 
systematic review conducted in 2006 suggests that access improves for vulnerable 
groups if they are explicitly targeted (Peterson et al. 2006) but several later studies 
from the US show that P4P may exacerbate disparities in healthcare (Greene and 
Nash 2009): P4P can increase racial disparities by disadvantaging hospitals with 
more than 20% of African Americans (Karve et al. 2008); and, it can worsen 
disparities between hospitals (Werner, Goldman, and Dudley 2009). Other studies 
show that P4P has no impact on equity in access to care: the quality of chronic 
disease management in England was generally equitable between socioeconomic 
groups before and after the P4P program (Crawley et al. 2009). 
Evidence on equity from LIC is limited (Lagarde and Palmer 2006) and all studies 
present significant methodological flaws. In a review of 14 PBF experiences, the 
impact on equity was measured in only three cases (Loevinsohn 2008). In 
Cambodia, PBF resulted in increased utilization and lower out-of-pocket (OOP) 
payments by the poorest 50%. However, as control districts received significantly 
lower resources than contracted districts, it is impossible to ascertain that the 
positive impact on equity in access is related to contracting and not to increased 
resources (England 2004, Palmer et al. 2004). Witter et al. (2012) report only one 
study looking at the impact of PBF on equity measured in terms of households’ 
payment and shows a positive impact on poorest household spending on healthcare 
                                                             
4 Households with the same ability to pay should provide the same financial 
contribution. 
5 Individuals with the same needs should be treated similarly. 
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services. The literature insists on the importance of targeting the poor as the better-
off could be the main beneficiaries of a rise in utilization (Gwatkin, Bhuiya, and 
Victora 2004). The experience shows that equity in access improved only when the 
poor were explicitly targeted, such as in urban Bangladesh and Cambodia. In 
Pakistan, where there was no targeting, no improvement was observed (Loevinsohn 
2008). Finally, evidence from Burundi is mixed: PBF had a positive impact on 
institutional deliveries only among the better off women, but the positive effect of 
PBF on the probability of a child being fully immunized was observed particularly 
among the poorest (Bonfrer, Van de Poel, and Van Doorslaer 2014). Building on the 
evidence from HIC and LIC, Chapter 4 will contribute to the debate on the impact of 
performance incentives on equitable access to care in LIC. As PBF is increasingly 
implemented in LIC and the evidence base remains thin, the evidence presented in 
Chapter 4 will benefit other countries. 
Health systems must be responsive to patients’ needs to reduce the damage to 
dignity and autonomy and ensure patients’ satisfaction with their interaction with 
the health system. Patients’ satisfaction is an important aspect of quality of care 
assessment (Donabedian 1988). Knowing how performance incentives affect 
patients’ satisfaction is thus central to the efficiency analysis. The integration of 
responsiveness opposes high and low income countries. HIC have extensive 
experience with patient satisfaction surveys. Overtime, measuring patients’ 
satisfaction with healthcare has become a regular process that P4P schemes have 
internalized and utilize for calculating rewards (Peterson et al. 2006). Satisfaction 
with P4P schemes is however expressed from the providers’ perspective in the 
literature, rather than from the patients’ perspective (Greene and Nash 2009). In 
low income countries, measuring patients’ satisfaction is not common and quality is 
mainly measured from a clinical perspective. PBF schemes in LIC generally do not 
tie performance incentives to patient satisfaction. Witter et al. (2012) report some 
evidence showing that patients’ perception of the quality of care with PBF is mixed: 
there was no effect on satisfaction in Tanzania; satisfaction improved in the 
Philippines and Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) but worsened in Burundi and 
Zambia. The evidence on the impact of PBF on the quality of care and on patient 
satisfaction in LIC is scarce. Chapter 3 proposes to use the patients’ perspective to 
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measure the quality of care of providers receiving financial incentives as well as 
their responsiveness to patient needs. This will contribute in closing a gap in the 
knowledge by bringing some elements on the quality of care under PBF schemes in 
LIC. It is also interesting, from a methodological point of view, as it uses the patients’ 
perspectives rather than clinical indicators to measure quality. 
1.4. DECENTRALIZATION REFORMS 
1.4.1. DEFINITION 
The term “decentralization” is a general term and different forms of 
decentralizations have been developed with varying implementation arrangements.  
Overall, decentralization relates to the transfer of authority and responsibility for 
public functions from central government to the local level. Political 
decentralization aims to give more power in public decision-making to the lower 
levels of the state. It is assumed that decisions taken locally will better respond to 
needs and interests of the population. Administrative decentralization aims to 
delegate responsibility and financial resources for the provision of public services to 
lower levels of government. Three major forms of administrative decentralization 
exist. ‘Deconcentration’ is usually chosen in unitary states as responsibilities remain 
with central government and the local level remains under the supervision of the 
central level. With ‘delegation’, semi-autonomous organizations receive a transfer of 
responsibility from the central government. Finally, ‘devolution’ is the most 
advanced form of decentralization with central government transferring authorities 
to quasi-autonomous units. The latter can elect their own representatives, raise 
their own revenues and use resources according to their own decisions. Fiscal 
decentralization is a major component of decentralization as local entities must 
have adequate revenues to exert their new responsibilities. Fiscal decentralization 
can take many forms, including self-financing, co-financing, expansion of local 
revenues, intergovernmental transfers or borrowing (World Bank).  
The economic argument in favor of decentralization is based on two assumptions: 
decentralization increases economic efficiency as local governments will deliver 
better public services; population mobility and competition at the local level will 
ensure that optimal services are delivered (Oates 1999). However, some dangers 
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are also associated with decentralization. Prud'homme (1995) highlights several of 
the potential pitfalls of decentralization: first, it can increase disparities as the 
reform can adversely affect income inequalities as well as regional disparities by 
generating destructive competition between entities; second, decentralization can 
jeopardize stability as it makes monetary and fiscal policies, two main instruments 
of macroeconomic policy, difficult to implement; and third, decentralization can 
undermine efficiency as local governments will have different tastes and require 
differential treatment. Further, if corruption is more widespread at the local than at 
the national level, decentralization will increase the level of grassroots corruption. 
1.4.2. IMPACT OF THE REFORM 
Over recent decades, most high-income countries have adopted some degree of 
fiscal decentralization and have converged to an intermediate level implying that 
extreme decentralization and extreme centralization both hamper economic 
growth. A long-run analysis of fiscal decentralization in HIC revealed that it is 
positively associated with per capita economic growth, capital formation and total 
factor productivity growth up to a certain level (Thiessen 2003). However, using 
data on 46 countries over a 20-year period, Davoodi and Zou (1998) found a 
negative relationship between fiscal decentralization and economic growth in LIC 
but not in HIC.  
Decentralization has been promoted in developing countries as a way of increasing 
efficiency in the use of health sector resources. Decentralization was initially 
conceived as an administrative reform to raise efficiency and quality of services. 
More recently, advocates of the reform see it as a way to promote democracy and 
strengthen accountability mechanisms and therefore to ensure better quality 
services to the populations (Bossert 1998). Evidence from Colombia and Chile 
suggests that decentralization can improve equity of resource allocation. In 
Colombia and Chile, Bossert et al. (2003) found that local per capita financial 
allocations were equitable. Increased funding was also associated with increased 
utilization and could thus reduce inequalities in access to services. However the 
evidence base remains thin, although most countries, in particular in LIC, have 
embarked on decentralization reforms. Chapter 5 aims to generate some evidence 
on the impact of decentralization on regional inequalities and access to basic health 
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services. This will complement the analysis on the impact of PBF on equity by 
examining the joint effect of decentralization and PBF on the reduction of 
inequalities.  
1.5. JUSTIFICATION OF THE THESIS 
1.5.1. EXPLORING HEALTHCARE PROVIDERS’ MOTIVATION 
Human resource management strategies are key in improving an organization’s 
performance (Huselid 1995, Mabey, Salaman, and Storey 1998). The human 
resource system is made of inputs, throughputs and outputs. Inputs are resources 
required for production, i.e. human resources (employees’ knowledge, skills and 
abilities); they are transformed in the system by the throughput process (human 
resource behavior); and, the resulting outputs include productivity, job satisfaction, 
turnover and absence (Wright and Snell 1991, Wright and McMahan 1992). To 
achieve expected outputs, human resource management strategies must therefore 
focus on competence management (inputs) as well as on behaviors (throughputs) 
by encouraging certain behaviors and eliciting others (Wright and Snell 1991). In 
other words, human resource management strategies should aim to attract, develop, 
motivate and retain human resources (Jackson and Schuler 1999). 
By its focus on performance incentives, this thesis contributes in answering a 
broadly-encompassing question: ‘how can we motivate healthcare providers?’ It 
explores how performance-based financing, as a human resource management 
strategy, succeeds in improving inputs, throughputs and outputs of the human 
resource system. Indeed, the strategy has the potential to influence all steps in the 
production process: first, evidence suggests that PBF can improve the supply of 
healthcare providers (inputs) both quantitatively and qualitatively; second, by 
essence, the strategy aims to align behaviors to set objectives (throughputs) with 
extrinsic motivation; and finally, the overarching objective of PBF is to raise health 
workforce productivity (outputs). By looking into different aspects of healthcare 
providers’ motivations including its determinants, the mechanisms through which 
motivation generates expected results and how tangible rewards affect other 
motivations doctors have, this thesis contributes to knowledge on human resource 
management strategies and health workforce motivation in LIC.  
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1.5.2. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
The conceptual framework presented in Figure 1-2 describes the underlying 
assumption for performance incentives and how they are expected to impact on 
various components of service delivery performance. This conceptual framework 
guides the selection of hypothesis to be tested, the definition of research questions 
and provides a context for interpretation.  
Figure 1-2: Conceptual framework 
 
Source: author (2015) 
This conceptual framework reflects the rationale of the human resource 
management strategy underpinning performance-based financing as presented in 
section 1.5.2. PBF is a strategy aiming at improving inputs, throughputs and outputs 
in the production process of health care services. The end result on service delivery 
performance, which can lead to more efficient, accessible and responsive health 
systems also depends on surrounding factors and accompanying strategies.  
Service delivery performance primarily depends on inputs, throughputs and outputs 
delivered by the health system. As these aspects are directly targeted by the PBF 
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strategy, one can expect a positive impact on productivity. Service delivery 
performance will also depend on patients’ control over healthcare services and thus 
on staff responsiveness to patients’ needs. Finally, it will depend on the presence or 
not of equity considerations in the PBF scheme, and of other strategies such as 
health insurance. The more responsive and equitable healthcare services will be, the 
more performing service delivery will be. Deterred equity or poor responsiveness to 
patients’ needs would generate suboptimal performance in services delivery.  
1.5.3. GENERATING EVIDENCE ON PERFORMANCE INCENTIVES IN LIC 
The review of the evidence on performance incentives in high and low income 
countries revealed five important findings. First, the strength of the evidence is 
weak. Most experiences of P4P in high income countries operate on a small scale 
and details of implementation vary significantly. Although the literature on P4P is 
abundant and many systematic reviews exist, the evidence on its impact is minor, as 
controlled evaluations are rare and findings are sometimes inconsistent (Khanduja, 
Scales, and Adhikari 2009). In low income countries, where there are only a handful 
of evaluations, the strength of the evidence is even poorer and results from only one 
randomized control trial in Rwanda are reported in the literature (Witter et al. 
2012). Second, most evidence relates to high income countries for which the 
objectives of performance incentives differ from those of low income countries. The 
differences in contexts hamper the replication, thus the generalization, of findings 
from one setting to another. Third, most evidence focuses on the impact of 
performance incentives on efficiency. Evidence from high income countries (Greene 
and Nash 2009, Dudley et al. 2004) and low income countries (Witter et al. 2012, 
Gorter, Por, and Meessen 2013) reveals mostly positive results in terms of quality, 
efficiency and patient outcomes. Fourth, the evidence on the impact of P4P and PBF 
on the quality of outputs produced (efficiency) mostly uses clinical measures. 
Patients’ satisfaction and health workforce responsiveness are seldom assessed and 
no conclusion can be drawn on the effect of performance incentives on the 
perception held by end users. Fifth, the evidence-base on performance incentives’ 
perverse effect on equity is weak. Few studies suggest that P4P may induce perverse 
incentives that exacerbate inequalities in access to healthcare (Greene and Nash 
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2009), involve gaming strategies (Khanduja, Scales, and Adhikari 2009) or 
encourage adverse selection to avoid sicker patients (Karve et al. 2008).  
This thesis aims to address a gap in knowledge about performance incentives in low 
income countries by exploring the most unknown dimensions of performance-based 
financing. This is important and timely as this strategy is increasingly being used in 
LIC. In Africa alone, PBF is implemented in more than twenty countries. The 
evidence-base remains thin, however, in particular with regard to aspects unrelated 
to efficiency (i.e. access, clinical quality or resource use). Evidence on equity and 
responsiveness, which are important to measure health systems’ performance 
(World Health Organization 2000), is not conclusive and too limited to support 
policymakers.  
Welfare economic theory suggests that an efficient allocation of resources is one 
from which no one can be made to feel better-off without making another person 
feel worse (Pareto efficiency). Resources can be allocated in a variety of Pareto 
efficient ways, but no attention is paid to the allocation that is the most socially 
desirable (Hurley 2000, Reinhardt 1992, 1998). Indeed, it is assumed that the 
market will allocate health resources in the most efficient way and that politicians 
can ex-post redistribute benefits if the market allocation is not adequate (Arrow 
1963). This shows the tension between efficiency gains and equity considerations  
known as the ‘equity-efficiency trade-off’ in the literature (Okun 1975); however, 
this equity-efficiency trade-off is mostly theoretical.  
Although the reviewed literature suggests that performance incentives may 
generate trade-offs between performance dimensions, it is more theoretical than 
empirical as no study has yet attempted to evaluate the impact of PBF on efficiency, 
responsiveness and equity altogether. The thesis proposes to narrow the gap in 
knowledge on performance-based financing by addressing the following research 
question:  
Can performance-based financing raise productivity without hampering equity and 
responsiveness?   
Based on the above, this thesis seeks to test the following hypotheses: 
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a) With performance incentives, healthcare workers receive financial 
incentives to deliver more services. As the focus is primarily on quantitative 
indicators, this may lead to increased supply of services but poorer quality 
of care.  
b) Performance-based financing may not lead to increased demand among the 
poor and improved satisfaction with health services as the strategy focuses 
on suppliers of healthcare services. On the contrary, PBF may increase 
inequalities in access to incentivized services, as providers may focus on the 
easier to reach, that is to say - those who live closer to the facility and 
already visit it. Further, due to increased workload, responsiveness to 
patients’ needs may be overlooked by providers.  
c) Performance-based financing may have limited impact on reducing regional 
inequalities in access to care because the strategy was not developed for that 
purpose and interactions with the decentralization policy were not explicitly 
explored.  
d) The scale-up of health insurance in Rwanda and the fact that  the uptake of 
some basic health interventions is tracked by political leaders led to 
exceptional improvements in utilization of basic health services in Rwanda, 
including among the poor. The impact of PBF may thus be only marginal 
unless synergies exist between strategies.  
To address the broad research question and test the above hypotheses, the thesis 
investigates the impact of performance incentives on efficiency, focusing on the least 
documented aspects, as well as on equity. The proposed process to address this goal 
is summarized in Figure 1-3. This first chapter provides the theoretical justification 
for the thesis and highlights its contribution to current knowledge by identifying 
gaps in the literature. Part two explores the effect of PBF on efficiency, looking at 
aspects of efficiency that are not well documented. This is the case of systemic 
factors that drive productivity gains (Chapter 2) and of responsiveness that gives an 
indication of the efficient production of healthcare services from the patients’ 
perspective (Chapter 3). Part three explores the effect of PBF on equity, looking at 
two major equity dimensions: wealth related inequalities in access (Chapter 4) and 
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regional inequalities in access (Chapter 5). Chapter 6 draws conclusions from the 
four empirical chapters to answer the broad research question. Chapter 7 
formulates policy recommendations. 
Figure 1-3: Proposed process to answer the thesis’ research question 
 
1.6. RWANDA 
1.6.1. CASE STUDY 
Rwanda is chosen as the country case study for many reasons. First, it was the first 
country to implement performance-based financing on a national scale and that 
decided to rigorously evaluate the impact of the strategy using a robust impact 
evaluation design. It thus provides the opportunity to attribute PBF with differences 
observed between treatment and control groups. This stands for a major difference 
with other evaluations of performance incentives in high income and low income 
countries of poor research design, generating weak evidence. In LIC, there is 
therefore a growing interest for evidence on the impact of PBF in Rwanda and 
potential lessons learned. 
Second, as the Government of Rwanda have engaged in a series of structuring 
reforms over the past ten years, thus a case study on Rwanda enables an assessment 
of the effect of performance-based financing as well as its interactions with other 
Part 1: introduction 
Theoretical justification and 
contribution to knowledge 
Part 2: Efficiency 
1) Productivity 
2) Responsiveness/patients' 
satisfaction with quality 
Part 3: Equity 
1) Wealth related equity in access 
2) Regional equity in access 
Part 4: Conclusion 
Conclusions from the empirical 
chapters and policy 
recommandations 
Can performance-
based financing raise 
productivity without 
hampering equity and 
responsiveness?   
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reforms. The 1994 genocide and war devastated the country on all grounds. The 
unprecedented efforts deployed by policymakers, the donor community, 
communities and individuals to rebuild the country provided an opportunity to test 
and implement innovative strategies as all infrastructures and social constructs had 
to be rebuilt from scratch. During the reconstruction period, many saw Rwanda as a 
laboratory to test new ideas. The health sector was particularly rich in innovations 
including performance-based financing, health insurance and decentralization. 
Exploring synergies with health insurance, which stimulates the demand for health 
services, and with decentralization, which aims to raise efficiency in service 
delivery, can be of great interest to researchers and policymakers. 
Third, Rwanda is often cited as a success story on the African continent for its pace 
of reforms and results achieved. The Rwanda case study shows what can be 
achieved with strong enabling factors. External factors that contribute to good 
health system governance in Rwanda and the successful implementation of PBF 
include the country’s receptivity to change, decentralization, availability of financial 
resources, political will and state-society relationships (Brinkerhoff, Fort, and 
Stratton 2009). The synergy between PBF and CBHI and the autonomy of health 
centers which have the capacity to hire and fire personnel also ease the 
implementation of PBF (Basinga et al. 2011).  
Fourth, Rwanda is characterized by a strong performance-oriented culture that 
facilitates the implementation of PBF and production of quick results: there is great 
pressure, at all levels, to report on performance and reach targets. The Imihigo, a 
performance contract between the President of the Republic of Rwanda and Mayors 
of districts, tracks and publicly reports district performance related to service 
delivery. An Imihigo contains about 100 indicators, of which 15 are health 
indicators such as contraceptive prevalence rates, assisted deliveries at facilities, 
and, membership to community-based health insurance. Performance is reported 
quarterly and districts are ranked annually (Brinkerhoff, Fort, and Stratton 2009). 
District Mayors in turn sign performance contracts with health facilities to ensure 
the requirements of Imihigo are fulfilled. As a result of this performance 
environment, Rwanda has good quality information technology to collect and 
manage health information (Logie, Rowson, and Ndagije 2008). A major downside of 
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this performance-oriented culture and of the strong reporting mechanisms in place 
is that Rwanda is not a democratic regime. Rwanda is an authoritarian regime 
according to the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Index of Democracy.6 This index is 
based on five categories: electoral process and pluralism; civil liberties; functioning 
of government; political participation; and, political cultures (Economist intelligence 
unit 2008). The lack of civil liberties, political participation and political culture may 
influence individuals and communities’ behaviors.  It is an important factor to keep 
in mind when interpreting results of this thesis. In particular, the strong control and 
lack of liberty may influence healthcare providers’ attitude, including their 
performance and presence at work as studied in Chapter 2. Similarly, patients’ 
perception of the quality of care explored in Chapter 3 must be interpreted with 
caution. It is likely that the authoritarian environment prevents individuals from 
speaking the truth about public health services, despite the anonymous nature of 
the survey.   
Fifth, the relatively low level of corruption in Rwanda facilitates the successful 
implementation of reforms, including PBF. Rwanda ranked first among Central and 
Eastern African countries in the 2009 Transparency International Corruption 
Perceptions Index and tenth out of 47 Sub-Saharan African countries (Transparency 
International 2009). The World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators7 also show 
that Rwanda is performing better than the SSA average, except for voice and 
accountability8 (World Bank Institute 2010).  
  
                                                             
6 Out of four regime categories: full democracy; flawed democracy; hybrid regime 
and authoritarian regime 
7 These indicators provide a summary of six aggregate governance indicators: voice 
and accountability; political stability and lack of violence/terrorism; governance 
effectiveness; regulatory quality; rule of law; and, control of corruption. They show 
the percentile rank of Rwanda, i.e. the percentage of countries worldwide that rate 
below Rwanda (with a 90% confidence interval).  
8 Rwanda has a 13 percentile rank whereas the SSA average is 32.6 for voice and 
accountability. However, Rwanda stands as a particular case in the African context 
for all other indicators, with a 48.3 percentile rank in 2008 for government 
effectiveness (against 26.3 for SSA average) and a 59.4 percentile rank for the 
control of corruption (against 30.8% for the SSA average).  
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1.6.2. OVERVIEW OF THE COUNTRY 
Rwanda is a small landlocked African country. In 2012, there were 10.5 million 
inhabitants, a 2.4 million increase compared to 2002. Rwanda is a predominantly 
rural country with 83% of the population living in rural areas. Half the population is 
aged 18 or below. Rwanda has one of the highest population densities in the region 
with an average of 415 inhabitants per square kilometer, but the density varies from 
2,124 inhabitants/km2 in Nyarugenge (urban district) to 178 inhabitants/km2 in 
Kayonza (rural district) (Rwanda Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning and 
National Institute of Statistics of Rwanda 2014). 
The Republic of Rwanda has two layers of government (central and local). It is 
divided into 5 provinces, 30 districts, 416 sectors, 2,148 cells and 14,837 villages. 
The administrative organization is guided by the principle of subsidiarity. The 
central level formulates policies, regulations and provides support to local 
governments through capacity building, financing and monitoring and evaluation. 
The local levels implement government policies and deliver services. The province 
ensures that district development planning is aligned with national policies and 
programs and supervises districts. Districts are responsible for local economic 
development and planning as well as for coordinating service delivery. Sectors 
deliver services while cells are responsible for needs assessments, prioritization, 
and the mobilization of communities. The village is responsible for building 
cooperation, collaboration and solidarity among community members (Rwanda 
Ministry of Local Government and Social Affairs 2001, Rwanda Ministry of Local 
Government Good Governance Community Development and Social Affairs 2008). 
The district is the basic politico-administrative unit of Rwanda. All citizens living in 
a district are members of the District council which identifies, discusses and 
prioritizes problems and takes decisions for their resolution. The District Council 
elects the District Executive Committee which is in charge of administration and 
community development and is assisted by a technical committee (Rwanda Ministry 
of Local Government and Social Affairs 2001). One of the eight technical units in the 
district office deals with health, family promotion, and protection of children’s 
rights. 
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The Government of Rwanda adopted the National Decentralization Policy in May 
2000 to promote good governance, poverty reduction as well as efficient, effective 
and accountable delivery of services. The reform is implemented in three successive 
phases. The first phase between 2000 and 2005 aimed to establish democratic and 
community development structures and reinforced the core local government 
authority (district). The second phase (2006-2010) aimed to enhance effectiveness 
in service delivery to communities by increasing capacities at the lower levels of 
administration. More technically competent personnel and financial resources were 
made available at the district level to facilitate the implementation of fiscal 
decentralization. The third phase (2011-2015) aims to improve and sustain the 
achievements of the first two phases (Rwanda Ministry of Local Government and 
Social Affairs 2001, Rwanda Ministry of Local Government Good Governance 
Community Development and Social Affairs 2008). With fiscal decentralization 
(phase two) districts are responsible for coordinating lower administrative levels in 
the delivery of services to the population. Since 2006, the Ministry of Finance and 
Economic Planning transfers part of the health budget direct to the 30 districts.  
Despite recent improvements, poverty is a critical issue in Rwanda. Consumption 
poverty remained stable between 2000/01 (58.9%) and 2005/06 (56.7%) but 
decreased in 2010/11 (44.9%). National averages hide regional disparities as the 
drop in 2010/11 was indeed driven by Northern and Western provinces. Extreme 
poverty fell from 40% in 2000/01 to 35.8% in 2005/06 and 24.1% in 2010/11 with 
the Northern Province experiencing the largest gains. Poverty rates vary largely 
from one district to another with the more rural and remote districts having the 
highest poverty rates. In 2005/06, district poverty rates ranged from 10% to 85%; 
in 2010/11 they ranged from 8.3% to 73% and poverty declined in only 13 out of 30 
districts (National Institute of Statistics of Rwanda 2012). 
Rwanda has achieved tremendous progress in health since 1994.  More than 97% of 
Rwandan infants are now vaccinated against ten different diseases , 69% of women 
deliver their babies in a health facility, and deaths caused by HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis 
and malaria have significantly fallen (Binagwaho et al. 2014). Increases in the health 
workforce and their skill-sets, performance-based financing, health insurance, and 
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better leadership and governance has led to impressive results in service use. Births 
attended by skilled personal rose by 77% between 2006 and 2010 compared to 
26% between 2000 and 2005. Similarly, contraceptive prevalence rose by 351% 
against 150% over the same time period (Bucagu et al. 2012).  Rapid increases in 
use of essential maternal and child health services resulted in significant progress in 
health outcomes. The infant and under-five mortality rates fell drastically from 121 
per 1,000 to 50 per 1,000 and from 217 per 1,000 to 76 per 1,000 respectively 
between 2000 and 2010. The maternal mortality ratio also decreased, although not 
significantly, from 1,071 maternal deaths per 100,000 live births in 2000 to 750 in 
2005. The use of modern contraceptives rose from 10.3% in 2005 to 45.1% in 2010 
and the percentage of children taken to healthcare providers in the event of 
diarrhea rose from 14.1% to 37.2% over the same period (National Institute of 
Statistics of Rwanda 2006, 2009, 2001).  
1.6.3. HEALTH SYSTEM 
From the second half of the twentieth century until 1994, Rwanda had a strong 
centralized healthcare system. Health services were theoretically provided free of 
charge. The civil war and 1994 genocide, which resulted in one million deaths, left 
the country with devastated political and social structures and very poor service 
delivery capacity. More than 80% of health personnel were killed or fled. 
Immediately after the genocide, Rwanda began rebuilding its primary healthcare 
system and human resources for health. 
Following the Alma Ata declaration, Rwanda adopted a primary healthcare policy 
aiming to develop primary healthcare services for the population. In March 2005, 
the Government of Rwanda adopted the Health Sector Policy (2005) and Health 
Sector Strategic Plan (2005-2009) which focused on ensuring the availability of 
human resources for health; ensuring the availability of quality medicine, vaccines, 
and others medical supplies; and, providing affordable care and services.  
There is at least one hospital (district hospital) and several primary healthcare 
facilities (health centers) per district. District hospitals are the first referral level 
and treat patients referred by the primary healthcare facilities. The 2007 service 
provision assessment survey showed significant variations between districts about 
54 
 
district hospital capacities and the population covered by a district hospital varied 
from 70,000 to 480,000 people. Health centers are responsible for providing 
primary healthcare that includes complete and integrated services. These 
encompass curative, preventive, promotional and rehabilitative services. In 2007, 
85% of the population lived within one and a half hours of a health center (National 
Institute of Statistics of Rwanda, Ministry of Health of Rwanda, and Macro 
International Inc 2008). 
1.6.4. HEALTH REFORMS 
As in many SSA countries, the delivery of healthcare services in Rwanda suffers 
from large inefficiencies such as the scarcity and misuse of financial and human 
resources that make it difficult to address health problems, in particular those of the 
poor.   
Three major health financing reforms, namely health insurance, fiscal 
decentralization and performance-based financing, have been implemented over the 
past 10 years in Rwanda with a significant impact on the supply and demand for 
healthcare (Sekabaraga, Diop, and Soucat 2011). In 1998, user fees were 
reintroduced, thus increasing the financial barriers to health services. Since 1999, 
community-based health insurance schemes have been piloted. The 2005 national 
health insurance policy made health insurance compulsory to all citizens and 
resulted in better financial protection. The coverage increased from 7% of the target 
population in 2003 to 85% in 2008 (Rwanda Ministry of Health 2009).  
Since salaries were low, healthcare workers were not motivated to take on 
additional work resulting from increased demand (Rusa et al. 2009, Kalk et al. 2005, 
Logie, Rowson, and Ndagije 2008). Three PBF pilot schemes were thus run between 
2001 and 2005 to motivate health staff to produce increased and better services. 
These schemes resulted in increased use of services, greater staff motivation and 
higher productivity. The impact on equity remains unclear (Rusa et al. 2009, Rusa 
and Fritsche 2007, Musango et al. 2007, Soeters, Habineza, and Peerenboom 2006, 
Meessen, Kashala, and Musango 2007).  
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1.6.5. PERFORMANCE-BASED FINANCING NATIONAL MODEL 
In 2006, the Ministry of Health (MoH) decided to scale-up PBF nationally in all 
primary healthcare facilities and the scale-up plan included a rigorous impact 
evaluation. The design of the national model is extensively described by Basinga et 
al. (2011). This section reports the main features they present in the Lancet.  
Performance payments in the Rwandan national model are based on the quantity of 
outputs achieved conditional on quality. Outputs produced are measured every 
month and quality of care is measured quarterly. Health workers can increase their 
earnings in different ways: by increasing the quantity of outputs; by increasing the 
quality of services; or by increasing both. Earnings are the highest when both 
quantity and quality increase. The formula used for payment is: 
,* it
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where Pj is the payment per output unit j (for instance delivery in the facility), Ujit is 
the number of patients receiving output j in facility i in period t, and Qjt is the quality 
index of facility i in period t bounded between 0 and 1. Therefore, if the quality 
index is equal to one, the health center receives the maximum possible bonus; in 
contrast, if the quality index is less than one, PBF payments are discounted for all 
services. PBF is applied to 14 maternal and child health output indicators (Ujit).  
Table 1-6 presents these indicators with their associated payment rate.  
Table 1-6: Output indicators and unit payment for PBF formula 
Output indicators Amount Paid per 
unit (US$) 
Visit indicators: number of… 
1 Curative care visits (new visits) 0.18 
2 First prenatal care visits 0.09 
3 Women who completed 4 prenatal care visits 0.37 
4 First time family planning visits (new contraceptive 
users) 
1.83 
5 Contraceptive resupply visits 0.18 
6 Deliveries in the facility 4.59 
7 Growth monitoring visits 0.18 
Content of care indicators: number of… 
8 Women who received tetanus vaccine during prenatal 0.46 
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Output indicators Amount Paid per 
unit (US$) 
care (2nd to 5th dose) 
9 Women who received 2nd dose of malaria prophylaxis 
during prenatal care 
0.46 
10 At-risk pregnancies referred during prenatal care to 
hospital for delivery 
1.83 
11 Emergency transfers to hospital for obstetric care 
during delivery 
4.59 
12 Children who completed vaccinations on time 0.92 
13 Malnourished children referred for treatment during 
preventive care visits 
1.83 
14 Other emergency referrals 1.83 
Source: Basinga et al. (2011) 
At the health center level, quality is assessed by a complex instrument that 
measures quality across 13 characteristics. The quality index captures structural 
and process measures of quality from the Rwandan preventive and clinical practice 
guidelines. Structural measures of quality are concerned with the availability of 
equipment, drugs, medical supplies and personnel in the facility that are required to 
deliver a given service. Process measures assess the clinical content of care. The 
formula for the quality index is: 
kit
k
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whereSkit is the share of indicators for service k that are met by facility i in period t, 
and ωk is the weight for service k. The weights (Table 1-7) add up to one which 
means that a facility with perfect structural and process quality will have an overall 
quality index of one. The shares of structural and process indicators are those 
recommended in the Rwandan clinical practice guidelines. 
Table 1-7: Services and weights used for the quality score 
 Service Weight Weight for 
structural 
components 
Weight for 
process 
component 
1 General administration 0.052 1.00 0.00 
2 Cleanliness 0.028 1.00 0.00 
3 Curative care 0.170 0.23 0.77 
4 Delivery 1.130 0.40 0.60 
5 Prenatal care 0.126 0.12 0.88 
6 Family planning 0.114 0.22 0.78 
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 Service Weight Weight for 
structural 
components 
Weight for 
process 
component 
7 Immunization 0.070 0.40 0.60 
8 Growth monitoring 0.052 0.15 0.85 
9 HIV services 0.090 1.00 0.00 
10 TB services 0.028 0.28 0.72 
11 Laboratory 0.030 1.00 0.00 
12 Pharmacy management 0.060 1.00 0.00 
13 Financial management 0.050 1.00 0.00 
          Total 1.000   
Source: Basinga et al. (2011) 
Evidence was already published on the positive impact of the national PBF model on 
the quality and quantity of maternal health services (Basinga et al. 2010, 2011). It 
shows that the incentive mechanism increased the probability of institutional 
delivery by 7.3%, of getting women to take the tetanus vaccination during their 
prenatal visit and had a positive effect on quality of care (competency of healthcare 
providers). The evidence also reports that the probability that a child visits a health 
facility for preventive care increases with PBF. However, there is no impact on the 
probability of a woman receiving prenatal care. 
1.7. DATA 
1.7.1. OVERVIEW OF RANDOMIZED CONTROL TRIALS 
There are five main methods for evaluating a health intervention, which are, from 
the less rigorous to the most rigorous: descriptive evaluation, audit, before-after, 
comparative-experimentalist and randomized controlled experiment (Ovretveit 
1998). Their objectives, strengths and weaknesses are presented in Table 1-8.  
Table 1-8: Presentation of methods to evaluate health interventions 
Type of evaluation Purpose Strengths Weaknesses 
Descriptive Describe 
intervention and 
its environment. 
Easy. Can clarify 
objectives and 
identify problems. 
Unscientific and 
biased. Does not 
evaluate 
efficiency. 
Audit Compare results 
of the 
intervention and 
expected 
outcomes. 
Easy. Can help 
understand 
reasons of success 
or failure. 
Does not 
evaluate 
efficiency. 
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Type of evaluation Purpose Strengths Weaknesses 
Before-After Judge value of 
intervention by 
comparing 
situation before 
and after. 
Can be done 
rapidly and on a 
small scale.  
Outcomes may 
be due to factors 
other than the 
intervention. 
Comparative-
experimentalist 
Compare before 
and after 
outcomes of two 
groups with 
different 
interventions. 
Shows the most 
effective 
intervention.  
Expensive. 
Difficult to 
prove that 
outcomes are 
only caused by 
the 
intervention.  
Randomized 
controlled 
experimental 
Compare 2 groups 
that are similar in 
all respects except 
that only one 
receives an 
intervention.  
Groups randomly 
assigned. No 
confounding 
factors. High 
scientific 
credibility. 
Expensive, time-
consuming, 
requires 
expertise.  
Source: Adapted from Ovretveit (1998).  
Comparing the same individuals before and after the intervention or enrolled and 
not enrolled individuals, leads to false counterfactuals as other factors may have 
been involved over time in the first case, and there is a selection bias in the second 
case. These weaknesses highlight the importance of a random assignment to 
treatment or control groups. The objective of randomized controlled experiments is 
to estimate the causal effect, or impact (thus referring to impact evaluation) of an 
intervention on an outcome, such as the impact of PBF on the utilization of maternal 
health services. The impact corresponds to the observed outcome with the 
treatment or intervention minus the estimated outcome in the counterfactual, which 
is used as a comparison or control.  
Randomized controlled experiments present many advantages over other types of 
evaluations: the intervention and surrounding conditions are specified and 
controlled; the intervention (treatment) is compared to a ‘placebo’ (control); the 
randomization reduces bias; and, the results are objective and measurable 
(Ovretveit 1998). This type of impact evaluation produces a counterfactual that 
shows what would have happened in the absence of a program (e.g. in the absence 
of PBF). A randomized controlled experiment was used to evaluate performance 
incentives in Cambodia (Bloom et al. 2007); however, the evaluation had limitations 
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as contracted districts received more resources than controlled districts; it had a 
small sample size; and, there were randomization issues.  
1.7.2. DESIGN 
This empirical work relies on data from the impact evaluation of the national PBF 
model in Rwanda. It is the first randomized experiment used to rigorously assess 
the impact of this strategy on a national scale. It took advantage of the phased 
implementation of PBF over a 23-month period between 2006 and 2008. The 19 
rural districts that did not implement a PBF pilot before 2006 were paired and 
randomly assigned to treatment (12 dark-shaded districts) or control groups (7 
light-shaded districts). The remaining 11 districts (white-shaded) that already 
piloted PBF were excluded from the impact evaluation (Figure 1-4). As the three 
urban districts of the country were not included, the study focuses on rural districts 
only.    
Figure 1-4: Rwanda: Allocation of districts to treatment and control groups 
 
Source: Author (2015). 
The impact evaluation was designed as a randomized controlled experiment. 
However, because of the decentralization reform that occurred during the impact 
evaluation, some health centers that were in the control group had to be reassigned 
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to the treatment group. The evaluation therefore shifted to a quasi-experimental 
status but the descriptive analysis of baseline and follow-up surveys shows balance 
between treatment and control areas (Basinga et al. 2011). In addition, contrary to 
what was done in other countries such as Cambodia, budgets of control facilities 
were increased by the average PBF payment to treatment facilities. Therefore, 
differences observed between the two groups at the end of the treatment period can 
be attributed to PBF alone.  
1.7.3. SAMPLING 
The evaluation took advantage of the phased implementation of PBF over a 23-
month period between 2006 and 2008, and consisted of the 12 treatment districts 
and 7 comparison districts with a total of 166 facilities and 2,145 households in the 
catchment area of those facilities. Districts were mapped and overlaid with 
information on relief, rainfall and population density. Using these characteristics, 
areas of the country without PBF before 2006 were paired. A coin was then flipped 
to determine districts assigned to treatment or control groups. 
1.7.4. SURVEYS 
The database contains baseline and follow-up rounds of health facility and 
household data collected in 2006 and 2008. The healthcare facility survey includes: 
a module on available services and pricing; an equipment module; a human 
resources module focusing on skills, experience and motivation; a set of vignettes to 
measure the practical knowledge of providers; and, an exit interview to assess the 
perceived quality of services. The household survey was administered to a sample of 
households and measured the basic socio-demographic characteristics of the 
population, its health status and utilization of health services.  
1.7.5. ETHICS 
The Research Ethics Commission at the Rwandan Ministry of Health validated the 
PBF evaluation plan and design. In addition, in both rounds of the evaluation, 
respondents who agreed to participate in the survey were asked to sign an informed 
consent declaration.  
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1.7.6. RELATIONSHIP TO THE DATA 
This thesis relies on secondary data analysis. The author was not involved in the 
study design or in data collection. The raw data is in the public domain and the 
author had to clean and reshape the datasets to perform analyses presented in this 
thesis.  
1.7.7. VARIABLES OF INTEREST 
As illustrated in Table 1-6, PBF in Rwanda placed emphasis on maternal and child 
health services, as utilization of those services can significantly reduce maternal and 
child mortality. The largest financial reward was associated with institutional 
deliveries to ensure women deliver at health centers rather than at home with a 
traditional birth attendant. Institutional deliveries reduce the risk of maternal 
mortality and facilitate referral to a hospital in case of complications. The second 
most incentivized service was family planning as the Government of Rwanda aimed 
to lower fertility to reduce maternal and infant mortality and address the unmet 
need for modern contraceptive. Preventive care services were also rewarded to 
avoid complications during pregnancy (i.e. completion of four prenatal care visits 
and tetanus vaccine during prenatal care) and protect children from ill-health (i.e. 
immunization and growth monitoring).  
The thesis logically focuses on the impact of PBF on maternal and child health 
services including:  
• Institutional deliveries: the variable takes the value 1 if pregnant women 
aged 15-49 delivered at health center and 0 otherwise; 
• Family planning: the variable takes the value 1 if married women use 
modern contraceptives and 0 otherwise; 
• Four or more prenatal care visits: the variable takes the value 1 if a woman 
had at least four prenatal care visits during her last pregnancy (last two 
years) and 0 otherwise; 
• Preventive care for children under 5: the variable takes the value 1 if 
children visited a health center for preventive care in the four weeks 
preceding the survey and 0 otherwise; 
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• Curative care for children under 5: the variable takes the value 1 if children 
visited a health center for curative care in the event of an illness during the 
four weeks preceding the survey and 0 otherwise.  
For most analyses, control variables include individual characteristics (sex, age, 
education attainment and marital status), household characteristics (size, number of 
children, wealth and health insurance status) and facility characteristics (public or 
faith-based). Further details on dependent and independent variables are provided 
in subsequent chapters.  
1.8. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS 
Can performance-based financing raise productivity without hampering 
equity and responsiveness? 
To address this broad research question, this thesis successively looks at the impact 
of PBF on efficiency (Part 2) and equity (Part 3). This section briefly outlines the 
sub-research questions addressed by the four empirical chapters, gaps in literature 
and how the chapter contributes in addressing the broad research question. 
Individual introductions, backgrounds, methods, results, discussions and 
conclusions are provided in the chapters. 
1.8.1. CHAPTER 2: PBF AND PRODUCTIVITY 
Efficiency gains are the main outcome expected from PBF and efficiency is one of the 
key dimensions of health sector performance. The evidence from high income and 
low income countries is rather unanimous on the positive effect of performance 
incentives on health workers’ productivity and see it as a mechanical effect resulting 
from extrinsic motivation generated by financial rewards. However, little is known 
on the structural factors driving productivity gains and on the way health facilities 
and healthcare providers adapt their behavior to maximize their gains. Chapter 2 
thus aims to address the following research questions:  
a) Does PBF improve the availability of healthcare providers in primary 
healthcare facilities?  
b) Are staff that are rewarded for their performance absent less?  
c) How does PBF affect workforce productivity?  
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This chapter identifies systemic factors that drive higher productivity in PBF 
schemes. It provides evidence on productivity gains in Rwanda and on efficiency 
gains achieved due to improved management of human resources.  
1.8.2. CHAPTER 3: PBF AND RESPONSIVENESS 
Assessing the impact of performance incentives on efficiency entails measuring its 
impact on quality of care. The literature review showed that clinical measures on 
processes of care are the most largely used measures and little to no evidence exists 
on patients’ perception of the quality of care under performance incentive schemes. 
Contrary to HIC, patients’ satisfaction is not even used to calculate the rewards in 
LIC.   
There is a risk that higher productivity will be at the expense of patients. 
Responsiveness to their needs, respect for dignity and autonomy can be hampered if 
providers, in their search for productivity, have no incentive to take them into 
account when delivering services. Chapter 3 aims to address the following research 
questions:  
a) Are patients satisfied with services delivered at primary healthcare 
facilities? 
b) What is the impact of PBF on satisfaction with clinical content of care?  
c) What is the impact of PBF on satisfaction with non-clinical aspects of 
services?  
To address those questions, Chapter 3 uses the unusual perspective of the patients’ 
viewpoint to assess the effect of PBF on healthcare services.  
1.8.3. CHAPTER 4: PBF AND EQUITY IN ACCESS TO SERVICES 
As reported in the literature review, the effect of PBF on equity is not well 
documented and what evidence there is, is mixed. However, the risk that PBF will 
hamper equity in access stands for a major potential negative side effect of the 
strategy. This is supported by welfare economics theory that suggests that greater 
efficiency in healthcare may not translate to greater social welfare and thus, 
policymakers should be concerned, not only with the health policy being on the 
Pareto frontier, but also in which way it should move from this frontier (Reinhardt 
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1992, 1998, Lindholm, Rosen, and Emmelin 1996). Chapter 4 aims to assess 
whether efficiency gains presented in Chapter 2 and 3 were achieved at the expense 
of equity in accessing basic health services, in particular for the poor who are the 
most in need for primary healthcare services. Specifically, Chapter 4 addresses the 
following research questions:  
a) Does PBF exert a differential impact on income subgroups of populations 
defined by their wealth status?  
b) How does PBF interact with other health financing strategies, such as health 
insurance? 
Chapter 4 aims to answer these questions by comparing increases in access to key 
maternal and health services according to household wealth status.  
1.8.4. CHAPTER 5: PBF AND SPATIAL DISPARITIES 
In addition to wealth related inequalities, low income countries are characterized by 
large regional disparities. In the past decade, significant effort has been made to 
reduce regional disparities in access to, and utilization of, basic health services, in 
particular through decentralization. Decentralization aims to improve efficiency in 
the use of resources and to narrow inequalities between regions by stimulating 
competition between regions and bringing decisions and resources closer to the end 
users.  
Decentralization and performance-based financing thus share common objectives. 
In that context, it is important to investigate whether PBF has an impact on regional 
inequalities as well as how PBF and decentralization interact. Chapter 5 aims to 
address the following research questions:  
a) How do spatial disparities change overtime? 
b) What is the source of spatial variability in the utilization of basic health 
services? 
c)  What is the contribution of contextual factors to spatial disparities? 
Chapter 5 will explore synergies between those two strategies to see whether they 
are mutually reinforcing and explore their effect on equity at the regional level.  
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PART 2: EFFICIENCY 
 
2. FINANCIAL INCENTIVES, HEALTH WORKFORCE 
AVAILABILITY, PRESENCE AT WORK AND 
PRODUCTIVITY: EVIDENCE FROM AN IMPACT 
EVALUATION IN RWANDA  
ABSTRACT 
Of the different inputs involved in the production function for healthcare, human 
resources are the most important. Most countries are confronted with human 
resource shortages, skill mix imbalances, uneven distribution, inadequate work 
environment and weak knowledge base. This represents a major challenge as health 
systems’ performance is directly linked to the availability and quality of the 
workforce. According to the World Health Organization (WHO), health workforce 
performance encompasses four dimensions: availability (distribution and 
attendance), competence (technical knowledge, skills and behaviors), 
responsiveness, as well as productivity (World Health Organization 2006). 
Performance-based financing is increasingly implemented in African countries 
under the basic assumption that financial incentives motivate health facilities and 
their staff to increase productivity. This chapter examines the impact of PBF on 
health workforce availability, presence at work and productivity and how these 
different elements interact using data from a randomized control trial evaluating the 
impact of PBF in Rwanda. This chapter focuses on availability, through assessing the 
impact of PBF on the change in the number of healthcare providers and on 
absenteeism, as well as on the impact of PBF on productivity through outputs 
produced by staff. 
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Consistently with predictions, results show that PBF improves productivity of the 
health workforce. However, the novelty of results lies in the driver of productivity 
gains: they do not come from staff expansion, but rather from cutting absenteeism 
and putting a higher workload on staff. Results suggest that productivity gains can 
be achieved through improved supervision and rewarding systems, but this can be 
at the expense of a relaxed working environment.  
This study illustrates the potential pitfalls of PBF. PBF, as a financial incentive, above 
all speaks to the extrinsic motivation of healthcare workers. Mechanisms should be 
put in place in parallel to ensure greater job satisfaction and working conditions, 
which are critical determinants of intrinsic motivation. According to the literature, 
this could include training opportunities, career advancement, recognition from the 
community and a better work environment. Also, individual incentives (as opposed 
to those targeting the health facility as in Rwanda) may be more effective in 
stimulating the productivity of staff. Results suggest that PBF should be adapted to 
the behavioral expectations of each country. 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
Of the different inputs involved in the production function for healthcare, human 
resources are at the core of health systems’ performance (Zurn et al. 2004, Chen et 
al. 2004, Serneels et al. 2007, World Health Organization 2000). Given the important 
information asymmetries between providers and consumers of healthcare, health 
workers’ availability and motivation need to be acted upon.  
It is not uncommon for LIC to be confronted with staff shortages, skill mix 
imbalances, uneven distribution and inadequate work environments (Chen et al. 
2004). This represents a major challenge as health systems’ performance is directly 
linked to the availability and quality of the health workforce: evidence shows that 
maternal, infant and under-five mortality rates decrease as the density of human 
resources for healthcare rises (Anand and Barnighausen 2004); indeed, achieving 
80% coverage of measles immunization and of skilled attendants at births is more 
likely when the density of health workers exceeds 2.5 workers per 1000 individuals 
(Chen et al. 2004).  
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Well-designed incentives can help in improving the production of healthcare by 
better management of inputs (Filmer, Hammer, and Pritchett 2000). This article 
aims to explore whether performance-based financing can help improve the 
management of human resources and ultimately increase productivity. PBF is 
increasingly implemented in African countries under the basic assumption that 
financial incentives motivate the health workforce to be more productive. By 
topping up health providers’ wages, PBF is expected to raise staff motivation, cut 
staff turnover and improve their availability (Meessen, Soucat, and Sekabaraga 
2011). However, PBF can lead to some unintended effects that undermine a health 
workforce’s productivity: it may crowd out intrinsic motivation and encourage 
gaming within the system (Ireland, Paul, and Dujardin 2011); it can also result in a 
drop in morale and undermine social relations and teamwork (Magrath and Nichter 
2012). Lastly, it may add to an already heavy load of paperwork, cut time spent with 
patients and deter workforce productivity (Magrath and Nichter 2012).  
This chapter uses data from the randomized control experiment in Rwanda to 
generate evidence on the impact of PBF on staff availability, presence at work and 
productivity, which are areas not well documented to date. Logie, Rowson, and 
Ndagije (2008) report on the lack of evidence on the impact of PBF on staff 
distribution and turnover. Similarly, evidence on its impact on absenteeism is scarce 
and non-conclusive (Pouliakas and Nikolaos 2009). The hypothesis of this chapter is 
that PBF improves productivity as health facilities will make better use of key 
inputs, in particular of human resources, to increase performance, and thus 
earnings. This should result in more staff working in the health facility to increase 
the volume of services delivered and in fewer staff being absent as they become 
more accountable and motivated.  
More specifically, this chapter addresses four research questions:  
a) Does PBF improve the availability of healthcare providers in primary 
healthcare facilities?  
b) Are staff that are rewarded for their performance less absent?  
c) How does PBF affect workforce productivity?  
d) What is the importance of specifications on coefficient estimates?  
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To address these questions, this article proposes a new conceptual framework 
(Figure 2-1) to understand the drivers of health workforce productivity and explore 
the links between availability, presence at work and productivity. The conceptual 
framework suggests that productivity is first determined by whether providers are 
available, second by whether they are present at work, and third by how productive 
present providers are. This multistep analysis allows for us to identify bottlenecks 
in productivity in the delivery of healthcare services. This framework also highlights 
the importance of intrinsic motivation to ensure adequate productivity: the larger 
the bottom of the pyramid, the more likely staff productivity will be satisfactory. A 
suboptimal level in one or more of the different components will negatively affect 
staff productivity.  
Figure 2-1: Conceptual framework 
 
Source: Author (2015). 
The chapter is organized as follows: a brief review of the literature on availability, 
presence at work and productivity of the health workforce as well as background 
information on human resources for health in Rwanda is first provided. Methods 
and results are then presented before a discussion of results and conclusions. 
2.2. BACKGROUND 
2.2.1. PRODUCTION FUNCTION 
Workforce productivity relates more broadly to what is referred to as the 
production function in economics. The production function relates physical output 
of a production process to factors of production as follows:  
𝑄 = 𝑓(𝑋1, 𝑋2, 𝑋3, … , 𝑋𝑛) 
Staff productive 
Staff at work 
Staff available 
Job satisfaction and motivation 
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where Q is the quantity of outputs and X1, X2, X3,… Xn are the quantities of factor 
inputs such as labor, capital, raw material… 
The most common form of the production function is the Cobb-Douglas production 
function which is:  
𝑌 = 𝐴𝐿𝛽𝐾𝛼 
where Y is the total production, L is labor, K is capital and A corresponds to total 
factor productivity. α and β are the elasticities of capital and labor. The above 
production function suggests that an increase in total factor productivity, capital or 
labor will lead to an increase in outputs (total production). Contrary to capital and 
labor which are tangible inputs, total factor productivity is not. It captures 
technology and human capital aspects such as knowledge and competences of the 
workforce (efficiency).  
2.2.2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
“A well-performing workforce is one that works in ways that are responsive, fair 
and efficient to achieve the best health outcomes possible, given available resources 
and circumstances” (World Health Organization 2006). Health workforce 
performance encompasses four dimensions: availability (distribution and 
attendance), competence (technical knowledge, skills and behaviors), 
responsiveness and productivity (World Health Organization 2006).  
Most low income countries are affected by shortages in the health workforce that 
affect the efficiency and effectiveness of the healthcare delivery system. The 
availability of health providers (through recruitment and retention) depends on job 
satisfaction in a broad sense, but evidence based on interventions that improve 
retention is limited (Lu, While, and Barriball 2005). Job satisfaction depends on 
working conditions, adequate resources and proper infrastructures; relationships 
with patients, co-workers and managers; the work; the workload; job security; pay; 
self-growth, praise and recognition; control and responsibility; leadership styles and 
organizational policies (Lu, While, and Barriball 2005, Griffeth, Hom, and Gaertner 
2000, Willis-Shattuck et al. 2008). On the opposite side, inadequate management, a 
70 
 
poor infrastructure and lack of resources are significant de-motivating factors 
(Willis-Shattuck et al. 2008). 
Poor performance of health workers is often associated with absenteeism defined as 
the failure to report for scheduled work. Absenteeism of health workers is 
considered a major issue in developing countries but the evidence is scant. Lewis 
(2006) reports health workers’ absenteeism rates around 35-40 % and in Uganda, 
37 % of health workers were absent (Chaudhury et al. 2006). Besides personal 
reasons, poor management, higher workload, unfavorable working conditions and 
inadequate salaries are determinants of absenteeism (Kiwanuka et al. 2011, Isah et 
al. 2008). In a Nigerian hospital, Isah et al. (2008) found that absenteeism was 
significantly associated with age, gender and being married. Stressed health 
workers; those unsatisfied with the working environment or job, were also more 
absent. In a study conducted across five countries, Chaudhury et al. (2006) found 
that higher-ranking and more powerful providers were absent more often than in 
lower-ranking cases. Absenteeism was also associated with gender and working 
conditions; little evidence was found where pay affected absence. In Lao PDR, 
extrinsic and intrinsic motivations affected health workers’ behavior (Yamada, 
Sawada, and Luo). Lastly, in the US, burnout was found to affect absenteeism 
(Parker and Kulik 1995).  
Absenteeism undermines service delivery and results in fewer outputs, 
underperformance, lowering patient access to services and poor quality. As a result, 
absenteeism constitutes as a barrier to better health outcomes (Chaudhury et al. 
2006). Goldstein et al. (2013) found that in Western Kenya, nurse absence on a 
female patient’s first visit significantly cuts the probability that the woman tests for 
HIV over her entire pregnancy and results in poorer child and maternal health. 
Another effect of absenteeism is higher workload for co-workers, thus increasing 
stress and job dissatisfaction (Kiwanuka et al. 2011). Absenteeism is also associated 
with high costs to governments as undeserved salaries are paid to workers, 
regardless of their presence (Chaudhury and Hammer 2003).  
Determinants of workforce productivity are numerous and their 
interconnectedness, complex. The review of evidence from low and middle income 
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countries by Rowe et al. (2005) suggests that interventions that improve motivation 
and job satisfaction as well as supervision and audit with feedback can improve staff 
performance. Knowledge, skills, motivation, job satisfaction, pay, experience, patient 
factors, attributes of the work as well as health facility, education, administration, 
work, community, sociocultural, economic and political environments are factors 
that can influence a health workforce’s performance. In Uganda, health workers’ 
productivity improved with the availability of drugs and equipment as well as with 
better management (Lutwama, Roos, and Dolamo 2012). In Ethiopia, the 
productivity of community health workers was determined by their work 
environment including workload, supportive supervision, supplies and equipment 
and respect from the community (Jaskiewicz and Tulenko 2012).  
2.2.3. HUMAN RESOURCES FOR HEALTH IN RWANDA 
In 2007 there were 0.03 doctors/1000 inhabitants and 0.48 nurses/1000 
inhabitants in Rwanda. The decentralization reform resulted in an almost doubling 
of the health workforce in public facilities between 2005 and 2008 (from a total of 
6,963 to 13,155), many of which were hired for rural facilities (Soucat, Scheffler, and 
Ghebreyesus 2013). Still, 75% of doctors and 60% of nurses work in the capital city 
where only 15% of the total population lives (Basinga et al. 2010). There are no 
doctors working in primary healthcare facilities. An A1 nurse manages the facility 
and several A2 nurses deliver healthcare services. They are supported by a social 
assistant, laboratory technicians, auxiliary staff, administrative staff and support 
staff (Table 2-1). All facilities report staffing levels below the national norms.  
Table 2-1: Staffing norms for a primary healthcare facility in Rwanda (2007) 
Staff categories Norm Tasks performed 
Nurse A1  1 Head of the primary healthcare facility 
Nurse A2 15 6 for curative care 
1 for family planning 
1 midwife 
2 for prenatal care 
2 for immunization and postnatal care 
1 for inpatient care 
1 for hygiene and sanitation 
1 A2 nurse or 1 nutritionist 
Auxiliary staff 2 1 for small surgery and curative care (A3) 
1 for managing and distributing drugs (A3) 
Social assistant 1 1 social assistant (A2) 
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Staff categories Norm Tasks performed 
Laboratory technician 2 2 laboratory technicians (A2) 
Administrative staff 2 1 assistant-accountant (A2) 
1 cashier (A2) 
Support staff 4 2 for cleaning and sterilization 
2 guards 
Source: Rwanda Ministry of Health (2007) 
In 2006-2008, wages for health workers were partly delinked in Rwanda. Basic 
salaries were paid from the wage bill, while performance-based incentives were 
paid from block grants provided to district level authorities and facilities. Between 
2005 and 2008, the fixed salaries grew from $6.4 million to $21.4 million, following 
a dramatic rise in the number of health workers. During the same period, 
performance-based pay grew tenfold, from $0.8 million to $8.9 million. In 2008, PBF 
represented 41.8 % of the funds paid as salaries (Soucat, Scheffler, and Ghebreyesus 
2013). In 2008, the human resources for health reform decentralized hiring, 
management, and payment of health workers to primary healthcare facilities (Haji 
et al. 2010, Soucat, Scheffler, and Ghebreyesus 2013).  
Performance-based financing in Rwanda began with small scale pilots in 2003. In 
2006, the Ministry of Health decided to nationally scale-up the strategy to all 
primary healthcare facilities (health centers). In the Rwandan PBF national scheme, 
payments for performance were provided to health centers based on the quantity of 
outputs achieved through case-based remuneration conditional on the quality of 
services delivered. As in most countries, the bulk of PBF resources (77.5%) were 
allocated to extrinsic motivation (i.e. to salaries) although the facilities were free to 
decide on the use of additional resources (Basinga et al. 2010). 
The implementation of PBF in Rwanda was accompanied by strong reporting and 
supervision mechanisms. Facilities in the treatment areas submitted monthly 
activity reports to a district steering committee. Each facility received an 
unannounced quarterly visit by a team from the district hospital (referral facility) to 
assess quality indicators. Findings were discussed with the staff at the end of the 
visit and recommendations were formulated (Basinga et al. 2011).   
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2.3. METHODS 
2.3.1. MEASURING PRODUCTIVITY 
As presented in section 2.2.1, estimating the production function requires data on 
labor, capital and an estimate of total factor productivity. In practice, analyses 
performed in LIC usually focus on outputs produced by hospitals (Anderson 1980, 
Mills, Hongoro, and Broomberg 1997, Barnum and Kutzin 1993) and both 
descriptive (ratios) and causal analyses of inefficiencies are performed.  
Descriptive analyses relate to technical and allocative efficiency using staffing ratios, 
expenditure ratios and average costs and were performed with data on Sri Lanka 
(Somonathan et al. 2000), Senegal (Bitran 1995), Benin and Guinea (Soucat, Levy-
Bruhl, De Bethune, et al. 1997, Soucat, Levy-Bruhl, Gbedonou, et al. 1997). However, 
they must be interpreted with caution as they may hide complex situations: for 
instance, high levels of labor productivity in understaffed facilities may indicate 
poor quality rather than high technical efficiency (Knowles, Leighton, and Stinson 
1997).  
Ratios and average costs show a deviation from the average whereas frontier 
analysis, by estimating a production or cost function, compares efficiency levels to a 
best-practice. The production function presents a locus of technically efficient 
output combinations an organization can produce. It takes into account the quantity 
of outputs and inputs, whereas the cost function introduces data on their cost 
(Worthington 2004). There are two main methods to define a frontier: data 
envelopment analysis (DEA) which uses mathematical programming techniques and 
stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) which is a statistical method. The main difference 
is that DEA is a non-parametric method that uses observations from the sample to 
define the frontier, whereas SFA uses a parametric method to assume a best-
practice frontier (Jacobs, Smith, and Street 2006). SFA is less likely to overestimate 
inefficiency as, unlike DEA, it separates the random error (statistical noise) from 
inefficiency (Mortimer and Peacock 2002, Murillo-Zamorano 2004, Forsund, Lovell, 
and Schmidt 1980). Using panel data stochastic frontier model allows relaxing 
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assumptions that have to be made with cross sectional data9. Indeed, panel data 
approaches are recommended as they provide more robust estimates and can be 
estimated using ordinary least squares (Dor 1994, Skinner 1994, Sena 2003).  
The choice between production or cost frontier analyses is often driven by the 
availability of data. As the data collected from the primary healthcare facilities in 
Rwanda was not complete enough and reliable enough, none of these methods could 
be used to measure productivity. Indeed, data on capital, labor and outputs was 
either missing or incomplete. As a result, this chapter proposes an alternative to 
productivity measurement using the conceptual framework presented in Figure 2-1 
to allow estimate the drivers of health workforce productivity in Rwanda.  
2.3.2. DATA 
This chapter uses two rounds of health facility surveys that were collected before 
the implementation of PBF in treatment districts (the ‘baseline’ in 2006) and after 
two years of implementation (the ‘follow-up’ in 2008). The health facility surveys 
provide data on: i) the facility including type, infrastructure and finances; ii) health 
services available and 6-month utilization; iii) laboratory tests; iv) medical 
equipment; v) drugs; and, vi) human resources taking into account incoming 
personnel and leavers.  
Data was collected from 166 primary health centers at baseline and from 154 health 
facilities at follow-up. Data on 1,621 staff were collected at baseline (793 in the 
treatment facilities and 828 controls) and on 2,724 at follow-up (1,298 in treatment 
facilities and 1,426 controls). For both rounds, the respondent was the Director of 
the health center.  
The analysis uses three dependent variables to tackle the different elements 
identified in the conceptual framework. First, the variable DIFFERENCEA2 assesses 
the difference in the number of A2 nurses (healthcare providers) between the two 
waves. The variable is the ratio of the number of nurses during a given period over 
the number of nurses at baseline; equal to one at baseline. At follow-up, if the ratio 
                                                             
9 Such as assumptions on the fact that inefficiency is uncorrelated with the level of 
inputs or on the distribution of the inefficiency effect. 
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is below one, fewer healthcare providers are working in the facility compared to the 
baseline. On the contrary, if above one, the facility has recruited and retained more 
staff. This variable aims to assess improvements in the availability of healthcare 
providers in health facilities and to see whether PBF facilities have 
attracted/recruited more healthcare providers, thus reducing the shortage of 
nurses. The variable is: 
𝐷𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐸𝑅𝐸𝑁𝐶𝐸𝐴2𝑗𝑡 =
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝐴2𝑗𝑡1
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝐴2𝑗𝑡0
 
where t is the time dummy, t0 denotes the baseline, t1 the follow-up and j the health 
facility.  
Second, dichotomous variable PRESENT is used to look at the impact of PBF on 
absenteeism. For that purpose, the response to the question “Is NAME here today?” 
was used. The reasons for absence were looked at to assess whether absences were 
authorized or not. However, for consistency with previous studies and because 
there is a tendency to under-report unauthorized absences, staff were considered 
absent if he/she was not in the facility on the day of the survey, regardless of the 
reason for being absent (Yamada, Sawada, and Luo 2012, Kiwanuka et al. 2011, 
Chaudhury et al. 2006). Indeed Chaudhury et al. (2006) highlight that it is difficult to 
assess the extent to which absence is authorized as facility directors may not 
answer truthfully. A sensitivity analysis was performed by removing ‘authorized 
absences’ and results did not change significantly from those presented in the next 
section.  
Third, the variable WPI (Workforce Productivity Index) is an index to proxy health 
workforce productivity. Following Vujicic, Addai, and Bosomprah (2009), the WPI 
was computed to obtain a more comprehensive measure of health workers’ 
productivity than those often used in the literature (simple ratios). It uses a 
Composite Services Indicator (CSI) which is a weighted sum of the volume of the 
main health services produced in primary healthcare facilities:  
𝐶𝑆𝐼𝑖 = ∑𝑗𝛼𝑗𝑆𝑖𝑗 
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where CSIj is the composite service indicator for primary healthcare facility j; Sij is 
the volume of service i in primary healthcare facility j and αi is the weight assigned 
to service i.  
Services included in the CSI are inpatient services (number of stays), outpatient 
visits, prenatal care visits, institutional deliveries, family planning visits and 
immunization delivered in one month (averages of the 6-month or 7-month data 
provided in the survey). Weights used for the CSI are presented in Table 2-2. They 
reflect time and resources mobilized for delivering services. Although assigning 
weights is somehow arbitrary, the weights used in the analysis are consistent with 
those used elsewhere (Vujicic, Addai, and Bosomprah 2009). A sensitivity analysis 
was performed to check the robustness of results with a change in the weights to 
align them to those of the payment formula, giving more weight to higher payments. 
Comparable results were found and the decision was made to use weights already 
reported in the literature for comparison purposes.   
Table 2-2: Weights used in the Composite Service Indicator 
Services Weights 
Number of Inpatient stays (IPD) 3 
Number of Outpatient visits (OPD) 1 
Number of Prenatal care visits (PNC) 1 (similar to outpatient) 
Number of Institutional deliveries (ID) 3 (similar to inpatient) 
Number of Family planning visits (FP) 1 (similar to outpatient) 
Number of Immunizations (Imm)  0.5 
Source: Adapted from Vujicic, Addai, and Bosomprah (2009).  
The WPI also uses a Composite Human Resources for Health (CHRH) index. The 
CHRH index is the total wage bill (in thousand Rwandan Francs) of primary 
healthcare facilities for staff working in each facility. Using this method is similar to 
weighting each health worker by average salary (Vujicic, Addai, and Bosomprah 
2009). This places the greatest weight on higher salaries and is useful when 
performing a cost-effectiveness comparison across facilities, in this case, between 
treatment and control groups:  
𝐶𝐻𝑅𝐻𝑗 =
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑗
1000
 
 
So the workforce productivity index in facility j is: 
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𝑊𝑃𝐼𝑗 =
𝐶𝑆𝐼𝑗
𝐶𝐻𝑅𝐻𝑗
 
For ease of interpretation, the WPI is normalized to one. The higher the WPI, the 
more productive the primary healthcare facility.  
The decision to include control variables in the models was driven by theory and 
adjusted from fieldwork knowledge, institutional specificities and data availability. 
The literature suggests that infrastructure specificities, working conditions, 
workload, stress, availability of drugs and equipment and salary are important 
determinants of staff motivation, job satisfaction and ultimately of productivity, 
presence at work and retention. The inclusion of control variables was tested for 
each model and the most relevant variables (i.e. those that had an effect in other 
settings as reported by the literature) were kept.  
For regressions on availability of healthcare providers and presence at work, 
controls include characteristics of the facility, such as its status (public or faith-
based), the log size of the population in the catchment area, whether it is open on a 
24 hour basis, the availability of communication means on a 24 hour basis, the 
availability of toilets and of adequate electricity. Staff controls include the number of 
A1 nurses (heads of facility), of A2 nurses, of laboratory technicians and gender. The 
log of the health facility wage bill and total expenditure were also added as variables 
on outputs produced by the facility (prenatal care services, deliveries and inpatient 
stays) to control for their activity and workload. Finally, scores for the availability of 
key equipment and essential drugs were computed and included to proxy working 
conditions and process quality.  
For the regression on the Workforce Productivity Index, the variables PRESENT and 
DIFFERENCEA2 were introduced as explanatory variables along with the status of 
the health facility, the log of the health facility wage bill, equipment and drug scores, 
outputs produced by the facility and the availability of A1 and A2 nurses.  
2.3.3. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
Descriptive analyses including t-tests were performed for all dependent and 
independent variables in the models to compare the means in the treatment and 
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control groups at baseline. This checks whether the randomization worked as 
expected, and if treatment and control groups were balanced before implementing 
PBF in treatment districts. As data is randomized in clusters, t-tests were performed 
using clustering at the district-by-year level.   
Further, regressions using the difference-in-difference model were run (Bertrand, 
Duflo, and Mullainathan 2004). The use of difference-in-difference model despite 
the randomized controlled trial design of the study is justified by the fact that with 
the decentralization reform that occurred during the impact evaluation, some 
control health centers were reassigned to the treatment group. As a result, the 
evaluation design shifted to a quasi-experimental one thus justifying the need for 
difference-in-difference model. This model first calculates the mean difference 
between the baseline and follow-up values of the variable of interest for the 
treatment and control groups; second, it calculates the difference between these two 
mean differences. This second difference isolates the impact of PBF. The difference-
in-difference estimator assumes that unobserved heterogeneity is time invariant. 
Thus possible bias caused by unobserved heterogeneity (that is uncorrelated with 
the treatment) is cancelled out through differencing (Khandker, Koolwal, and Samad 
2010).  
The difference-in-difference is estimated using a Linear Probability Model (LPM) for 
the dichotomous dependent variable (PRESENT). Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) are 
used for the regressions on the Workforce Productivity Index (WPI) and the 
availability of healthcare providers (DIFFERENCEA2). The regression specification 
of the difference-in-difference model is:  
ititiiiit tTtTDDY    .  
where T is the treatment variable, t is the time dummy, X is a list of time varying 
individual characteristics and the coefficient of the interaction of T and t (DD) gives 
the estimate of the impact of treatment on outcome Y.  
Robustness checks using fixed-effects and clustering were run to assess the 
robustness of regression coefficients. Fixed effects control the effect of unobservable 
characteristics that can influence the dependent variable (Bertrand, Duflo, and 
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Mullainathan 2004, Khandker, Koolwal, and Samad 2010). As performed in previous 
analyses using data from the same impact evaluation, but for household level data, 
facilities and time fixed effects were used to control for time and time-invariant 
locations (Basinga et al. 2011). This allows estimation for the inter-facility (within) 
variation rather than the intra-facility variation in the coefficient estimates. Further, 
clustered standard errors were computed. Clustering allows the error terms to be 
correlated within the same cluster. As facilities in the same district are more likely 
to share common observable and unobservable characteristics after implementing 
PBF, clustering was done at the interaction of the district with the post intervention 
level (38 clusters) (Basinga et al. 2011). The regression specification of the 
difference-in-difference model using clustering and fixed effects is:  
ijtijtiiijijt tTtTDDj    .  
where T is the treatment variable, t is the time dummy, λj are facility fixed effects, X 
is a list of time varying individual characteristics and the coefficient of the 
interaction of T and t (DD) gives the estimate of the impact of treatment on outcome 
Yijt for individual i living in the catchment area of facility j in year t.  
For the regressions on absenteeism (PRESENT) and on the availability of healthcare 
providers (DIFFERENCEA2), the model chosen assumes a linear relationship and is 
based on findings from the literature review on individual and health facility’s 
characteristics that influence health workforce behavior. However, the potential 
nonlinear relationship was tested in regressions on the Workforce Productivity 
Index by including interaction terms as further explained below.  
Different specifications were run for the Workforce Productivity Index to assess 
what best predicts the productivity of staff and how it interacts with absenteeism 
and the availability of healthcare providers: Specification 1 reports the base model. 
This simple specification assumes a linear relationship between WPI, absenteeism 
and availability of healthcare providers. This specification only includes the 
variables used previously as dependent variables (ABSENT and DIFFERENCEA2) as 
controls. Specification 2 adds an interaction between PBF and absenteeism and 
between PBF and the availability of healthcare providers to Specification 1 to assess 
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the contribution of PBF to productivity through its impact on absenteeism and 
availability of healthcare providers, thus assuming a non-linear relationship. 
Specification 2 enables us to describe the simultaneous influence of the two 
variables rather than the additive influence, as in Specification 1. Specification 3 
serves as a robustness check for Specification 1 by adding a number of variables that 
might explain productivity as presented above. Similarly Specification 4 serves as a 
robustness check for Specification 2 by adding the same controls as in Specification 
3. 
2.3.4. LIMITATIONS 
This study used the PBF impact evaluation data from Rwanda to assess the impact 
of the strategy on human resources management and behavior, as this data offers a 
unique opportunity to isolate the impact of PBF on variables of interest. However, 
using secondary data presents some limitations as one cannot choose questions to 
be included in the questionnaire. As outlined in section 2.3.1, due to data limitation, 
the production function could not be estimated and an alternative way of measuring 
productivity had to be proposed. This method, using the WPI, has limitations as 
weights are arbitrary and one cannot capture all dimensions of the production 
function. Further, some questions were not asked at baseline and responses to 
others were not complete (such as, the reason for being absent or age). The 
adjustment for quality, using equipment and drug scores, is also incomplete. 
Another limitation lies in the duration of the exposure to treatment. The 23-month 
exposure is enough to isolate the impact of PBF on utilization of healthcare services, 
but is probably too short to observe changes in human resource management and 
behavior, coping strategies or changes in working conditions. Finally, since 
understanding human resources behavior is complex, mixed methods with 
qualitative research would have provided some insight on the determinants of 
motivation and satisfaction, in particular in the context of PBF.  
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2.4. RESULTS 
2.4.1. BALANCE CHECK AND PRIMARY HEALTHCARE FACILITY 
CHARACTERISTICS 
The comparison of primary healthcare facilities in the intervention and control 
groups at baseline shows that the random assignment of facilities to intervention or 
control groups was successful in creating two comparable groups. The results from 
clustered t-tests show no statistically significant difference between treatment and 
control facilities on infrastructure and equipment, services delivered and staffing. 
Most facilities in the sample (66% in total) are public facilities. Electricity is 
functional in only 30% of facilities, water in 56% and communication and waste 
disposal in about two-thirds of facilities. The availability of drugs is poor, with a 
drug score of only 29%. Equipment is better but still low (63%). Services provided 
by facilities (outputs) in one month are comparable in both groups. On average, a 
primary healthcare facility in Rwanda did 14 institutional deliveries a month in 
2006, 646 vaccinations, 1,430 outpatient consultations, 17 family planning 
consultations and had 54 inpatient stays. Finally, facilities in both groups are below 
the norm for all staff categories. Only one fifth of facilities have an A1 nurse (head of 
facility) and facilities have an average of five A2 nurses to deliver healthcare 
services (Table 2-3).  
 
Table 2-3:  Baseline characteristics of treatment and control primary healthcare facilities 
(2006) 
 Total Interventi
on 
Control Diff. P-
value 
 N % / # N % / # N % / # % / #  
Characteristics of primary healthcare facility  
Is a public facility 166 66% 80 67% 86 65% 2% 0.840 
Has electricity 166 30% 80 28% 86 33% 5% 0.657 
Has communication 
means 
166 67% 80 64% 86 71% 7% 0.519 
Has water 166 56% 80 59% 86 53% 6% 0.564 
Has toilets 166 19% 80 18% 86 21% 3% 0.584 
Has waste disposal 166 67% 80 73% 86 62% 11% 0.236 
Equipment score 166 62% 80 60% 86 64% 4% 0.475 
Drug score 166 29% 80 31% 86 27% 4% 0.590 
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 Total Interventi
on 
Control Diff. P-
value 
 N % / # N % / # N % / # % / #  
Outputs of the primary healthcare facility 
Deliveries 166 14 80 15 86 13 2 0.522 
Vaccines 166 646 80 687 86 609 78 0.489 
Outpatient 
consultations 
166 1,430 80 1,622 86 1,251 371 0.206 
Family planning 
consultations 
166 17 80 20 86 14 6 0.235 
Inpatient stays 166 54 80 60 86 46 14 0.308 
Staffing of primary healthcare facility 
Number of nurse A1  166 0.2 80 0.2 86 0.3 0.1 0.251 
Number of nurse A2 165 5.3 80 5.5 86 5.2 0.3 0.660 
Laboratory 
technician 
165 0.8 80 0.8 86 0.8 0.0 0.942 
 
2.4.2. AVAILABILITY OF HEALTHCARE PROVIDERS 
A total of 29% of staff working in health facilities at follow-up were new staff and 82% 
of those working in the health facility at baseline were still working there during the 
follow-up survey.  
2.4.2.1. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression 
Results from the OLS regression on the difference in the number of A2 nurses 
between the two surveys show that facilities in the treatment area are less likely to 
fill in the shortage of healthcare providers compared to facilities in the control area. 
PBF has a negative impact on the increase in the number of healthcare providers as 
there are about 21% fewer nurses in treatment facilities compared to control 
facilities at follow up (probability of 99%). The coefficient on the time variable 
illustrates the rise in the number of nurses that occurred over that period and 
suggests an almost doubling of the number of nurses between the two waves 
(probability of 99%). Some characteristics of health facilities have an effect on the 
availability of nurses: public facilities have 16% more staff between the two waves 
compared to faith-based cases; the availability of toilets and of staff (presence of a 
head of facility, number of healthcare providers and gender) also positively 
influences the increase in number of A2 nurses in the facility. Working conditions 
related to the availability of drugs or equipment have no effect. Some negative 
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coefficients are difficult to interpret, such as those on salary and some facilities’ 
characteristics (Table 2-4).    
2.4.2.2. Robustness check 
OLS do not enable us to capture the inter-variability due to PBF within a health 
facility. The following robustness check measures within-facility change as the main 
objective is to assess the change in health workforce behavior with PBF, and 
therefore to note variations within a facility. The same regression with clustering 
and facility fixed-effects shows a different picture. The coefficient associated with 
the impact of PBF and time are no longer significant suggesting that the relationship 
between the availability of healthcare providers in PBF facilities compared to 
controls is probably more complex than the one estimated with linear regressions. 
However, as for OLS, some facility characteristics (such as being a public health 
facility) and staffing characteristics are positively associated with the availability of 
healthcare providers (Table 2-4). As this robustness check did not allow 
confirmation of the OLS results, further specifications will be developed to better 
capture the relationship between PBF and availability of healthcare providers.  
2.4.3. ABSENTEEISM 
Basic descriptive analysis of data shows that about one third of staff are absent in 
primary healthcare facilities, both in baseline and follow-up surveys.  
2.4.3.1. LPM regression 
Results from the regression analysis on presence of staff at work using a linear 
probability model show that PBF has an impact on absenteeism, as staff in the 
treatment facilities are 6% more likely to be present at work compared to those in 
the control facilities (90% confidence level). Results also show that absenteeism 
worsened over time by 5%. Control variables include facility and individual 
characteristics that had an effect in other contexts, as revealed by the literature 
review. The fact that the facility operates on a 24-hour basis is significant and 
negatively associated with presence at work. Being a male health provider increases 
the probability of being at work by 3% (Table 2-4).   
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2.4.3.2. Robustness check 
The same regression with clustering and facility fixed-effects confirms the results 
from LPM. The coefficient associated with the impact of PBF and time is significant 
and suggests that staff are 9% more likely to be present at work in the treatment 
facilities compared to the control group (95% confidence). Results also show that 
between the two surveys, staff were 16% more likely to be absent. As with LPM, 
neither the status of the health facility influences absenteeism level, nor does the 
characteristics of the infrastructure, except for the presence of toilets. The total 
expenditure of the facility (not salary) is positively associated with presence at work 
but the presence of a head of facility and higher scores for equipment are 
surprisingly negatively associated.   
Table 2-4: Regression results on absenteeism and availability of nurses A2 
  Difference in number of 
nurses 
Presence at work 
(DIFFERENCEA2) (ABSENT) 
VARIABLES OLS Clustering 
and FE 
LPM Clustering 
and FE 
Treatment*Post -0.212*** -0.060 0.064* 0.094** 
 (0.050) (0.057) (0.037) (0.040) 
Post 0.954*** 0.182 -0.052* -0.162*** 
 (0.055) (0.108) (0.031) (0.046) 
Treatment 0.034  -0.012  
 (0.020)  (0.025)  
Public (=1) 0.162*** 0.241*** 0.011 0.054 
 (0.027) (0.054) (0.020) (0.037) 
Has medical staff on-duty 
24 hours 
-0.007 0.158 -0.089*** 0.049 
 (0.046) (0.111) (0.034) (0.041) 
Has communication means 
on a 24 hours basis 
-0.098*** 0.076 -0.024 0.037 
 (0.035) (0.062) (0.023) (0.034) 
Has toilets 0.087** -0.125 0.023 0.093*** 
 (0.036) (0.079) (0.021) (0.027) 
Has adequate electricity -0.215*** -0.061 -0.016 -0.005 
 (0.029) (0.065) (0.020) (0.018) 
People served by the 
facility (log) 
0.323*** 0.380*** -0.011 -0.047 
 (0.034) (0.072) (0.021) (0.042) 
Number of Nurse A1 0.026** -0.191*** -0.006 -0.042*** 
 (0.013) (0.064) (0.007) (0.015) 
Number of Nurse A2 0.081*** 0.226*** 0.001 0.008 
 (0.006) (0.022) (0.003) (0.005) 
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  Difference in number of 
nurses 
Presence at work 
(DIFFERENCEA2) (ABSENT) 
VARIABLES OLS Clustering 
and FE 
LPM Clustering 
and FE 
Number of laboratory 
technicians 
0.009 -0.009 -0.004 -0.015 
 (0.010) (0.039) (0.009) (0.020) 
Sex (male=1) 0.056** -0.003 0.031* 0.026 
 (0.025) (0.005) (0.018) (0.017) 
Total recurrent costs for 
salary (log) 
-0.186*** -0.264*** -0.006 0.023 
 (0.024) (0.050) (0.017) (0.019) 
Total expenditures (log) 0.011 0.178*** 0.031* 0.035* 
 (0.021) (0.053) (0.018) (0.017) 
Number of prenatal care 
consultations  
-0.006*** 0.000 0.000 -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Number of deliveries  0.005*** -0.000 0.000 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
Number of inpatient stays -0.000 -0.003*** 0.000* 0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Availability of medical 
equipment 
-0.041 0.141* -0.018 -0.050** 
 (0.030) (0.074) (0.020) (0.021) 
Availability of essential 
drugs 
-0.013 -0.145** -0.002 -0.037 
 (0.026) (0.058) (0.020) (0.029) 
Observations 3,205 3,205 2,981 2,981 
Number of health facilities   164   167 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
2.4.4. PRODUCTIVITY 
Descriptive statistics on the workforce productivity index shows that the index 
ranges from 0.007 to 0.89 at baseline and from 0.017 to 1 at follow-up. The median 
WPI in 2006 was 0.277 and 0.116 in 2008. A clustered t-test of difference in means 
shows no statistically significant difference in the mean WPI (P=0.949) revealing a 
balance at baseline between the two groups.  
2.4.4.1. Regressions 
The regression analysis using the workforce productivity index shows interesting 
patterns. Results from the OLS and of the regression using clustering and fixed effect 
on Specification 1 (which assumes a linear relationship) highlight the downward 
trend between baseline and follow-up surveys for the value of the WPI (-18% to -
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19%). The LPM finds a 4% increase in WPI due to PBF, but this result is not 
confirmed when focusing on the variation within facilities. Similarly, the OLS 
regression suggests that WPI increases with the availability of nurses but this is not 
confirmed with clustering and fixed effects.  
Further specification using nonlinear relationships (interactions) provides more 
robust estimates to assess the impact of PBF on productivity.  Specification 2 
suggests that there is no direct effect of PBF on the WPI and confirms a negative 
trend in WPI (-17 to -19) over time. The coefficients associated with the interaction 
of PBF and presence at work (0.009) as well as PBF and availability of staff (0.068) 
are significant at the 90% confidence level in regressions using fixed effects and 
clustering (Table 2-5). Robustness checks will enable us to confirm the existence of 
an impact.  
Table 2-5: Output from regressions on WPI 
 Specification 1 
Linear 
Specification 2 
Interaction 
VARIABLES OLS Clustering + FE OLS Clustering + 
FE 
Treatment*Post 0.038*** 0.057 -0.009 0.015 
 (0.011) (0.034) (0.011) (0.037) 
Post -0.178*** -0.199*** -0.172*** -0.190*** 
 (0.008) (0.026) (0.008) (0.026) 
Treatment 0.008  -0.070***  
 (0.009)  (0.015)  
Present (=1) -0.003 0.000 -0.010 -0.004 
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.008) (0.004) 
Present*PBF   0.013 0.009* 
   (0.011) (0.005) 
Difference in 
number of nurses 
0.017*** 0.023 0.012*** 0.013 
 (0.001) (0.016) (0.001) (0.013) 
Difference in 
number of 
nurses*PBF 
  0.069*** 0.068* 
   (0.010) (0.037) 
Observations 3,581 3,581 3,581 3,581 
Health facilities  164  164 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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2.4.4.2. Robustness check 
Results from Specification 3, which adds controls to Specification 1 and assumes a 
linear relationship between availability of staff, absenteeism and productivity of 
staff, are comparable to those from Specification 1. Adding controls to the 
specification did not provide a clear picture on determinants of the WPI at the 
facility level (Table 2-6). As suggested above, non-linear specification is probably 
more relevant in estimating the impact of PBF on productivity.  
Results from Specification 4, which adds controls to Specification 2, shows that the 
triple interaction effects are better predictors of the impact of PBF on productivity. 
Including control variables in the specification provided more robust coefficient 
estimates. Results from OLS on the inter-facility variation suggests that PBF has a 
negative impact on WPI (reduction of 4%) but that it is cancelled out by the positive 
effect that PBF has on WPI through improving the availability of healthcare 
providers (4% increase) (99% confidence interval). The OLS results also show that a 
higher salary and the presence of an A1 nurse have a negative impact on WPI, while 
the availability of drugs, equipment and healthcare providers as well as the quantity 
of services delivered are associated with higher productivity. Coefficients related to 
the within-facility variation (regressions using clustering and fixed effects) show 
that PBF has a positive impact on productivity: it increases WPI by 2% (99% 
confidence level) due to a reduction in absenteeism by 8% (95% confidence level) 
and through improved availability of staff. The availability of equipment has a 
positive effect on productivity; and, higher salary has a negative effect (Table 2-6).   
Table 2-6: Robustness checks for regressions on WPI 
 Specification 3 Specification 4 
VARIABLES OLS Clustering + FE OLS Clustering + FE 
Treatment*Post -0.015* -0.012 -0.041*** -0.062 
 (0.009) (0.031) (0.009) (0.038) 
Post -0.026*** -0.012 -0.021*** 0.008 
 (0.007) (0.029) (0.007) (0.033) 
Treatment 0.047***  0.000  
 (0.007)  (0.012)  
Present (=1) 0.004 0.003 -0.001 -0.004 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) 
Present*PBF   0.010 0.018*** 
   (0.008) (0.005) 
Difference in number of -0.004 0.020 -0.009*** 0.013 
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 Specification 3 Specification 4 
VARIABLES OLS Clustering + FE OLS Clustering + FE 
nurses 
 (0.002) (0.016) (0.002) (0.017) 
Difference in number of 
nurses*PBF 
  0.040*** 0.081** 
   (0.008) (0.035) 
Public (=1) 0.018*** -0.043 0.017*** -0.050 
 (0.005) (0.031) (0.005) (0.031) 
Costs for salary (log) -0.112*** -0.117*** -0.111*** -0.118*** 
 (0.004) (0.010) (0.003) (0.010) 
Availability of essential 
drugs 
0.002 0.004 0.002 0.004 
 (0.004) (0.017) (0.004) (0.018) 
Availability of medical 
equipment 
0.046*** 0.043** 0.046*** 0.051** 
 (0.005) (0.020) (0.005) (0.020) 
Number of Nurse A1 -0.020*** -0.021** -0.017*** -0.013 
 (0.001) (0.009) (0.001) (0.010) 
Number of Nurse A2 0.005*** 0.002 0.005*** 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.004) 
Number of Lab 
technician 
-0.000 0.002 -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.008) (0.002) (0.007) 
Number of family 
planning consultations 
0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Number of deliveries 0.001*** 0.001 0.001*** 0.001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 3,462 3,462 3,462 3,462 
Health facilities   164   164 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
2.5. DISCUSSION 
Performance-based financing aims at modifying health workforce behavior to 
improve performance in service delivery. There is growing evidence showing that 
PBF encourages healthcare providers to increase the volume of services delivered 
(quantitative aspect) and some evidence that shows it improves the quality of care 
(Basinga et al. 2011, Witter et al. 2012). However, evidence on the impact of PBF on 
absenteeism, availability of healthcare providers and resulting productivity is scarce 
and inconclusive. 
This chapter uses a conceptual framework according to which the health workforce 
productivity is influenced by a number of human resource-related factors including: 
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the availability of staff (first level) and the effective presence of staff at work 
(second level). As the literature shows that both availability and absenteeism are 
affected by motivation and job satisfaction, it assessed whether the change in 
motivation and satisfaction, resulting from the implementation of PBF, influenced 
the availability of staff, presence at work and ultimately, the productivity and how 
these different parameters interact. Factors associated with absenteeism, 
availability of healthcare providers and activity of primary healthcare facilities were 
quantified to show the impact of PBF on the health workforce.  
This chapter contributes to knowledge in at least three independent ways; it is the 
first to rigorously and wholly assess the impact of PBF on providers’ availability, 
presence at work and productivity. Second, it contributes to the debate on the effect 
of PBF on intrinsic motivation by reporting sound evidence from Rwanda. Third, it 
reveals the importance of specification on coefficient estimates, since the 
comparison of linear probability model or OLS with regressions using clustering and 
fixed effects highlighted differences in inter- and intra-facility variation.  
2.5.1. IMPACT OF PBF ON AVAILABILITY OF HEALTHCARE PROVIDERS 
There is evidence that utilization of health services raises with the availability of 
staff (Chen et al. 2004). As facilities are understaffed in Rwanda, one can expect that 
health facilities in the treatment group will recruit more staff to increase the volume 
of services delivered. The literature also shows that job satisfaction, working 
conditions, management and leadership affect staff retention and hiring in 
underserved areas, but little is known about the impact of PBF on those 
determinants and therefore on the impact on the availability of healthcare 
providers. 
Contrary to Soeters et al. (2011) who found that PBF health facilities recruited more 
staff in the DRC, this chapter shows, by using rigorous impact evaluation data, that 
the impact of PBF on the availability of staff is indeed negative when looking at 
inter-facility variation. The availability of nurses almost doubled during the study 
period as a result of the decentralization reform, but more nurses were recruited in 
control facilities. Further analysis is necessary to understand this pattern, but a 
possible explanation includes the fact that PBF facilities are more efficient in service 
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delivery and thus require fewer staff to perform the work. Another explanation 
could be, as suggested in the literature (Ireland, Paul, and Dujardin 2011, Magrath 
and Nichter 2012), that PBF worsens working conditions and demotivates staff, thus 
renders facilities less attractive to health workers. Within-facility variation does not 
show any impact of the strategy on the availability of staff suggesting that staff 
working in PBF facilities at baseline did not quit their job. The negative impact of 
PBF would therefore only affect new staff. 
To some extent, the results confirm findings from the literature (not specific to PBF) 
in terms of staff retention determinants. They show that infrastructure-related 
determinants do not play a significant role in Rwanda, probably because the 
infrastructure remains poor in both groups. On the other hand, they reveal that 
determinants of working conditions and workload are associated with the 
availability of staff: staff availability improves in facilities that are more staffed and 
when the workload is smaller, in particular within complex and time consuming 
services (inpatient care). Salary is negatively associated with the availability of staff, 
suggesting that the higher the salaries (including incentives), the less likely health 
facilities will recruit more staff as facilities operate within a budget.  
2.5.2. IMPACT OF PBF ON ABSENTEEISM 
Results are consistent with previous studies showing that PBF cuts absenteeism 
(Kalk, Paul, and Grabosch 2010, Huilleryy and Sebanz 2014) but this chapter 
provides more robust evidence. In Rwanda, PBF cut absenteeism by 6% to 9% (95% 
confidence level) suggesting that financial incentives, but also increased 
accountability and better management resulting from PBF, are effective in making 
available staff go to work. Contrary to the literature (Chaudhury et al. 2006, 
Kiwanuka et al. 2011, Isah et al. 2008), most health facilities’ characteristics have no 
impact on absenteeism. Further analysis is necessary to understand the negative 
coefficients associated with the availability of medical equipment as well as the 
reasons behind the rise in absenteeism (5% to 16% according to the specifications) 
between the two waves.  
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2.5.3. IMPACT OF PBF ON PRODUCTIVITY 
In Rwanda, the workforce productivity index decreased over time, probably because 
of the parallel doubling in the number of staff in facilities. The above results on the 
availability of staff and presence at work show that there are fewer health providers 
available in treatment facilities, but that available staff are more likely to go to work. 
How does this translate in terms of productivity? Regressions on the WPI suggest 
that the relationship between PBF, availability of staff, absenteeism and productivity 
is not linear. Triple interaction effects provide the best coefficient estimates and 
show that PBF has a positive impact on productivity (i.e. on the WPI) through the 
improved availability of staff and reduced absenteeism. Firstly, this suggests that 
PBF facilities made a better use of additional healthcare providers recruited 
between the two waves as part of the decentralization reform compared to control 
facilities. Secondly, results reveal that productivity gains were achieved with fewer 
staff, but higher performing staff as the absenteeism rate was cut by 9%. In sum, 
PBF increased extrinsic motivation but did not deter intrinsic motivation as health 
workers were less absent and performed better. Further research is needed to 
understand other determinants of staff productivity and understand why the 
working environment does not play a significant role in Rwanda as in other settings. 
One reason may be that these changes require more time to produce results than 
the two-year window of the presented experiment. 
2.5.4. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
Possible policy implications can be drawn from these empirical results. First, as low 
income countries often face difficulties in containing their wage bill, the case of 
Rwanda suggests that countries implementing PBF may recruit fewer additional 
staff since PBF can cut absenteeism of health workers and improve their 
productivity. In Rwanda, with PBF, productivity gains are achieved with staff 
already available through increased workload (as illustrated by the higher WPI), 
better management of human resources and responsiveness (through cuts in 
absenteeism) and stronger monitoring and supervision (key feature of the PBF 
scheme in Rwanda). In other words, the same health outputs can be achieved with 
fewer inputs. 
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Second, the findings suggest that in Rwanda, strategies aiming to reward 
performance and increase motivation have more impact on the productivity of 
health workers compared to working conditions and working environment. They 
also suggest that PBF encourages health workers to perform better, due to extrinsic, 
but also intrinsic motivation. It is important to note that in Rwanda, performance 
incentives were given to primary healthcare facilities. It is likely that individual 
incentives would have had an even greater impact than the case reported in this 
chapter.  
Third, this chapter suggests that policymakers and designers of PBF schemes should 
pay attention to reporting mechanisms in the management of human resources and 
grant more autonomy in the use of resources to improve input-use. It is likely that in 
the case of Rwanda, more autonomy in the management of human resources and of 
financial resources, more accountability and the existence of rewards, motivated 
staff and health facilities to perform better. Indeed specificities of Rwanda, as 
highlighted in section 1.6, such as the strong reporting mechanisms in place, the 
performance culture, the low degree of corruption and the supporting reforms 
implemented at the same time, which could not be quantified in the models, might 
partially explain the results presented in this chapter. Generalization of results and 
policy recommendations must thus be done with caution.  
2.6. CONCLUSION 
Over the past twenty years, Rwanda’s health system has gone through a series of 
major reforms which supported the country’s major progress in access to basic 
health services and health outcomes. Approaches in rebuilding the health system 
after the genocide of 1994 were oriented toward improving access to services, 
performance and accountability (Binagwaho et al. 2014). The weaknesses of 
healthcare service delivery were addressed through major health financing reforms 
which aimed to increase the autonomy of health facilities (fiscal decentralization), 
foster performance and accountability in service delivery (performance-based 
financing), remove financial barriers to healthcare services (health insurance) and 
improve the availability of health workers (massive recruitments and a 
decentralization of human resource management). The country is now one of the 
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few countries in Africa which is on track to reach the health related Millennium 
Development Goals.  
This chapter proposes a new conceptual framework to understand the determinants 
of productivity. It contributes to narrow a gap in knowledge by bringing robust 
evidence to the contribution of PBF to productivity and its different determinants. 
The novelty of findings lies in the drivers of productivity gains: they do not come 
from staff expansion, but from cutting absenteeism and providing higher workloads 
for staff. Productivity gains can be achieved through financial incentives, improved 
supervision and more responsiveness at the expense of a relaxed working 
environment. This suggests that PBF should be adapted to the behavioral 
expectations of each country.  
This study sheds light on possible pitfalls of PBF, as this mechanism is increasingly 
adopted in Africa and elsewhere. PBF, as a financial incentive, above all speaks to 
the extrinsic motivation of the health workforce. Mechanisms should be put in place 
in parallel to ensure greater job satisfaction and working conditions, which are 
critical determinants of intrinsic motivation. This could include training 
opportunities, career advancement, recognition from the community and a better 
work environment. Also, individual incentives (as opposed to those targeting the 
health facility) may be even more effective in stimulating the productivity of staff.   
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3. IMPROVING HEALTH WORKER PERFORMANCE: THE 
PATIENT-PERSPECTIVE FROM A PBF PROGRAM IN 
RWANDA10 
 
ABSTRACT 
This chapter examines the effect of performance-based financing (PBF) on patients’ 
perception of primary healthcare services and on health workers’ responsiveness to 
patients’ needs; one of the four dimensions of health workforce performance. Data 
from a randomized impact evaluation in Rwanda is used to explore patients’ 
satisfaction with clinical and non-clinical services and quantify the contribution of 
individual and facility characteristics to satisfaction.  
The majority of respondents declared overall satisfaction with prenatal care and 
curative care for children and adults, with the exception of waiting time. The 
empirical study shows that productivity gains resulting from performance 
incentives are not achieved at the expense of patients’ satisfaction or perceived 
service quality. Improvements in productivity, availability and competences of the 
health workforce have a positive effect on patients’ satisfaction with clinical 
services, even when patients’ satisfaction is not tied to a reward. The positive effect 
of PBF on non-clinical dimensions of satisfaction also suggests that PBF incentivizes 
providers to raise patients’ satisfaction with non-clinical services if associated with 
future financial gains. In particular, healthcare providers adopted a coping strategy 
to raise satisfaction among patients associated with the largest financial gains 
(pregnant women) by improving their satisfaction in terms of waiting time so that 
they may visit the facility again for prenatal care (rewarded service) and 
institutional delivery (the service tied to the largest financial reward). 
It is recommended that low income countries build on the experience from high 
income countries to better listen to the patients’ voice in general and to also include 
                                                             
10 This chapter is based an article published in Social Science and Medicine (Lannes 
2015) 
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an assessment of patients’ satisfaction in incentive mechanisms as a way of 
increasing the benefits of the strategy.  
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
Over recent decades, paying healthcare providers against agreed performance 
targets has gained momentum in HIC and more recently in low income countries. 
Financial incentives aim to provide extrinsic motivation so as to improve health 
workforce performance and contribute to a health system’s performance. Poor 
performance in health systems is a worldwide concern and greater investment in 
the health sector does not necessarily translate to better health outcomes (World 
Health Organization 2000).  
Performance incentives are increasingly promoted to enhance health workforce 
performance. Performance-based financing can be defined as “a system approach 
with an orientation on results defined as quantity and quality of service outputs and 
inclusion of vulnerable persons (…)”(Cordaid-SINA Health 2014). PBF is 
increasingly adopted in LIC although the strategy has been criticized on several 
fronts (Ireland, Paul, and Dujardin 2011). Nevertheless the consensus on the 
positive effect of the strategy is growing and the potential of performance-based 
financing to address structural problems of health systems is increasingly 
acknowledged. As argued by Meessen, Soucat, and Sekabaraga (2011), PBF can be a 
reform catalyst. PBF is now recognized as a holistic reform approach comparable to 
the old paradigms of primary healthcare and the Bamako initiative. The innovative 
provider payment mechanism is only one dimension of PBF. The approach is indeed 
more comprehensive as it entails, among others, health facility autonomy, 
integrated management of funds, autonomous human resource management, more 
efficient management of drugs, better quality standards, strengthened governance 
and accountability (Fritsche, Soeters, and Meessen 2014).  
As opposed to demand side interventions that incentivize the population to use 
healthcare services (such as conditional cash transfers or vouchers), this chapter 
focuses on a supply side mechanism that incentivizes healthcare providers to 
achieve quantitative and qualitative targets in the delivery of services. Such 
mechanisms usually rely on indicators related to providers’ practice with the quality 
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of care traditionally being measured from a clinical viewpoint; patients’ view on 
their interaction with the health system having often been overlooked. Patients’ 
satisfaction is however a desired outcome of care and an indicator of process quality 
(Donabedian 1988). Emphasis is increasingly placed on a patient’s perception of the 
quality of care (Andaleeb 2001) and responsiveness to patients is recognized as a 
critical dimension of health system performance (World Health Organization 2000) 
and of health workforce performance (World Health Organization 2006).  
Satisfaction with health services is a multidimensional phenomenon and is 
categorized in various ways in the literature. Patients’ satisfaction results from their 
perception of service quality including: interpersonal quality, which reflects the 
relationship between the service provider and the patient; technical quality, which 
relates to the outcomes achieved and the technical competence of the service 
provider; environment quality, which corresponds to environmental features that 
shape consumer service perceptions; and, administrative quality, which relates to 
facilitating (non-health related) services for the delivery and consumption of the 
health service (Dagger, Sweeney, and Johnson 2007). Existing evidence suggests 
that patients’ satisfaction is predominantly determined by the quality of medical 
care (including competences, infrastructure, health services, diagnostic and 
therapeutic procedures); information; equity in access; costs; waiting time; 
cleanliness; and, participative approach of care (Mpinga and Chastonay 2011).  
The patient-oriented perspective of this chapter is justified on three grounds. First, 
one cannot ignore the impact a strategy has on users’ satisfaction as it stands for a 
critical component of service quality evaluation. Second, patients’ satisfaction affects 
compliance with treatment and is therefore important from a public health 
perspective. Third, satisfied patients will continue using services and recommend 
services to others. As PBF in LIC primarily aims to increase utilization of health 
services, it is critical to ascertain that poor satisfaction with services is not 
hampering overall utilization.  
PBF focuses on providers and sets clinical targets: thus, the hypothesis is that PBF 
will result in improved satisfaction from clinical aspects, but will have no effect on 
satisfaction with non-clinical dimensions. The potential downside of PBF is indeed 
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that providers will have no incentive to raise patients’ satisfaction if they are not 
rewarded for it. However, as unsatisfied patients decide not to visit a facility again, 
providers may perceive the need to satisfy patients, even in the absence of a reward, 
in particular for dimensions that determine the most satisfaction and that they can 
influence. This hypothesis is tested with data from a randomized control trial of the 
national PBF scheme in Rwanda. In this scheme, targeting primary healthcare 
facilities, incentives were based on the quantity of outputs achieved, conditional on 
the quality of services delivered using 14 maternal and child health output 
indicators and 13 quality indicators (Basinga et al. 2011). Patients’ satisfaction was 
not measured.   
This chapter also aims to verify the reform potential of PBF with a particular focus 
on patients’ satisfaction in quality assurance. The analysis covers satisfaction with 
prenatal care and with curative care for children and adults. In the subsequent 
sections, a brief literature review on patients’ satisfaction and PBF is presented, 
followed by methods, results and a discussion with policy recommendations.  
3.2. BACKGROUND 
3.2.1. DEFINITION AND THEORIES OF PATIENTS’ SATISFACTION 
The review of the literature highlights two shortcomings: there is no clear definition 
of patients’ satisfaction and most surveys have methodological flaws. In the 
literature, there is often confusion between responsiveness and satisfaction. Strictly 
speaking, this article addresses responsiveness defined as the “legitimate 
expectations of the population for their interaction with the health system” (World 
Health Organization). Responsiveness relates to the actual experience with health 
services in the recent past, while satisfaction with the health system is a broader 
concept that can be influenced by illegitimate expectations and factors outside the 
control of health systems (Busse 2013, World Health Organization 2006).  
Attention paid to patients’ satisfaction can be sourced back to the desire for greater 
accountability of health professionals resulting from growing consumerism and the 
need to measure health sector in terms of efficiency (Williams 1994). Patients’ 
satisfaction in HIC has been extensively studied, although the theoretical basis is 
weak. One review concluded that the service marketing literature provided more 
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advanced consumer theories than the healthcare satisfaction models (Gill and White 
2009). The authors identify five major theories of patient satisfaction in healthcare: 
1) discrepancy and transgression theories of Fox and Storms (1981), according to 
which, patients are satisfied if their healthcare orientation is congruent with 
providers’ conditions; 2) expectancy-value theory of Linder-Pelz (1982), according 
to which, satisfaction derives from personal beliefs, values about care and earlier 
expectations about care; 3) determinants and components theory of Ware et al. 
(1983), which states that patient satisfaction is a function of patients’ subjective 
responses to experienced care; 4) multiple models theory of Fitzpatrick and 
Hopkins (1983) arguing that expectations are socially mediated; and, 5) the 
healthcare quality theory of Donabedian (1980) that considers patients’ satisfaction 
as a main outcome of the interpersonal process of care. In sum, although some argue 
that measures of technical and functional quality are appropriate for health services, 
measuring patients’ satisfaction is recommended: authors claim that it is a good 
proxy for patients’ assessment of service quality (Gill and White 2009). As stated by 
Donabedian (1988), whatever the strengths and limitations of patients’ satisfaction 
as an indicator of quality may be, it remains essential to assess the quality of 
healthcare systems.  
3.2.2. EVIDENCE ON PATIENTS’ SATISFACTION 
Most evidence on patient satisfaction with healthcare services comes from HIC and 
shows the importance of satisfaction with clinical over non-clinical dimensions. A 
meta-analysis performed by Hall and Dornan (1988) shows that humaneness, 
technical, and overall quality are the most important, while information, 
psychosocial problems, access, cost and bureaucracy are the least important 
determinants of patient satisfaction. In the US, satisfaction with patient-provider 
relationships outweighs satisfaction with other dimensions. Patients are also more 
satisfied under the fee-for-service payment mechanism as compared to prepaid 
schemes or gatekeeping arrangements (Crow et al. 2002).  
Patient satisfaction is associated with prior satisfaction with healthcare, 
respondents’ predisposition, utilization and the granting of patients’ desires (for 
tests and medications for instance). Sicker patients tend to be less satisfied, while 
older and less educated patients are more satisfied. Evidence on gender, ethnicity 
99 
 
and socio-economic status remains unclear (Hall and Dornan 1990, Crow et al. 2002, 
Sitzia and Wood 1997, Hekkert et al. 2009).  
Interestingly, satisfaction with a healthcare system largely depends on factors 
external to the health system: in Europe, patients’ experience with healthcare was 
found to explain only 10% of the variation in satisfaction, whereas patient 
expectations, health status, type of care and immunization coverage explained only 
17.5% (Bleich, Özaltin, and Murray 2009).  
3.2.3. PERFORMANCE INCENTIVES AND PATIENTS’ SATISFACTION 
In HIC, where performance incentives are common, patients’ satisfaction is given 
significant importance. In most pay-for-performance (P4P) schemes, a measure of 
patient satisfaction is used, along with process (content of care), outcome (effect of 
care on patients) and structure measures (facility, personnel, equipment) to 
calculate the financial incentive (Peterson et al. 2006). The measure generally 
assesses patients’ perception of the quality of care (such as information, cleanliness 
or privacy) (Rosenthal et al. 2004). However, published studies on the effect of P4P 
focus on a narrow definition of quality (clinical) and do not present patients’ 
perspectives (Young, Meterko, and Desai 2000, Campbell et al. 2007, Peterson et al. 
2006).  
In traditional LIC health systems, patients’ perception of health services is largely 
ignored. In LIC, PBF schemes have tended to adopt a narrow clinical focus with the 
risk that providers may then focus on clinical indicators at the expense of patients’ 
satisfaction. More recent PBF schemes however measure patients’ satisfaction 
(Cordaid-SINA Health 2014) but the results are not yet reported in the literature. 
This chapter takes an unusual viewpoint (from the patients’ perspective) to assess 
the effect of PBF on the quality of health services.  
Evidence from LIC is scant. In the DRC, Soeters et al. (2011) found that patients were 
more satisfied with the availability of drugs, perceived quality and respect for 
patients in districts participating in the PBF program. Waiting time was judged more 
acceptable in control districts, but the difference with PBF districts was not 
significant. Other evaluations of PBF schemes do not report the impact on patients’ 
satisfaction. Patients’ satisfaction in LIC is studied in relation to the status of health 
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facilities (public or private) with authors arguing that what differs between those 
facilities is the available financial incentive. In a comparative analysis of patients’ 
satisfaction with family planning services in Tanzania, Kenya and Ghana, 
Hutchinson, Do, and Agha (2011) found that patients were more satisfied with the 
process quality in private facilities, but found less difference in technical quality. 
Greater satisfaction with family planning services in private facilities was associated 
with process and structural factors, such as reduced waiting time and less stock 
outs. A systematic review using 80 studies on LIC also found that drug supply, 
waiting time, privacy, confidentiality, staff friendliness, communication, dignity and 
efforts were better in the private sector, but that patient satisfaction with care did 
not differ between public and private providers (Berendes et al. 2011).  
3.3. METHODS 
3.3.1. DATA 
Data was collected from 157 primary healthcare facilities, including 77 treatment 
facilities and 80 control facilities in 2008, after two years of PBF implementation in 
treatment facilities. Patient exit interviews were conducted with patients visiting 
the health center on the day of the interview for prenatal care, child curative care 
and adult curative care. In the case of children, respondents were the accompanying 
adult. Eight to twelve patients were interviewed for each service in each facility. 
Information collected from the patients included: patient characteristics, provider 
effort and patient satisfaction with services. Patients were asked to rank their 
satisfaction with medical and non-medical services according to five categories: 
very unsatisfied, unsatisfied, no opinion, satisfied and very satisfied for a list of ten 
satisfaction indicators (Table 3-1). 
Table 3-1: Satisfaction indicators 
 Satisfaction 
indicators 
Hypothesis on indicators 
Waiting time Patients expect to see a healthcare provider in an acceptable 
waiting time. Lower waiting time indicates better respect for 
patients.  
Cleanliness of the 
facility  
Patients expect the health facility to be clean. A clean and 
organized appearance can influence patients’ impressions 
about the facility.  
Availability of the Patients expect prescribed drugs to be available. Their 
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 Satisfaction 
indicators 
Hypothesis on indicators 
medicine satisfaction with services will increase with the availability of 
drugs.  
Time with the 
health provider 
Patients expect the consultation to last some time. Time spent 
with patients indicates a provider’s responsiveness to patients’ 
needs. 
Privacy during the 
examination 
Patients expect privacy during examination. Privacy illustrates 
respect of patients’ dignity. 
Staff attitude Patients expect staff to be responsive to their needs and to be 
professional. Staff attitude will influence patients’ perception 
about the facility.  
Explanation from 
provider 
Adequate information from the provider is critical to patients’ 
satisfaction and to ensure a good healing process.  
Cost of the 
medicine 
If patients perceive drug costs as excessive, it can affect their 
satisfaction. 
Cost of the service If patients perceive treatment costs as excessive, it can affect 
their satisfaction. 
Overall service 
received today 
Overall satisfaction with services will depend on satisfaction with 
the most determining dimensions of satisfaction (clinical 
dimensions) 
Source: Author (2015) 
3.3.2. VARIABLES 
To facilitate the interpretation of results, an index was constructed from the various 
dimensions of satisfaction. The traditional principal component analysis (PCA) 
method that creates indexes from dummy variables (Filmer and Pritchett 2001) was 
not appropriate, as satisfaction variables are ordinal. Using dummy indicators in 
PCA would have introduced fake correlations as there were more than two 
categories for a variable. Following Kolenikov and Angeles (2009), polychoric 
correlation, an alternative approach for the analysis of ordinal data using PCA, was 
used. It assumes that ordinal variables were obtained by categorizing normally 
distributed underlying variables, and that those unobserved variables followed a 
bivariate normal distribution. Polychoric correlation corresponds to the maximum 
likelihood estimate of that correlation.  
The first factor structure derived from polychoric correlation resulted in only one 
factor having an Eigenvalue over 1 and explaining 88% of the variation (Table 3-2). 
However, waiting time, time with provider and cleanliness were not well captured 
by the first factor as their uniqueness exceeded their contribution to factor 1 (Table 
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3-3). These variables were thus removed from factor 1, and factor 1 was normalized 
to facilitate interpretation. As further analysis showed that they could not be 
combined in an index, they were kept as single measures of satisfaction.  
 Table 3-2: Output of initial factor analysis 
Factor Eigenval. Diff. Prop. Cum. 
1 4.28670          3.52473 0.8823 0.882 
2 0.76197 0.53421 0.1568 1.039 
3 0.22776 0.08069 0.0469 1.086 
4 0.14707 0.0455 0.0303 1.116 
5 0.10157 0.13436 0.0209 1.137 
6 -0.03279 0.03236 -0.0067 1.130 
7 -0.06515 0.08863 -0.0134 1.117 
8 -0.15378 0.04091 -0.0317 1.085 
9 -0.19469 0.02532 -0.0401 1.045 
10 -0.22001 0 -0.0453 1 
 
Table 3-3: Contribution of variables to factor 1 
Variable Factor1 Uniqueness 
Waiting time 0.4164 0.8266 
Time w/ provider 0.5824 0.6608 
Cleanliness 0.596 0.6448 
Privacy 0.684 0.5321 
Staff attitude 0.7362 0.458 
Cost of service 0.6606 0.5636 
Cost of drug 0.6611 0.5629 
Avail. of drugs 0.6659 0.5565 
Explanation 0.6855 0.5301 
Overall service 0.7888 0.3778 
 
 
Four satisfaction measures were retained, including one index corresponding to 
satisfaction with clinical services and three measures of satisfaction corresponding 
to non-clinical services (Table 3-4).  
Table 3-4: Satisfaction measures retained for analysis 
Area Satisfaction 
measure 
Satisfaction indicators included in the 
measure 
Clinical 
services 
Clinical services 
index 
Privacy during examination, staff attitude, 
explanation, cost of medicine, cost of the 
service, availability of drugs, overall satisfaction 
Non-clinical 
services 
Waiting time Waiting time 
Time with 
provider 
Time with provider 
Cleanliness Cleanliness 
3.3.3. STATISTICAL METHODS  
3.3.3.1. Ordinary Least Squares 
Ordinary least squares were used for regressions on the clinical satisfaction index. 
OLS were compared to a censored model (Tobit) assuming no negative values. 
Regression outcomes from OLS and Tobit were comparable revealing the 
robustness of OLS outputs presented in this chapter. Independent variables in the 
models aimed to control for facility characteristics (public or faith-based, PBF 
treatment or control); individual characteristics (primary education, sex when 
relevant, age, health insurance); and characteristics of the health service (whether 
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the patient was given a prescription to buy drugs outside or to perform laboratory 
tests from another health facility). In the sample of pregnant women, additional 
controls included the months of pregnancy and whether it was their first prenatal 
care visit. In the sample of children, their age was controlled for. For all models, 
independent variables were included in the models based on variables’ availability 
and variables that proved to influence satisfaction in the literature. The review of 
the literature indeed revealed that sicker patients tend to be less satisfied, while 
older and less educated patients are more satisfied. Evidence on gender, ethnicity 
and socio-economic status remains unclear (Crow et al., 2002; Hall and Dornan, 
1990; Hekkert et al., 2009; Sitzia and Wood, 1997). 
3.3.3.2. Ordered probit and marginal effect 
The ordinal measures of satisfaction with non-clinical services (waiting time, time 
with provider and cleanliness) were modeled with ordered probit regressions. 
Independent variables included facility characteristics (public of faith-based, PBF 
treatment or control) and individual characteristics (primary education, sex, age 
and health insurance). Time spent waiting in the facility was added as a control in 
the regression on satisfaction with waiting time.  
The model is estimated using maximum likelihood and supposes the following 
underlying relationship:  
𝑦∗ = 𝑥′𝛽 + 𝜖 
where y* is the exact unobserved dependent variable (i.e. the exact level of a 
patient’s satisfaction); x’ is the vector of independent variables, and β is the vector of 
regression coefficients to estimate. As we cannot observe y*, the ordered probit 
allows observing different categories of responses as follows: 
𝑦 =
{
 
 
 
 
0  𝑖𝑓  𝑦∗ ≤ 0
1  𝑖𝑓  0 < 𝑦∗ ≤ 𝜇1
2  𝑖𝑓  𝜇1 < 𝑦
∗ ≤ 𝜇2
⋮
𝑁  𝑖𝑓  𝜇𝑁−1 < 𝑦
∗
 
The ordered probit uses observations on y, which are a form of censored data on y* 
and fits the parameter vector β. 
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As only the sign of coefficients of ordered probit regressions can be interpreted, 
marginal effects were computed. The marginal effect of an independent variable 
measures the impact of change in an independent variable on the expected change 
in the dependent variable. 
3.3.4. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
Data drawn from the household surveys, which provide information on the 
utilization of health services collected from 2,145 households in the catchment areas 
of the 157 primary healthcare facilities of the impact evaluation, was used to control 
for district level utilization of child curative care and prenatal care services. 
Following evidence of large regional disparities in utilization of basic health services 
in Rwanda, robustness checks verify whether the observed effect of PBF on 
satisfaction varies with a district level utilization of services.   
3.3.5. LIMITATIONS 
This chapter has its own limitations, although it is one of the first attempts to 
explore the effect of performance incentives on patients’ satisfaction in LIC. First, 
the questionnaires included only ten satisfaction dimensions, thus restricting the 
analysis. Second, not enough data were collected from the respondents on their 
assets which did not allow for computing a wealth index. Third, instructions given 
for the survey firm on the number of patients to interview in each facility were 
misunderstood in 2006; thus too few interviews were conducted on satisfaction at 
baseline. Only 2008 (follow-up) data is used in the analysis which does not allow for 
isolating the impact of PBF through a difference-in-difference technique. Only causal 
relationships can be drawn. Nevertheless, the analysis benefits from the randomized 
design of the study and rigorous evaluation of household perceptions of the quality 
of care in their health facility, measured from the household surveys, which showed 
a balance at baseline between treatment and control groups (Basinga et al. 2009). 
Due to data limitations, this chapter has to assume that satisfaction of patients 
exiting the same facilities was also comparable at baseline and that any difference 
observed at follow-up can be attributed to PBF.  
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3.4. RESULTS 
This section starts with a brief descriptive analysis of respondents’ satisfaction on 
the ten dimensions of satisfaction. Then, it provides results from multivariate 
analyses to assess whether PBF affects clinical and non-clinical satisfaction. Finally, 
robustness checks are presented to assess whether PBF has a differential effect 
according to the district level utilization of services.  
3.4.1. DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSES 
The majority of respondents were satisfied with prenatal care and curative care for 
children and adults. Overall satisfaction (respondent satisfied or very satisfied) with 
service reached 86% for adult curative care, 90% for child curative care and 95% 
for prenatal care. Satisfaction with the cost of drugs and services, which occurs in 
about 90% of cases, is probably due to the fact that most patients benefit from 
health insurance. Drugs delivered at the facility and medical services are thus free of 
charge, except for a small financial contribution. Dissatisfaction with waiting time is 
the largest for the three categories of care, as close to half of respondents were not 
satisfied (Figure 3-1 to Figure 3-3).  On average, patients waited for two and half 
hours before seeing a healthcare provider and 20% to 25% had to wait for more 
than three hours (and some up to eight hours). Descriptive statistics of independent 
variables included in the models are presented in Appendix 2. T-tests reveal overall 
balance between the treatment and control groups.   
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Figure 3-1: Satisfaction with curative care 
(adults) 
 
Figure 3-2: Satisfaction with prenatal care  
 
Figure 3-3: Satisfaction with curative care for children 
 
3.4.2. REGRESSION ANALYSES 
3.4.2.1. Adult curative care 
Adults seeking care from a facility implementing PBF are more satisfied with clinical 
services (+2.5%), time spent with provider and cleanliness of the facility compared 
to patients in control facilities. PBF has no effect on satisfaction with waiting time.  
Health insurance is the only other determinant of satisfaction with clinical services: 
insured patients were 6.7% more satisfied with clinical services than non-insured 
ones. This may reflect that patients that are more satisfied with services of the 
health facility are those with health insurance. Patients’ characteristics such as age, 
education or sex have no effect. Similarly, prescribing practices (for drugs or 
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laboratory tests) did not influence adults’ satisfaction with clinical services (Table 
3-5).  
Table 3-5: Satisfaction with clinical and non-clinical services for adult curative care 
VARIABLES Clinical 
services index 
Waiting 
time 
Time with 
provider 
Cleanlines
s 
  OLS OP OP OP 
Public (=1) -0.014 -0.025 0.002 -0.170** 
 (0.009) (0.064) (0.071) (0.070) 
PBF (=1) 0.025*** -0.016 0.119* 0.169** 
 (0.008) (0.061) (0.068) (0.067) 
Drug prescription 
(=1) 
-0.003    
 (0.008)    
Laboratory tests (=1) 0.024    
 (0.030)    
Has primary 
education (=1) 
0.013 0.044 0.005 -0.013 
 (0.008) (0.065) (0.072) (0.072) 
Male (=1) -0.006 -0.180*** 0.052 -0.033 
 (0.008) (0.063) (0.070) (0.069) 
Age 0.000 0.006*** 0.002 0.003 
 (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Has health insurance 
(=1) 
0.067*** 0.012 0.130 0.304* 
 (0.025) (0.164) (0.180) (0.177) 
Waiting time (hours)  -0.257***   
  (0.020)   
Observations 1,088 1,324 1,326 1,314 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
OLS= Ordinary Least Squares; OP = Ordered Probit 
Marginal effects computed in Table 3-6 show that men were 7% more likely to be 
unsatisfied or very unsatisfied with waiting times compared to women. A possible 
explanation could be that the opportunity cost of waiting is higher for men. Adults 
were also 7% less likely to be satisfied with an additional waiting hour and 3% less 
likely to be very satisfied. Age is positively associated with satisfaction with waiting 
time as older patients tend to be more satisfied. PBF has no effect on satisfaction 
with waiting time but a positive effect on satisfaction with time spent with provider 
as patients were 2% more likely to be very satisfied in treatment facilities. Patients 
in PBF facilities were also 4% more likely to be very satisfied with cleanliness. 
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Contrary to waiting time, patients’ characteristics did not influence satisfaction with 
time spent with the provider and the cleanliness of the facility.  
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Table 3-6: Satisfaction with non-clinical services related to adult curative care (marginal effects) 
 Very unsatisfied Unsatisfied No opinion Satisfied Very satisfied 
 Marginal 
effect  
SE Marginal 
effect  
SE Marginal 
effect  
SE Marginal 
effect  
SE Marginal 
effect  
SE 
WAITING TIME          
Public = 1 0.002 0.004 0.007 0.018 0.001 0.003 -0.007 0.017 -0.003 0.008 
PBF = 1 0.001 0.004 0.004 0.017 0.001 0.003 -0.004 0.016 -0.002 0.007 
Primary education = 1 -0.003 0.004 -0.012 0.018 -0.002 0.003 0.012 0.017 0.005 0.008 
Male = 1 0.012*** 0.004 0.051*** 0.018 0.007*** 0.003 -0.049*** 0.018 -0.020*** 0.007 
Age -0.000*** 0.000 -0.002*** 0.001 -0.000*** 0.000 0.002*** 0.001 0.001*** 0.000 
Health insurance = 1 -0.001 0.010 -0.003 0.046 -0.001 0.007 0.003 0.045 0.001 0.019 
Waiting time (hours) 0.016*** 0.002 0.072*** 0.006 0.011*** 0.002 -0.069*** 0.007 -0.030*** 0.003 
TIME WITH PROVIDER          
Public = 1 -0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.006 -0.000 0.006 -0.000 0.001 0.000 0.014 
PBF = 1 -0.002 0.001 -0.010* 0.006 -0.009* 0.005 -0.002 0.002 0.023* 0.013 
Primary education = 1 -0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.006 -0.000 0.006 -0.000 0.001 0.001 0.014 
Male = 1 -0.001 0.001 -0.005 0.006 -0.004 0.005 -0.001 0.002 0.010 0.014 
Age -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Health insurance = 1 -0.003 0.004 -0.012 0.019 -0.011 0.015 0.002 0.008 0.024 0.030 
CLEANLINESS          
Public = 1 0.001* 0.001 0.013** 0.005 0.014** 0.006 0.011* 0.006 -0.040** 0.017 
PBF = 1 -0.001 0.001 -0.014** 0.006 -0.015** 0.006 -0.009** 0.004 0.039** 0.015 
Primary education = 1 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.006 0.001 0.006 0.001 0.004 -0.003 0.016 
Male = 1 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.006 0.003 0.006 0.002 0.003 -0.007 0.016 
Age -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 
Health insurance = 1 -0.004 0.004 -0.031 0.022 -0.029 0.018 0.004 0.015 0.059** 0.029 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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3.4.3. PRENATAL CARE 
Results on satisfaction with prenatal care present some differences when compared 
to satisfaction levels with curative care for adults. As for adults, pregnant women 
seeking care from PBF facilities were more likely to be satisfied with clinical 
services (+1%). However, PBF also positively influenced satisfaction with waiting 
time which was not the case for adults.  Finally, PBF showed no effect on satisfaction 
with time spent with provider and cleanliness. Satisfaction with clinical services 
decreased in public facilities but increased when women were asked to perform 
laboratory tests from another facility (+1%). Satisfaction with care also rose slightly 
with months of pregnancy (Table 3-7).  
Table 3-7: Satisfaction with clinical and non-clinical services for prenatal care 
 Clinical 
services 
index 
Waiting 
time 
Time 
with 
provider 
Cleanliness 
 OLS OP OP OP 
Public (=1) -0.004* -0.153** -0.170** -0.210*** 
 (0.002) (0.068) (0.080) (0.075) 
PBF (=1) 0.006** 0.199*** -0.029 0.089 
 (0.003) (0.064) (0.074) (0.070) 
Drug prescription (=1) -0.001    
 (0.002)    
Laboratory tests (=1) 0.011**    
 (0.005)    
Has primary education (=1) -0.004 -0.128** -0.174** -0.104 
 (0.003) (0.065) (0.076) (0.071) 
Age 0.000 0.005 -0.012 0.006 
 (0.000) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) 
Has health insurance (=1) 0.002 -0.041 0.180 -0.034 
 (0.002) (0.121) (0.141) (0.134) 
Waiting time (hours) 0.000 -0.174***   
 (0.000) (0.018)   
Months pregnant 0.001*** 0.052*** 0.019 0.023 
 (0.000) (0.019) (0.022) (0.021) 
First prenatal visit (=1) 0.006    
 (0.004)    
Number of children  -0.032 0.005 -0.032 
  (0.028) (0.033) (0.031) 
Observations 683 1,197 1,196 1,192 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
OLS= Ordinary Least Squares; OP = Ordered Probit 
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Marginal effects associated with the three non-clinical dimensions of satisfaction 
showed that women were 3% more likely to be satisfied and 4% more likely to be 
very satisfied with waiting time in PBF facilities compared to the control group. 
Satisfaction with waiting time decreased by 4% among more educated women and 
with time spent waiting (-6% per hour) but this improved with months of 
pregnancy. Satisfaction with time spent with providers decreased with primary 
education (Table 3-8).  
Satisfaction with waiting time, time with provider and cleanliness of the facility was 
consistently greater in faith-based facilities compared to public facilities, with the 
probability of women being very satisfied increasing from 3% to 6% in faith-based 
facilities (Table 3-8). As for adults, most individual characteristics did not influence 
satisfaction with time spent with provider and cleanliness of the facility.  
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Table 3-8: Satisfaction with non-clinical services related to prenatal care (marginal effects) 
 Very unsatisfied Unsatisfied No opinion Satisfied Very satisfied 
  Marginal 
effect  
SE Marginal 
effect  
SE Marginal 
effect  
SE Marginal 
effect  
SE Marginal 
effect  
SE 
WAITING TIME           
Public = 1 0.007** 0.003 0.032** 0.014 0.012** 0.006 -0.021** 0.009 -0.031** 0.014 
PBF = 1 -0.010*** 0.004 -0.043*** 0.014 -0.016*** 0.005 0.030*** 0.010 0.038*** 0.012 
Primary education = 1 0.006* 0.003 0.027* 0.014 0.010* 0.005 -0.020* 0.010 -0.024** 0.012 
Age -0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.002 -0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Health insurance = 1 0.002 0.006 0.009 0.025 0.003 0.010 -0.006 0.016 -0.008 0.024 
Waiting time (hours) 0.009*** 0.002 0.037*** 0.004 0.014*** 0.002 -0.026*** 0.004 -0.034*** 0.004 
Months pregnant -0.003*** 0.001 -0.011*** 0.004 -0.004*** 0.002 0.008*** 0.003 0.010*** 0.004 
Number of children 0.002 0.001 0.007 0.006 0.003 0.002 -0.005 0.004 -0.006 0.005 
TIME WITH PROVIDER           
Public = 1 0.003* 0.002 0.004** 0.002 0.008** 0.004 0.029** 0.015 -0.044** 0.021 
PBF = 1 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.004 0.005 0.012 -0.007 0.019 
Primary education = 1 0.003* 0.002 0.005** 0.002 0.008** 0.004 0.027** 0.012 -0.043** 0.019 
Age 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.001 -0.003 0.002 
Health insurance = 1 -0.004 0.004 -0.006 0.005 -0.009 0.008 -0.023* 0.014 0.042 0.031 
Months pregnant -0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.003 0.004 0.005 0.006 
Number of children -0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.002 -0.001 0.005 0.001 0.008 
CLEANLINESS           
Public = 1 0.002* 0.001 0.011*** 0.004 0.016*** 0.006 0.030** 0.012 -0.059*** 0.022 
PBF = 1 -0.001 0.001 -0.005 0.004 -0.007 0.006 -0.011 0.009 0.024 0.019 
Primary education = 1 0.001 0.001 0.006 0.004 0.008 0.006 0.013 0.009 -0.028 0.019 
Age -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 
Health insurance = 1 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.007 0.003 0.010 0.005 0.019 -0.009 0.038 
Months pregnant -0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.001 -0.002 0.002 -0.003 0.003 0.006 0.006 
Number of children 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.004 -0.009 0.008 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
113 
 
3.4.4. CHILD CURATIVE CARE 
PBF showed to have the smallest effect on child curative care, as the strategy only 
influenced satisfaction with clinical services with respondents (accompanying 
adult) being 2% more satisfied in treatment facilities. PBF had no effect on 
satisfaction with waiting time, time with provider or cleanliness. As for adult 
curative care, satisfaction with clinical services improved by 5% among insured 
respondents and no other individual or service-related factor influenced satisfaction 
with clinical services (Table 3-9).  
Table 3-9: Satisfaction with clinical and non-clinical services for child curative care 
VARIABLES Clinical 
services 
index 
Waiting 
time 
Time with 
provider 
Cleanline
ss 
  OLS OP OP OP 
Public (=1) -0.005 0.043 -0.084 -0.189** 
 (0.010) (0.075) (0.085) (0.084) 
PBF (=1) 0.020** -0.007 -0.027 0.099 
 (0.010) (0.072) (0.080) (0.080) 
Drug prescription 
(=1) 
0.001    
 (0.010)    
Laboratory tests (=1) 0.030    
 (0.030)    
Has primary 
education (=1) 
-0.007 -0.172** -0.018 -0.040 
 (0.010) (0.072) (0.081) (0.080) 
Male (=1) -0.005 0.000 0.039 0.001 
 (0.013) (0.126) (0.141) (0.140) 
Age 0.001 0.003 0.007 -0.002 
 (0.001) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Has health insurance 
(=1) 
0.053** -0.291** 0.195 -0.052 
 (0.024) (0.125) (0.140) (0.139) 
Age of the child -0.006 -0.052* -0.122*** -0.038 
 (0.004) (0.028) (0.032) (0.031) 
Waiting time (hours)  -0.206***   
  (0.021)   
Observations 750 947 945 940 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
OLS= Ordinary Least Squares; OP = Ordered Probit 
As for other groups of patients, waiting time was the satisfaction dimension most 
influenced by individual characteristics. Insured respondents and those with 
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primary education were less likely to be satisfied or very satisfied with waiting time. 
Their satisfaction also decreased as they spent more time waiting. Satisfaction with 
time spent with the provider was higher for younger children. Finally, patients were 
4.5% more likely to be very satisfied with cleanliness in faith-based facilities (Table 
3-10).  
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Table 3-10: Satisfaction with non-clinical services related to child curative care (marginal effects) 
  Very unsatisfied Unsatisfied No opinion Satisfied Very satisfied 
  Marginal 
effect  
SE Marginal 
effect  
SE Marginal 
effect  
SE Marginal 
effect  
SE Marginal 
effect  
SE 
WAITING TIME           
Public = 1 -0.003 0.005 -0.012 0.021 -0.002 0.003 0.012 0.021 0.005 0.009 
PBF = 1 0.000 0.005 0.002 0.020 0.000 0.003 -0.002 0.020 -0.001 0.008 
Primary education = 1 0.012** 0.006 0.048** 0.020 0.007** 0.003 -0.048** 0.020 -0.020** 0.008 
Male =1 -0.000 0.009 -0.000 0.035 -0.000 0.006 0.000 0.035 0.000 0.015 
Age -0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.001 -0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 
Health insurance = 1 0.016*** 0.006 0.078** 0.032 0.016* 0.008 -0.069*** 0.025 -0.041* 0.021 
Age of the child 0.004* 0.002 0.014* 0.008 0.002* 0.001 -0.014* 0.008 -0.006* 0.003 
Waiting time (hours) 0.014*** 0.002 0.057*** 0.007 0.009*** 0.002 -0.056*** 0.007 -0.024*** 0.003 
TIME WITH PROVIDER           
Public = 1 0.001 0.001 0.008 0.007 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.006 -0.019 0.019 
PBF = 1 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.007 0.002 0.005 0.001 0.004 -0.006 0.017 
Primary education = 1 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.007 0.001 0.005 0.001 0.004 -0.004 0.018 
Male =1 -0.000 0.002 -0.003 0.012 -0.002 0.009 -0.002 0.009 0.009 0.032 
Age -0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 
Health insurance = 1 -0.003 0.003 -0.020 0.016 -0.013 0.010 -0.003 0.005 0.039 0.025 
Age of the child 0.001* 0.001 0.011*** 0.003 0.008*** 0.002 0.006** 0.003 -0.027*** 0.007 
CLEANLINESS           
Public = 1 0.003* 0.001 0.013** 0.006 0.015** 0.007 0.015* 0.008 -0.045** 0.021 
PBF = 1 -0.001 0.001 -0.007 0.006 -0.008 0.007 -0.006 0.006 0.023 0.019 
Primary education = 1 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.006 0.003 0.007 0.002 0.005 -0.009 0.018 
Male =1 -0.000 0.002 -0.000 0.010 -0.000 0.011 -0.000 0.009 0.000 0.032 
Age 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.001 
Health insurance = 1 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.009 0.004 0.011 0.004 0.011 -0.012 0.033 
Age of the child 0.001 0.000 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 -0.009 0.007 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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3.4.5. ROBUSTNESS CHECK 
Robustness checks were run to see whether satisfaction with clinical services 
(index) was influenced by regional disparities in the utilization of health services. 
Utilization of four or more prenatal care visits and of curative care for children in 
the event of an illness was aggregated at the district level to create two groups of 
districts (lower and upper) according to their utilization level. This grouping 
revealed that the overall coverage of four or more prenatal care visits was larger 
than that of curative care for children in the event of an illness. A higher utilization 
of services was observed in almost the same districts for both services (Southern 
and Northern part of the country) and Eastern districts consistently registered with 
lower utilization rates (Figure 3-4 and Figure 3-5).  
Figure 3-4: Coverage of 4 or more prenatal care 
visits (2 groups) 
 
Figure 3-5: Curative care for children in the event 
of an illness (2 groups) 
 
Source: Author (2015) 
The robustness checks confirm the positive effect of PBF on patients’ satisfaction 
with clinical services among pregnant women and children under-five. They reveal 
however that PBF has an effect on satisfaction of pregnant women only in districts 
where utilization of prenatal care is the lowest (+0.5%) and an effect on satisfaction 
with child curative care in places where utilization is the highest (+3%) (Table 
3-11).  
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Table 3-11: Robustness check for prenatal care and child curative care distinguishing district 
level utilization 
  Clinical services index  
for prenatal care 
Clinical services index  
for child curative care 
 Lower 
group 
Upper 
group 
Lower group Upper group 
Public (=1) -0.004*** -0.006 0.003 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.008) (0.016) (0.014) 
PBF (=1) 0.004*** 0.007 0.009 0.026* 
 (0.001) (0.007) (0.015) (0.014) 
Drug prescription 
(=1) 
-0.001 -0.005 -0.015 0.022* 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.014) (0.013) 
Laboratory tests 
(=1) 
0.007 0.014** 0.059 -0.002 
 (0.005) (0.007) (0.039) (0.027) 
Has primary 
education (=1) 
-0.001 -0.009 -0.016 0.008 
 (0.001) (0.009) (0.014) (0.014) 
Male (=1)   -0.000 -0.020 
   (0.018) (0.019) 
Age -0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Has health 
insurance (=1) 
0.001 0.003 0.047 0.070*** 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.037) (0.023) 
Waiting time 
(hours) 
0.000 -0.000   
 (0.000) (0.001)   
Months pregnant 0.001*** 0.000   
 (0.000) (0.000)   
First prenatal visit 
(=1) 
0.004*** 0.008   
 (0.001) (0.009)   
Age of the child   -0.004 -0.008 
   (0.006) (0.005) 
Observations 386 297 452 298 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
3.5. DISCUSSION 
This chapter focuses on health workforce performance from the patients’ viewpoint, 
by looking at how responsive health workers are to patient needs. The randomized 
implementation of the strategy allows for a comparison of treatment and control 
facilities to see how PBF affects satisfaction measured across ten clinical and non-
clinical dimensions.  
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This chapter adds to knowledge in at least three ways: first, it provides evidence on 
patients’ satisfaction with health services (and health workforce responsiveness) in 
rural Rwanda. Second, it provides evidence on determinants of patient satisfaction 
and discusses differences between HIC and LIC that can serve as policy 
recommendations. Third, it confirms the PBF reform potential related to quality 
assurance and patients’ satisfaction. 
3.5.1. PATIENTS’ SATISFACTION WITH HEALTH SERVICES IN RWANDA 
As observed in other countries (Sitzia and Wood 1997, Bernhart et al. 1999), 
patients interviewed in Rwanda reported high satisfaction levels for clinical and 
non-clinical services. This contrasts with the suboptimal use of basic health services 
in the country and suggests a response-bias as patients tend to hold back negative 
views. Respondents show their lack of satisfaction only in the case of waiting time, 
probably because it is the most tangible measure and can be easily quantified.  
PBF has a positive effect on satisfaction with clinical services, as observed in the 
DRC (Soeters et al. 2011), but its effect on non-clinical services varies. Results 
suggest two interesting patterns: first, PBF primarily influences satisfaction related 
to the clinical content of care: satisfaction with clinical services improved by 2.5% 
for adult care, 1% for prenatal care and 2% for childcare in PBF facilities, suggesting 
that productivity gains achieved through PBF did not hamper healthcare service 
quality as perceived by patients. This is a key finding as service quality under pay-
for-performance schemes is a major concern in the literature (Greene and Nash 
2009, Peterson et al. 2006). Second, PBF can influence non-clinical dimensions of 
satisfaction if healthcare providers find an incentive to do so, that is to say, if the 
dimension is somehow compatible with the existing incentives. For instance, with 
PBF, the proportion of very satisfied adults increases by 2% for time spent with 
provider and by 4% for cleanliness of the facility, whereas those dimensions are not 
influenced by PBF for pregnant women and children. This may reveal that contrary 
to pregnant women who primarily pay attention to clinical services as they have no 
alternative but to visit the health facility, adults that are not satisfied with non-
clinical services could have chosen self-medication and thus not visited the facility. 
As a consequence, healthcare providers have an incentive to satisfy adults with 
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clinical but also non-clinical dimensions so that they visit the facility again and 
advise other people to do so, which will have a positive effect of providers’ earnings. 
Interestingly, PBF has no effect on waiting time except for pregnant women: 
pregnant women are 7% more likely to be satisfied or very satisfied with waiting 
times in PBF facilities. This suggests that healthcare providers have adopted a 
coping strategy to raise satisfaction among patients that represent the largest 
potential financial gain. If pregnant women are very pleased, they may visit the 
facility again for prenatal care (rewarded service) and institutional delivery (the 
service with the largest financial reward). This contradicts evidence from the DRC 
where PBF had a negative (but not significant) effect on waiting time (Soeters et al. 
2011). In the case of adults and children, dissatisfaction with waiting time can 
reflect the lack of human resources, space and equipment, but also poor 
responsiveness of healthcare providers which do not have an incentive to reduce 
waiting times.  
Satisfaction with clinical services is greater among insured patients (+7% for adults 
and +5% for children). Prescribing laboratory tests also influences a pregnant 
woman’s satisfaction as she may feel that the provider is taking good care of her. 
Interestingly, individual characteristics do not influence patients’ satisfaction with 
clinical services, but only satisfaction with non-clinical services. This study finds 
that women, older patients and less educated patients tend to be more satisfied with 
non-clinical services in Rwanda, which is in accordance with published evidence on 
the determinants of patients’ satisfaction (Hall and Dornan 1990, Crow et al. 2002, 
Sitzia and Wood 1997, Hekkert et al. 2009). The results also confirm evidence on 
satisfaction according to the status of facilities (public or private) in LIC (Berendes 
et al. 2011)  as differences between public and faith-based facilities were found only 
for non-clinical services.  
3.5.2. PBF AND HEALTH WORKFORCE PERFORMANCE 
The case of Rwanda provides a unique opportunity to comprehensively assess the 
impact of PBF on health workforce performance (World Health Organization 2006). 
The positive effect of PBF on health workforce competences was reported by 
Basinga et al. (2010). Chapter 2 shows that PBF improves the availability of 
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healthcare providers by cutting absenteeism by 6% to 9% and that PBF can result in 
improved productivity by placing a higher workload on staff and cutting 
absenteeism. This chapter shows that PBF also improves health workforce 
responsiveness for clinical services. This entails satisfaction with explanation, staff 
attitude, privacy, cost of service and drugs and overall satisfaction. PBF can also 
improve some non-clinical dimensions of responsiveness that depend on healthcare 
providers and for which they can perceive an indirect incentive to improve patients’ 
satisfaction. Results also suggest that healthcare providers tend to satisfy patients 
associated with the greatest reward (pregnant women in the case of Rwanda) but 
not at the expense of other patients. Further, in none of the cases was PBF 
negatively associated with satisfaction, showing that efficiency gains are not 
achieved at the expense of service quality or patient satisfaction.  
In sum, PBF can improve all dimensions of health workforce performance. This 
stands for a major finding as this chapter is the first to show that performance gains 
resulting from incentives to suppliers are not achieved at the expense of patients’ 
experience with healthcare. This is even more remarkable in the case of Rwanda as 
the PBF scheme did not include any assessment of patients’ satisfaction. This 
suggests that improvements in other dimensions of health workforce performance 
mechanically resulted in improvements in the fourth dimension; all dimensions are 
intertwined. 
3.5.3. LIC SPECIFICITIES 
Contrary to HIC, the assessment of patients’ satisfaction is not systematic in LIC and 
only limited evidence exists. Further, LIC traditional health systems are not well 
organized to internalize patient satisfaction. Until recently, performance-based 
financing schemes did not include a measure of satisfaction. As satisfaction with 
health services determines future utilization, attention paid to patients’ satisfaction 
is however critical to raise the overall utilization of basic health services in LIC.  
While HIC intend to limit the number of contacts between patients and the 
healthcare system, some basic maternal and child health services remain 
underutilized in LIC, particularly by the most vulnerable. Low utilization is a major 
impediment to patients becoming a countervailing force because the most 
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unsatisfied patients rarely or never use the services. Results from the robustness 
check suggest that PBF improves satisfaction with clinical services, only from a 
certain threshold and up to a certain level. For child curative care, where the 
utilization of services does not exceed one third of cases, PBF could make a 
difference, but only in districts where utilization is higher. For prenatal care services 
which are more commonly used, PBF can influence satisfaction, but only in districts 
with lower utilization. Contrary to high income countries where patients represent a 
countervailing force and can influence healthcare providers’ attitudes, patients from 
LIC are not empowered to oppose to healthcare providers.  
3.5.4. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
The literature review has suggested that healthcare managers and decision makers 
in LIC should consider service quality and patients’ satisfaction as important 
strategic objectives. Patients’ satisfaction with healthcare services is particularly 
critical in LIC where the population lacks trust in health services and where 
utilization of basic health services is low. However, the case study on Rwanda did 
not enable to measure the impact of integrating satisfaction measures in the 
incentive mechanism.  
The potential of performance-based financing in addressing structural problems of 
health systems should be acknowledged. As argued by Meessen, Soucat, and 
Sekabaraga (2011), PBF can be a reform catalyst. The Rwanda case shows that, 
although PBF focuses on suppliers of healthcare services and on the process of care, 
it can improve patients’ experience with healthcare services and improve their 
satisfaction with clinical and some non-clinical services. This should further 
encourage policymakers to explore synergies between PBF and other strategies 
aimed at improving fuller utilization and higher quality of health services.  
3.6. CONCLUSION 
This study provides evidence on patients’ satisfaction with primary healthcare 
services in LIC. It contributes in filling a knowledge gap by looking at an unexplored 
aspect of performance-based financing, taking a patient’s perspective to see how 
PBF affects healthcare services and healthcare workers’ responsiveness. It thus 
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complements the body of evidence on the impact of PBF on health workforce 
performance measured in terms of competence, availability and productivity.  
This chapter supports the hypothesis that PBF succeeds in improving all health 
patients’ satisfaction levels with health services, in particular for clinical related 
services. Improvements in staff availability, productivity and competences can 
result in patients being more satisfied with both clinical and non-clinical services 
provided. In other words, efficiency gains are not achieved at the expense of a 
perceived quality of care. In some instances, PBF can also improve satisfaction with 
non-clinical dimensions if they can generate future financial gains.  
The positive effect of PBF on patient satisfaction confirms that PBF is more than a 
provider payment mechanism, because it can contribute in strengthening health 
systems. As satisfaction with services can improve healthcare utilization and health 
outcomes, LIC should build on the experiences of HIC to respond better to the voice 
of the patients and include their feedback in quality assessments. As PBF is 
increasingly implemented in African countries, its reform catalyst potential should 
further be explored.   
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PART 3: EQUITY 
4. CAN PERFORMANCE-BASED FINANCING HELP IN 
REACHING THE POOR WITH MATERNAL AND CHILD 
HEALTH SERVICES? THE EXPERIENCE OF RURAL 
RWANDA11 
ABSTRACT 
More than twenty countries in Africa are scaling up performance-based financing 
(PBF) but its impact on equity in access to health services remains to be 
documented. This chapter draws on evidence from Rwanda to examine the capacity 
of PBF to ensure equal access to key health interventions, especially in rural areas 
where most of the poor live. Specifically, it focuses on maternal and child health 
services, distinguishing two wealth groups and uses data from a rigorous impact 
evaluation.  
The difference in difference technique is used and different model specifications are 
tested: a control for unobserved heterogeneity and common random error using a 
linear probability model, seemingly unrelated regression equations as well as 
clustering and fixed effects.  
Results suggest that in Rwanda from 2006 to 2008 PBF improved efficiency rather 
than equity for most health services. We find that PBF achieved efficiency gains by 
improving access to health services for those easier to reach; generally, the 
relatively more affluent and was less effective in reaching the poorest. Results 
illustrate the advantages of rigorous randomized impact evaluation data, as results 
published earlier using a nationally representative survey (DHS) were not able to 
capture the potential negative effect on equity of the PBF scheme in Rwanda.  
This chapter advocates building mechanisms targeting the vulnerable groups in PBF 
strategies. It also highlights the need to understand the impact of PBF together with 
                                                             
11 This chapter is based on a paper accepted for publication in the International 
Journal of Health Planning and Management.  
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the specific development of health insurance coverage and the overall organization 
of the health system. 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
One year before the deadline of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), most 
countries were not running to schedule. Goal 4, aiming to cut mortality among 
children under 5 by two-thirds between 1990 and 2015 is unlikely to be met in 
Africa, despite substantial progress. Africa still has the world’s highest under 5 
mortality rate, accounting for 1 in 9 child deaths (United Nations Economic 
Commission for Africa et al. 2014).  Over the last decade, an unprecedented search 
for strategies capable to accelerate progress toward these ambitious targets has 
taken place. 
There is growing recognition that as aggregate targets, MDGs may hide inequalities 
within countries. In an analysis conducted over 54 countries, Barros et al. (2012) 
found inequalities for most services. Skilled birth attendant coverage was found to 
be the least equitable intervention, followed by the indicator ‘four or more prenatal 
care visits’. The poorest children are also 2 to 3 times more likely to die or to be 
malnourished than better off children (UN System Task Team on the Post-2015 UN 
Development Agenda 2012).   
This recognition invites researchers to assess the performance in terms of equity of 
strategies promoted in low income countries (LIC). Performance-based financing 
(PBF) is one of these strategies. As a reform proposition (Meessen, Soucat, and 
Sekabaraga 2011), it aims to address systemic shortcomings of health systems in 
LIC. It focuses on the supply side and aims at improving the performance of the 
service delivery system by encouraging effort and compliance with recommended 
clinical practice, leading to improved access to health services (Soeters, Habineza, 
and Peerenboom 2006, Meessen, Kashala, and Musango 2007, Eichler 2006, Palmer 
et al. 2006).  
While there is growing evidence of the effectiveness of PBF, there is less evidence on 
the distribution of its effects. Most evidence is focused on the impact of the strategy 
in terms of the use of services and quality of care, but less is known on its cost-
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effectiveness, equity impact and potential adverse effects (Witter et al. 2012, Witter 
et al. 2013). It is however likely that the strategy can have a negative impact on 
equity in access to services as it can encourage health workers to cherry-pick 
patients that make it easier to reach targets (Ireland, Paul, and Dujardin 2011). 
Rwanda is one of the few countries in the world that is on track to reach the health 
related MDGs (Binagwaho et al. 2014) and the poor have not been left aside from 
progress achieved. Strategies aimed to improve financial access for the poor have 
resulted in increased utilization of health services and lower out-of-pocket 
payments. The country has experienced a rapid scale-up of health insurance 
schemes from 7% of the target population in 2003 to 85% in 2008 (Rwanda 
Ministry of Health 2009) thus improving equity in access to basic health services 
(Saksena et al. 2010). As a result, health spending and catastrophic expenditures 
have declined (Sekabaraga, Diop, and Soucat 2011). Rwanda is also one of the few 
countries in the world that has implemented PBF at the national scale.  
Evidence from developed countries on the impact of performance-based financing 
(or pay-for-performance – P4P) on access to care for disadvantaged groups is 
mixed. The design of the schemes and context in which they are implemented also 
vary. Some studies show that P4P may exacerbate disparities in healthcare (Greene 
and Nash 2009) while others find no impact on equity in access to care (Crawley et 
al. 2009). Setting up a targeted mechanism for vulnerable groups is a critical 
element to improve access to care for these groups (Peterson et al. 2006).  
Evidence from developing countries is more limited (Lagarde and Palmer 2006) and 
the diversity of schemes and contexts even more flagrant. In a review of 14 PBF 
experiences, the impact on equity was measured in only three cases (Loevinsohn 
2008). Still, available evidence insists on the importance of targeting the poor as the 
better-off could be the main beneficiaries of an increase in utilization (Gwatkin, 
Bhuiya, and Victora 2004). Equity in access can improve only when the poor are 
explicitly targeted by a PBF scheme, such as in urban Bangladesh and Cambodia 
(Loevinsohn 2008). In Rwanda, using Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) data, 
Priedeman et al. (2013) show that PBF was neither a pro-poor nor a pro-rich 
strategy. These latter results are further debated in the discussion section. In 
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neighboring Burundi, PBF was found to be pro-rich in the case of institutional 
deliveries, but pro-poor in the case of immunization (Bonfrer, Van de Poel, and Van 
Doorslaer 2014).  
In the absence of clear and robust evidence, this chapter first seeks to examine the 
distributional impact of PBF on access to basic health services using data from a 
randomized control trial evaluating the impact of PBF in Rwanda. The analysis 
covers a large range of maternal and child health interventions. The hypothesis is 
that the population uniformly benefits from an increase in the volume of care 
because the implementation of PBF followed a situation where no mechanism 
existed to target the poor. 
In the following sections, background information is provided on the utilization of 
basic health services in Rwanda, followed by details on methods, results and a 
discussion providing policy implications. 
4.2. BACKGROUND 
4.2.1. OVERALL ACCESS TO BASIC HEALTH SERVICES IN RWANDA 
In Rwanda, increases in the health workforce and their skills, performance-based 
financing, health insurance, and better leadership and governance led to impressive 
results in service use. Births attended by skilled personal rose by 77% between 
2006 and 2010 compared with 26% between 2000 and 2005. Similarly, 
contraceptive prevalence rose by 351% against 150% (Bucagu et al. 2012).   
Rapid increases in use of essential maternal and child health services resulted in 
significant progress in health outcomes. The infant and under-five mortality rates 
fell drastically from 121 per 1,000 to 50 per 1,000 and from 217 per 1,000 to 76 per 
1,000 respectively between 2000 and 2010. The maternal mortality ratio also 
decreased, although not significantly from 1,071 maternal deaths per 100,000 live 
births in 2000 to 750 in 2005. The use of modern contraceptive rose from 10.3% in 
2005 to 45.1% in 2010 and the percentage of children taken to a healthcare 
provider in the event of diarrhea rose from 14.1% to 37.2% over the same period 
(National Institute of Statistics of Rwanda 2006, 2009, 2001) (Table 4-1). 
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4.2.2. EQUITY IN ACCESS TO BASIC HEALTH SERVICES IN RWANDA 
It is significant to note that the poor experienced significant improvements in access 
to basic services. Although the rich still used more services than the poorest in 2010, 
the gap between the rich and the poor narrowed in many of the health services 
(Table 4-1). Using the 2005 and 2010 DHS data, Pierce, Heaton, and Hoffmann 
(2014) show that the greatest increases in health center deliveries occurred among 
less educated, less wealthy and rural Rwandan women. Strategies aimed at 
improving financial access for the poor resulted in an increased utilization of health 
services and lower out-of-pocket payments. Health spending and catastrophic 
expenditures have declined (Sekabaraga, Diop, and Soucat 2011). The poorest also 
benefited from significant improvements in health outcomes. In 2005, the under-
five mortality rate for the poorest quintile (211 per 1,000) was almost twice as high 
as the level for the richest quintile (122 per 1,000) but the gap between the two 
groups was cut by half between 2005 and 2010. The same pattern is true for infant 
mortality rate. Finally, the poorest experienced significant improvements in fertility, 
but the gap between the poorest and the richest widened. The gap remained the 
same for stunting but little improvement was achieved (Table 4-1). 
Table 4-1: Use of basic health services and health outcomes for richest and poorest quintile 
(2005-2010) 
  2005 2010 
  Q1 Q5 Tot. gap  Q1 Q5 Tot. gap  
Fertility 6.1 5 6.1 1.1 5.4 3.4 4.6 2 
IMR (/1000) 114 73 86 41 70 50 50 20 
U5MR (/1000) 211 122 152 89 119 75 76 44 
Use of modern FP 
(%) 
6 22 10 16 38 50 45 12 
ANC by trained 
personnel (%) 
92 96 94 4 97 99 98 2 
Assisted delivery 
(%) 
27 66 39 39 61 85 69 24 
Children < 5 taken 
to health provider 
for diarrhea (%) 
13 18 14 5 26 50 37 24 
Children under 5 
stunted (%) 
55 30 45 25 54 26 44 28 
Source: Author (2015): using DHS 2005 and 2010 data. 
Note: FP=Family Planning; U5MR= Under-five mortality rate; IMR= Infant mortality 
rate; Q1= poorest quintile; Q5= richest quintile 
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4.3. METHODS 
4.3.1. DATA 
4.3.1.1. Household surveys 
The database contains baseline and follow-up rounds of household data collected in 
2006 and 2008 for a total of 166 primary healthcare facilities and 2,145 households 
in the catchment areas of these facilities. Thirteen zones, of about 15 to 20 
households were initially sampled for each health facility. Households with at least 
one child below the age of six were selected until the fulfillment of the sample 
(Basinga et al. 2011). The same households were interviewed at baseline and 
follow-up thus allowing panel data analysis. Household surveys provide basic socio-
demographic characteristics of a population, data and health status and utilization 
rates of health services.   
The analyses are performed using three different groups of population: a group of 
married women aged 15-49 for the analyses on family planning, a group of women 
who were pregnant in the two years preceding the survey for the analyses of 
maternal health services; and, a group of children up to 5 years of age for analyses 
on child health services. Dependent variables are services that were incentivized as 
part of the PBF strategy:  institutional deliveries, use of modern family planning, 
‘four or more prenatal care visits’, ‘prenatal care during the first quarter’ and 
‘preventive and curative child care in the past four weeks’ and for which baseline 
data showed lower utilization by the poorest.  
Individual, household and health facility characteristics were added in the 
specification as explanatory variables: family members, children under six in each 
household, the distance between the household and the facility, whether the 
individual had health insurance and the status of the health facility (public or faith-
based). Specific controls for the analyses on women included years of schooling, 
marital status, partner living in the household, prior pregnancies and age. Specific 
controls for the children’s analyses included whether the parents lived in the 
household, whether the mother had primary education, health insurance, the 
children’s age and sex. The decision to include those control variables was guided by 
theory and published literature using the same dataset (Basinga et al. 2011).  
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4.3.1.2. Wealth groups 
Since data on income or consumption was not available, a wealth index was 
estimated to proxy living standards using a principal component analysis. As the 
same households were interviewed at baseline and follow-up, wealth groups were 
created according to the baseline wealth index and households’ wealth status was 
categorized according to the baseline in both rounds. The two groups called, the 
upper and lower groups, thus represent households below and above the median 
wealth at baseline.  
The asset score includes the following items: complete sofa set; refrigerator; deep 
freezer; radio; music system; television; satellite dish; video deck;  DVD player; 
computer and accessories; landline phone; mobile phone; washing machine; 
mosquito net; ventilator; air conditioner; sawing machine; bed; wardrobe; metallic 
library; table; chair; car; lorry/trailer; motorcycle; boat; and, bicycle. Table 4-2 
reports the assets possessed by households in the lower and upper wealth groups in 
both waves. It reveals three important findings: first, as discussed later in the 
chapter, households in the upper group are not rich households. The sample was 
drawn from rural Rwanda where the population is mostly poor. Thus, the upper 
group households do not possess assets that characterize wealth such as a car, a 
refrigerator or air conditioning. Second, the categorization of the population in the 
two wealth groups succeeded in constituting groups that differ in the assets they 
possess. Households from the upper group are more likely to possess a complete 
sofa set, a radio, music system, mobile phone, mosquito net, bed, wardrobe, table 
and bicycle. Indeed, assets of the lowest group households are limited to radio (26% 
in 2008), mosquito net (63%), bed (43%), table (40%) and chair (81%). Third, 
overall wealth status of households improved over the two year period as the 
number of assets possessed by households increased overtime as well as the 
proportion of households possessing a given asset. For instance, 18% of households 
possessed a mobile phone in 2008 against 2% in 2006.  
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Table 4-2: Households assets according to wealth group and wave 
 Baseline (2006) Follow-up (2008) 
 Lower 
group 
Upper 
Group 
Mean Lower 
group 
Upper 
Group 
Mean 
Complete sofa 
set 
0.0% 7.9% 2.5% 0.0% 15.3% 9.8% 
Refrigerator 0.0% 0.4% 0.1% 0.0% 1.3% 0.8% 
Deep freezer 0.0% 1.6% 0.5% 0.0% 1.7% 1.1% 
Radio 36.0% 80.4% 50.0
% 
26.5% 88.7% 66.2% 
Music system 0.0% 15.3% 4.8% 0.0% 8.1% 5.2% 
Television 0.0% 0.7% 0.2% 0.0% 2.6% 1.7% 
Satellite dish 0.0% 0.4% 0.1% 0.0% 1.6% 1.0% 
Video deck,  DVD 0.0% 0.3% 0.1% 0.0% 2.2% 1.4% 
Computer 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 1.6% 1.0% 
Landline phone 0.0% 0.3% 0.1% 0.0% 1.7% 1.1% 
Mobile phone 0.0% 7.3% 2.3% 0.0% 28.9% 18.5% 
Satellite dish 0.0% 0.3% 0.1% 0.0% 1.5% 0.9% 
Washing 
machine  
0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 1.5% 1.0% 
Mosquito nets 9.7% 61.1% 25.9
% 
63.6% 94.5% 83.3% 
Ventilator 0.0% 0.3% 0.1% 0.0% 1.2% 0.8% 
Air conditioner 0.0% 0.4% 0.1% 0.0% 1.2% 0.8% 
Sawing machine 0.0% 3.3% 1.0% 0.0% 4.4% 2.8% 
Bed 50.5% 82.0% 60.4
% 
44.3% 86.3% 71.2% 
Wardrobe 0.0% 15.6% 4.9% 0.0% 11.5% 7.3% 
Metallic library  0.0% 3.3% 1.0% 0.0% 4.0% 2.6% 
Table 53.5% 83.2% 62.9
% 
40.1% 83.0% 67.5% 
Chair 84.4% 84.9% 84.5
% 
81.6% 91.1% 87.7% 
Car 0.0% 1.9% 0.6% 0.0% 2.1% 1.4% 
Lorry / trailer 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 1.5% 0.9% 
Moto cycle 0.0% 1.5% 0.5% 0.0% 2.4% 1.5% 
Boat 0.0% 0.9% 0.3% 0.0% 2.8% 1.8% 
Bicycle 1.2% 51.6% 17.2
% 
0.4% 34.1% 22.0% 
Source: Author (2015) 
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4.3.2. STATISTICAL METHODS 
4.3.2.1. Clustered t-tests 
Descriptive analyses including t-tests were performed for all dependent and 
independent variables in the models to compare the means in the treatment and 
control groups at baseline. This enables to check whether the randomization 
worked as expected, and if treatment and control groups were balanced before 
implementing PBF in treatment districts. As the data is randomized in clusters, t-
tests were performed using clustering at the district-by-year level. The importance 
of testing the equality of samples lies in that randomization does not guarantee that 
control and treatment groups are comparable, and hence controls need to be added 
in the regression.  
Clustered t-tests for the variables of interest at baseline and follow-up by wealth 
groups were also run to assess difference in access to basic services according to 
wealth status in both years. This enables us to check the validity of the data used in 
this chapter by comparing results to those of the demographic and health surveys.  
4.3.2.2. Regression analyses 
As in chapter 2, a difference-in-difference model was used because the study lost its 
randomized design and shifted to a quasi-experimental status thus making the case 
for using difference-in-difference. Although the dependent variables are 
dichotomous, a Linear Probability Model was preferred to logistic regression as 
interactions in non-linear models are not consistently interpretable (Ai and Norton 
2003). The regression specification of the difference-in-difference model using LPM 
is:  
ititiiiit tTtTDDY    .   
where Y is the outcome of interest, T is the treatment variable (0= control; 1= 
treatment), t is the time dummy (0 = 2006; 1=2008), X is a list of time varying 
individual characteristics and Ɛ is the error term. The coefficient of the interaction 
of T and t (DD) gives the estimate of the impact of treatment on outcome Y.  
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A series of robustness checks were run to assess the robustness of regression 
coefficients. As there are reasons to believe that the probability of using one health 
service is linked to the probability of using another, Seemingly Unrelated Regression 
Equations (SURE) were completed. SURE provide the advantage of gaining eﬃciency 
in estimation by combining information on diﬀerent equations and by imposing or 
testing restrictions that involve parameters in diﬀerent equations (Moon and 
Perron 2006, Zellner 1962). In practice, SURE enable us to run several regression 
equations simultaneously as error terms across the equations can be correlated. The 
regression specification of the SURE are:  
ititiiiit
ititiiiit
nnntnTtTDDnnYn
tTtTDDY






.
1111.111

  
where Y = 1,… ,n are the outcomes of interest, T is the treatment variable, t is the 
time dummy, X is a list of time varying individual characteristics and the coefficient 
of the interaction of T and t (DD) gives the estimate of the impact of treatment on 
outcome Y.  
A second set of robustness checks were run using fixed-effects and clustering. Fixed 
effects control the effect of unobservable characteristics that can influence the 
dependent variable (Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan 2004, Khandker, Koolwal, 
and Samad 2010). They mitigate the risk of omitted variable bias related to 
unobservable variables that do not change over time or across facilities. As 
performed in a previous analysis using the same data, facilities and time fixed effects 
were used to control for time and time-invariant locations (Basinga et al. 2011). 
Further, clustered standard errors were computed. Clustering allows the error 
terms to be correlated in the same cluster. As randomization was conducted at the 
district level and facilities in the same district are more likely to share common 
observable and unobservable characteristics, robust standard errors clustered at 
the district level were computed. As a potential unobservable characteristic is more 
likely to be auto-correlated within a cluster after implementing PBF, clustering is 
done at the interaction of the district with post intervention level (38 clusters) 
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(Basinga 2009). The regression specification of the difference-in-difference model 
using clustering and fixed effects is:  
ijtijtiiijjijt tTtTDD    .  
where T is the treatment variable, t is the time dummy, λj are facility fixed effects, X 
is a list of time varying individual characteristics and the coefficient of the 
interaction of T and t (DD) gives an estimate of the impact of treatment on outcome 
Yijt for individual i living in the catchment area of facility j in year t.  
4.3.3. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY  
All multivariate statistical analyses were performed on three groups: total group, 
lower group and upper group, to see whether there is a difference in the impact of 
PBF according to wealth status. Four different specifications were used successively. 
Specification 1 specifies a linear relationship between the dependent variable and 
the interaction between the treatment variable and the year variable without any 
control. Specification 2 adds a selection of explanatory variables to Specification 1. 
Specification 3 adds an interaction between PBF and insurance to describe the 
simultaneous influence of the two variables rather than the additive influence. 
Finally, Specification 4 adds an interaction between PBF and the asset index to 
provide a different measurement of the relationship between wealth and PBF.  
Only results of Specification 3, which provided the best estimates, are presented in 
this chapter while other results are reported in the appendixes. The analyses 
revealed the importance of controls in the regression (and thus the weakness of 
Specification 1) and the importance of the interaction between PBF and health 
insurance for the interpretation of results (thus advocating against using 
Specification 2). As the interaction with the wealth index was not significant, 
Specification 4 was not retained. 
4.3.4. LIMITATIONS 
This study has limitations, although it is the first to provide rigorous evidence on the 
impact of PBF on equity for family planning, maternal health and child health 
services. First, the sample was not balanced at baseline for modern family planning 
methods for the richer group. However, as use was greater in the control group, 
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results presented here are indeed underestimating the impact of PBF. Second, the 
sample is not representative of the total population of Rwanda. The sample was 
designed to test the impact of PBF in a randomized evaluation and included only the 
districts that had not piloted PBF in the past. These districts excluded the capital city 
Kigali (17% of the population) and the second main city of Butare (9%). The sample 
studied here represents a more rural and less wealthy population than the overall 
population of Rwanda. Consequently our differentiation between lower and upper 
groups in this chapter could be better characterized as a difference between ‘poor’ 
and ‘near poor’. Hence one can acknowledge that the first phase of the PBF 
implementation was successful in reaching the rural ‘near poor’ although it did not 
have impact in reaching the ‘poor’. Third, as the observation period of the treatment 
was over 23 months only, one cannot observe the long term effect of performance-
based financing on the use of services in general, and on equity in access in 
particular, although this effect may be different from the one observed in the short 
term.  
4.4. RESULTS 
4.4.1. BALANCE CHECK 
The evaluation design achieved balance at baseline between the treatment and the 
control groups in the lower group, in the upper group and in the total sample 
(Appendix 3, 4 & Appendix 5). There are only significant differences for poor 
women who completed four or more prenatal care visits (with a larger utilization 
rate in the treatment group) and current use of family planning in the richest group 
(with a larger utilization rate in the control group).  
4.4.2. DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS 
The descriptive analysis of the impact evaluation data on utilization of basic health 
services confirms the trends highlighted in DHS (National Institute of Statistics of 
Rwanda 2006, 2009): between 2006 and 2008, utilization for women and children 
rose. Family planning intake rose by 23 percentage points to reach 34% in 2008 and 
assisted deliveries rose by 25 percentage points to reach 52% in 2008. Use of 
prenatal care services during the first trimester of pregnancy improved from 10% to 
25% while the coverage of four or more prenatal care visits rose from 15% to 28%. 
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Among the services under study, only preventive care at health centers did not 
experience any change (Table 4-3).   
Table 4-3: Trends in utilization of basic health services (2006-2008) 
  2006 2008 Abs. change 
  N % S.D. N % S.D.   
Family planning and maternal health services 
Family Planning 1592      0.11    0.01  1680 0.34  0.01  0.23*** 
Birth at facility 1089      0.36    0.02  1019 0.53  0.02  0.17*** 
Assisted deliveries 1271      0.27    0.02  1003 0.52  0.02  0.25*** 
4+ prenatal visits 1223      0.15    0.02  1000 0.28  0.03  0.13** 
Prenatal care during 
1st quarter 
1227      0.10    0.02  996 0.25  0.03  0.15*** 
Child health services  
Curative care  1388      0.23    0.02  1039 0.32  0.02  0.09** 
Preventive care  3150      0.12    0.02  2428 0.13  0.01  0.01 
Use of bed nets 3129      0.18    0.03  2372 0.75  0.02  0.57*** 
Note: Cluster-adjusted T-tests for differences between 2006 and 2008, *P<0.05, 
**P<0.01, ***P<0.001. 
A further descriptive analysis on utilization of healthcare services shows a mixed 
picture on equity. Undisputable progress was achieved as the use of services rose 
significantly among the lower group between 2006 and 2008: family planning 
intake rose from 9% to 28% and assisted deliveries from 25% to 48% for the 
poorest in the sample. Prenatal care services are equally used by lower and upper 
group women in both years showing that recent improvements in access to care are 
equitable. However, significant levels of inequity remain for family planning and use 
of Insecticide-Treated Nets (ITN) with inequalities observed in both years, although 
the gap between the two wealth groups is narrowing. Access to care for children in 
the event of illness also improved overtime for the poor, but inequalities remain in 
both years and access is low as fewer than one third of children visited a health 
center in the event of an illness (Table 4-4). 
Table 4-4: Equity in maternal and child health services in 2006 and 2008 
   Total Sample Lower group Upper group Absolute 
change 
  Year Obs Mean Obs Mean Obs Mean Lower-
upper 
Family planning and maternal health services 
Family 
Planning 
2006 1592 11% 1049 9% 543 15% 6%** 
2008 1680 34% 657 28% 1023 37% 9%*** 
Assisted 
deliveries 
2006 1271 27% 833 25% 438 31% 6% 
2008 1003 52% 398 48% 605 54% 6% 
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   Total Sample Lower group Upper group Absolute 
change 
  Year Obs Mean Obs Mean Obs Mean Lower-
upper 
4+ prenatal 
visits 
2006 1223 15% 791 14% 432 16% 2% 
2008 1000 28% 392 27% 608 28% 1% 
Prenatal care 
during 1st 
quarter 
2006 1227 10% 794 11% 433 10% 1% 
2008 996 25% 390 25% 606 25% 0% 
Child health services 
Curative care 
 
2006 1388 23% 934 21% 454 28% 7%* 
2008 1039 32% 338 28% 701 35% 7%* 
Preventive 
care 
2006 3150 12% 2048 12% 1102 11% 1% 
 2008 2428 13% 767 13% 1661 13% 0% 
Use of ITN 2006 3129 18% 2033 7% 1096 39% 32%*** 
 2008 2372 75% 748 59% 1624 82% 23%*** 
Source: Author (2015) 
Note: T-tests for differences between lower and upper groups, *P<0.05, **P<0.01, 
***P<0.001. 
 
4.4.3. REGRESSION ANALYSES 
4.4.3.1. Difference in difference estimates 
Maternal health 
Estimates from OLS regression analyses, that is, assuming a linear probability for 
three groups (upper, lower and total population) are first reported (Table 4-5). 
Appendix 6 to Appendix 8 report the results from the four Specifications.  
Consistently with previous work (Basinga et al. 2011), results suggest that PBF has 
an impact on increasing institutional deliveries, but not on prenatal care services. 
However, we find a positive impact on institutional deliveries for the upper group 
only. The probability of an upper group woman delivering in a health facility 
increased by 21% (99% confidence level) in the treatment group compared to the 
control group. However, PBF alone has no impact on the probability of a lower 
group woman delivering in a facility. Interestingly though, the coefficient on the 
interaction between PBF and health insurance suggests that when a poor woman 
has health insurance and lives in the catchment area of a PBF facility, she has a 15% 
higher chance of delivering in a health facility (99% confidence level). In sum, for 
institutional deliveries, PBF has favored those who did not have a financial barrier 
to access the service, i.e. the upper group women and those from the lower group 
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who have health insurance. Hence in Rwanda, the impact of PBF needs to be 
understood together with the specific development of health insurance coverage. 
Other significant controls include health insurance for deliveries (upper group only, 
with women having 18% more chance in delivering at a health facility if they have 
health insurance), female educational attainment, number of pregnancies 
(exhibiting a negative experience effect), distance to health facility (negatively 
correlated to the use of services) and status of the facility (with the probability of 
institutional delivery decreasing by 7% to 11% in public facilities). Finally, the 
coefficients on the wave dummy indicate a statistically significant increase in all 
maternal health services between 2006 and 2008 for all groups, as already 
highlighted in the bivariate analyses.  
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Table 4-5: Difference in difference estimates for maternal health services using LPM 
  Institutional deliveries 4+ prenatal care visits Prenatal care 1st trimester 
 Lower Upper Total Lower Upper Total Lower Upper Total 
Treatment* 
post 
-0.043 0.208*** 0.063 -0.007 -0.004 -0.006 -0.014 0.038 0.007 
 (-0.065) (-0.065) (-0.045) (0.054) (0.053) (0.037) (0.050) (0.047) (0.034) 
Wave (2006=0, 2008=1) 0.175*** 0.027 0.119*** 0.115*** 0.113*** 0.117*** 0.140*** 0.145*** 0.145*** 
 (-0.045) (-0.046) (-0.032) (0.036) (0.036) (0.025) (0.034) (0.033) (0.023) 
PBF*insurance 0.135** -0.082 0.027 0.032 -0.042 0.002 0.048 -0.078 -0.005 
 (-0.061) (-0.077) (-0.047) (0.047) (0.061) (0.036) (0.042) (0.058) (0.033) 
Age < 20 years (=1) 0.153* -0.301* 0.052 -0.006 -0.135 -0.044 0.022 0.001 0.014 
 (-0.091) (-0.173) (-0.086) (0.066) (0.118) (0.058) (0.066) (0.142) (0.061) 
Age > 35 years (=1) -0.044 -0.001 -0.029 -0.071** -0.018 -0.047** -0.024 -0.031 -0.025 
 (-0.04) (-0.043) (-0.029) (0.030) (0.036) (0.023) (0.029) (0.033) (0.022) 
Primary or more education (=1) -0.054* -0.019 -0.038* 0.000 0.012 0.005 0.014 0.073** 0.039** 
 (-0.03) (-0.036) (-0.023) (0.024) (0.030) (0.018) (0.023) (0.029) (0.018) 
Married/ union (=1) 0 -0.037 -0.007 0.004 0.022 0.008 -0.068 -0.040 -0.063* 
 (-0.056) (-0.076) (-0.045) (0.040) (0.069) (0.035) (0.045) (0.071) (0.038) 
Partner present (=1) 0.066 0.095 0.076 0.098** 0.036 0.066 -0.051 0.046 -0.008 
 (-0.085) (-0.089) (-0.062) (0.049) (0.076) (0.043) (0.065) (0.070) (0.048) 
Number pregnancies -0.018** -0.024** -0.022*** 0.014** -0.000 0.008 0.003 -0.009 -0.001 
 (-0.009) (-0.01) (-0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.005) 
Health insurance (=1) -0.025 0.183*** 0.075** 0.010 0.083** 0.040* -0.019 0.045 0.009 
 (-0.042) (-0.054) (-0.033) (0.030) (0.037) (0.023) (0.027) (0.037) (0.022) 
Public facility (=1) -0.072** -0.111*** -0.089*** -0.008 -0.031 -0.020 0.022 0.008 0.016 
 (-0.03) (-0.033) (-0.022) (0.024) (0.029) (0.018) (0.022) (0.026) (0.017) 
Number of household members -0.004 -0.005 -0.002 -0.009 -0.007 -0.008 0.008 0.001 0.003 
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  Institutional deliveries 4+ prenatal care visits Prenatal care 1st trimester 
 Lower Upper Total Lower Upper Total Lower Upper Total 
 (-0.01) (-0.011) (-0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) 
Distance HH-Facility (Km) -0.027*** -0.023*** -0.024*** -0.011* -0.010 -0.010** -0.005 -0.011** -0.008* 
 (-0.008) (-0.009) (-0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) 
Observations 1,092 987 2,079 1,164 1,031 2,195 1,165 1,030 2,195 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Family planning 
The estimated impact of PBF on the probability of a woman using a modern 
contraceptive method is not significant if one considers the total sample. However, 
regressions run by wealth groups provide interesting results: the coefficient 
associated with PBF reports a large and positive impact for the upper group 
(probability of 17% with a 99% confidence level) and a negative impact on the 
lower group (probability of -10% with a 90% confidence level) suggesting that the 
richest are the main beneficiaries of PBF at the expense of the poorest. However, the 
latter benefited from a large improvement in access to family planning between 
2006 and 2008 (an increase of 19 percentage points). The interaction between PBF 
and health insurance is significant for the lower group women only, but it affects 
utilization negatively (probability of -10% with a 95% confidence level) showing a 
possible crowding-out effect for the poorest because of different strategies 
influencing family planning utilization. Another potential explanation is that lower 
group women enrolling in the insurance scheme do it while pregnant (as they 
expect more health expenditures) which is when they do not need family planning 
services. The increase in the use of family planning for the lower group is probably 
caused by other policies put into effect in Rwanda to increase contraception use 
(Table 4-6) (see Appendix 9 for results on the 4 specifications).   
Table 4-6: Difference in difference estimates for use of modern family planning method using 
LPM 
 Use of modern family planning 
 Lower Upper Total 
Treatment*post -0.101* 0.174*** 0.054 
  (0.055) (0.057) (0.039) 
Wave=0 if 2006, Wave=1 if 2008 0.191*** 0.064 0.126*** 
  (0.042) (0.042) (0.029) 
interaction between PBF and  insurance -0.100** -0.012 -0.068* 
 (0.045) (0.070) (0.038) 
Age -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) 
Has primary or more education (=1) -0.007 0.013 -0.003 
  (0.023) (0.033) (0.019) 
Married/union (=1) -0.016 0.383*** 0.192** 
  (0.150) (0.032) (0.089) 
Partner present (=1) -0.092 0.055 -0.035 
  (0.069) (0.092) (0.056) 
Number of pregnancies -0.016** -0.014 -0.015** 
  (0.007) (0.010) (0.006) 
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 Use of modern family planning 
 Lower Upper Total 
Health insurance (=1) 0.079** 0.016 0.067** 
  (0.033) (0.051) (0.027) 
Public facility (=1) 0.031 0.039 0.028 
 (0.022) (0.030) (0.019) 
Total number alive child 0.011 0.017 0.011 
 (0.011) (0.018) (0.010) 
Number of household members 0.010 0.011 0.015* 
  (0.010) (0.015) (0.009) 
Household-Facility distance (in Km) 0.006 0.008 0.007 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) 
Delivery assisted by a skilled attendant 0.026 0.042 0.040** 
 (0.025) (0.030) (0.020) 
Observations 1,059 966 2,025 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Child health services 
Results from regression analyses on curative care received by a child at a health 
center in the event of an illness show no impact of PBF for none of the groups under 
study. This may be related to the fact that the price paid by the PBF scheme for 
curative care was purposely low and most of the incentives came from health 
insurance that provided free access to those services. Indeed, the regression 
analysis shows a positive impact of health insurance for getting healthcare among 
all groups (12% and 25% increase respectively for the lower and upper groups). 
Besides, for the lower group, the coefficient on the interaction between insurance 
and PBF shows that if the child benefits from health insurance and lives in a 
treatment district, the child will be 8% more likely to get care at the health center in 
the event of an illness (90% confidence interval). Results for preventive care show a 
positive impact of PBF (probability of 0.09 for the total group with a 99% 
confidence interval) for all groups. Age is negatively correlated showing that the 
older children are, the less likely they will visit a health facility. Distance to the 
facility also negatively influences the decision to visit (Table 4-7) (see Appendix 10 
and Appendix 11 for results of the four specifications).  
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Table 4-7: Difference in difference estimates for use of child care using LPM 
  Curative care Preventive care 
  Lower Upper Total Lower Upper Total 
Treatment* 
post 
0.035 0.024 0.027 0.081*** 0.098*** 0.092*** 
  (-0.053) (-0.06) (-0.039) (-0.028) (-0.026) (-0.019) 
Wave=0 if 
2006, Wave=1 
if 2008 
0.027 0.013 0.024 -0.013 -0.015 -0.018 
  (-0.034) (-0.04) (-0.026) (-0.019) (-0.019) (-0.013) 
PBF*Insurance 0.078* -0.093 0.006 0.033 -0.038 0.008 
  (-0.046) (-0.062) (-0.037) (-0.025) (-0.031) (-0.019) 
Age -0.023*** -0.009 -0.016*** -0.037*** -0.045*** -0.040*** 
  (-0.007) (-0.009) (-0.006) (-0.004) (-0.004) (-0.003) 
Sex 0.031 -0.065** -0.013 0.015 0.008 0.012 
  (-0.023) (-0.028) (-0.018) (-0.012) (-0.013) (-0.009) 
Mother has 
primary or 
more 
education (=1) 
-0.019 0.039 0.007 -0.007 0.012 0.003 
  (-0.023) (-0.029) (-0.018) (-0.012) (-0.013) (-0.009) 
Household-
Facility 
distance (in 
Km) 
-0.015** -0.013* -0.014*** -0.005 -0.007** -0.006*** 
  (-0.006) (-0.007) (-0.005) (-0.003) (-0.003) (-0.002) 
Health 
insurance (=1) 
0.117*** 0.245*** 0.179*** 0.003 0.046** 0.015 
  (-0.031) (-0.039) (-0.024) (-0.018) (-0.021) (-0.014) 
Number of 
household 
members 
-0.019*** 0.004 -0.008 -0.002 0.003 0 
  (-0.007) (-0.008) (-0.005) (-0.003) (-0.004) (-0.003) 
Observations 1,370 1,074 2,444 2,964 2,595 5,559 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
4.4.4. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
Maternal health 
Results from OLS for maternal health suggested that PBF has a positive impact, but 
only on institutional deliveries, and for the richer group. As there are reasons to 
assume that the utilization of all maternal health services is linked and that error 
terms across the equations can be correlated, SURE were run simultaneously for 
institutional deliveries, four or more prenatal care visits, prenatal care visits during 
the first trimester and assisted deliveries (the latter not being incentivized by PBF) 
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to see whether the use of any of these services was reinforcing that of other 
services.  
Results confirm previous estimates: PBF benefited upper group women as well as 
lower group women with health insurance in the case of institutional deliveries. 
Further, SURE enables us to find the positive impact of PBF on the total group, as 
showed by Basinga et al. (2011). The coefficient associated with prenatal care 
remains non-significant with SURE. Finally, clustering at the district and year level, 
as well as individual and facility fixed effects, also confirm results with slight 
modification in the size of coefficients: the effect of PBF on the upper group is lower, 
but the coefficient of the interaction between PBF and insurance for the lower group 
is greater. Significance disappears for the impact of PBF on the total group which is 
caused by the interaction term with insurance. Indeed, the same analysis ran on 
Specification 2 shows a statistically significant coefficient associated with PBF 
(probability of 0.073% with a 95% confidence interval) (Table 4-8). 
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Table 4-8: Robustness checks for maternal health 
  Institutional deliveries 4+ prenatal care visits Prenatal care 1st trimester 
  Lower Upper Total Lower Upper Total Lower Upper Total 
LPM without specification          
Effect of PBF -0.043 0.208*** 0.063 -0.007 -0.004 -0.006 -0.014 0.038 0.007 
  (-0.065) (-0.065) (-0.045) (-0.054) (-0.053) (-0.037) (-0.05) (-0.047) (-0.034) 
Interaction PBF * insurance 0.135** -0.082 0.027 0.032 -0.042 0.002 0.048 -0.078 -0.005 
  (-0.061) (-0.077) (-0.047) (-0.047) (-0.061) (-0.036) (-0.042) (-0.058) (-0.033) 
SURE estimates          
Effect of PBF -0.033 0.241*** 0.086* -0.013 0.010 -0.001 -0.013 0.058 0.016 
  (0.067) (0.066) (0.046) (0.054) (0.058) (0.039) (0.050) (0.053) (0.036) 
Interaction PBF * insurance 0.115* -0.090 0.009 0.033 -0.033 0.002 0.063 -0.057 0.008 
  (0.065) (0.082) (0.050) (0.052) (0.072) (0.042) (0.049) (0.066) (0.039) 
 Clustering and Fixed-Effects          
Effect of PBF -0.005 0.185*** 0.054 -0.009 0.003 0.011 0.004 0.060 0.024 
 (0.066) (0.043) (0.041) (0.049) (0.049) (0.035) (0.050) (0.055) (0.036) 
Interaction PBF * insurance 0.164** -0.021 0.064 0.045 -0.033 -0.001 0.036 -0.107* -0.011 
 (0.064) (0.070) (0.055) (0.054) (0.088) (0.039) (0.040) (0.063) (0.033) 
Observations 1,092 987 2,079 1,164 1,031 2,195 1,165 1,030 2,195 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Family planning 
Results for the use of modern contraceptives suggest that PBF had a positive impact 
on family planning for the upper group but a negative impact on the lower group. 
This was reinforced by a negative and significant coefficient on the interaction 
between insurance and PBF for the lower group.  
As family planning intake may be linked to a woman’s knowledge of services 
provided at a health facility and may be proposed to a woman who recently gave 
birth, SURE were run to capture potential correlations between assisted deliveries, 
institutional deliveries, four or more prenatal care visits and family planning. 
Results show that it only slightly affects the size of the coefficient, but not the 
interpretation of results. Similarly, running the model with clustering and fixed 
effects only slightly increases the size of coefficients. The impact of PBF on the upper 
group thus increases from 0.174 to 0.204 and the negative coefficient of the 
interaction between PBF and insurance changes from -0.100 to -0.119 (Table 4-9).  
Table 4-9: Robustness checks for use of modern contraceptive 
  Family planning 
  Lower Upper Total 
LPM without specification    
Effect of PBF -0.101* 0.174*** 0.054 
  (-0.055) (-0.057) (-0.039) 
Interaction PBF * insurance -0.100** -0.012 -0.068* 
  (-0.045) (-0.07) (-0.038) 
SURE estimates    
Effect of PBF -0.113** 0.188*** 0.047 
  (0.052) (0.063) (0.040) 
Interaction PBF * insurance -0.105** 0.024 -0.061 
  (0.052) (0.078) (0.044) 
Clustering and Fixed-Effects    
Effect of PBF -0.087 0.204*** 0.060 
  (0.058) (0.039) (0.036) 
Interaction PBF * insurance -0.119** 0.015 -0.064 
  (0.050) (0.078) (0.043) 
Observations 1,056 965 2,021 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Child health services 
The first estimates of the impact of PBF on the probability of a child getting curative 
care showed no impact. However, a positive impact was found for both wealth 
groups for preventive care.  
SURE was conducted to account for other services that may influence a child’s visit 
to a health center: curative care, preventive care, but also use of ITN as it can affect 
morbidity. SURE confirm the impact of PBF on preventive care with a larger effect. 
The probability of a child receiving preventive care rises from 0.08 to 0.1 in the 
lower group, from 0.1 to 0.16 in the upper group and from 0.09 to 0.13 in the total 
sample. SURE do not find any significance in the interaction between insurance and 
PBF. Clustering and fixed effects, on the contrary, provide a lower but still significant 
coefficient associated with the impact of PBF, in particular for the upper group 
(Table 4-10).  
Table 4-10: Robustness checks for child health services 
  Curative Care Preventive care 
  Lower Upper Total Lower Upper Total 
LPM without specification 
Effect of PBF 0.035 0.024 0.027 0.081*** 0.098*** 0.092*** 
  (-0.053) (-0.06) (-0.039) (-0.028) (-0.026) (-0.019) 
Interaction 
PBF * 
insurance 
0.078* -0.093 0.006 0.033 -0.038 0.008 
  (-0.046) (-0.062) (-0.037) (-0.025) (-0.031) (-0.019) 
SURE estimates 
Effect of PBF 0.037 0.029 0.031 0.102** 0.160*** 0.126*** 
  (0.051) (0.060) (0.038) (0.047) (0.050) (0.033) 
Interaction 
PBF * 
insurance 
0.075 -0.099 0.001 0.067 -0.071 0.013 
  (0.048) (0.071) (0.040) (0.044) (0.060) (0.035) 
Clustering and Fixed-Effects 
Effect of PBF 0.012 -0.048 0.010 0.096*** 0.089*** 0.103*** 
  (0.055) (0.057) (0.036) (0.031) (0.029) (0.024) 
Interaction 
PBF * 
insurance 
0.152*** -0.088 0.037 0.037 -0.011 -0.002 
  (0.056) (0.086) (0.059) (0.032) (0.039) (0.023) 
Observations 1,370 1,074 2,444 2,964 2,595 5,559 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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4.5. DISCUSSION 
This chapter measures and compares the impact of PBF on equity in access to 
healthcare in rural Rwanda, and specifically examines the effect of PBF on income 
sub-groups defined according to their wealth status (upper and lower groups). 
Factors associated with inequality in access to basic services are quantified to show 
the dynamic and fairness of performance-based financing in Rwanda and draw 
policy recommendations. Notably, findings confirm the positive trend in access to 
care in Rwanda, in particular for the poor. Still, they show remaining differences in 
access to child health services, family planning and maternal health services. 
This chapter adds to current knowledge in at least two independent ways: first, it 
speaks to existing evidence on the impact of PBF on the overall use of health 
services in Rwanda (Basinga et al. 2011) by evaluating the effect of PBF on 
subgroups of the population. Second, this chapter highlights the advantages of the 
impact evaluation panel data over nationally representative cross sectional data by 
comparing results published earlier on PBF’s impact on equity in Rwanda using DHS 
data (Priedeman et al. 2013).  
4.5.1. IMPACT OF PBF ON USE OF HEALTH SERVICES 
Results are consistent with previous studies conducted on Rwanda using nationally 
representative data or impact evaluation data (Basinga et al. 2011, Sekabaraga, 
Diop, and Soucat 2011). Findings show a positive impact of PBF on the probability of 
a woman delivering in a health facility and no impact on prenatal care, consistent 
with results published elsewhere for the population as a whole (Priedeman et al. 
2013, Basinga et al. 2011). Our results suggest that the probability of a woman 
delivering in a health facility increases by 8.6 percentage points (SURE) compared to 
8.1 (Basinga et al. 2011) and 10 (Priedeman et al. 2013). As in previous studies, no 
impact of financial incentives was found on prenatal care. As shown by Basinga et al. 
(2011), results highlight a positive impact on the probability of a child benefiting 
from preventive care.  
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4.5.2. DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPACT OF PBF 
Other findings contradict previously published results as regard to the impact of 
PBF on equity in access to services. Priedeman et al. (2013) using DHS data found 
that PBF in Rwanda was neither a pro-rich nor pro-poor strategy for increasing use 
of services. In contrast, results reported here using panel data from the PBF impact 
evaluation suggest that PBF has a positive impact on the upper group. That is, the 
already known positive impact of PBF on the probability of a woman delivering in a 
health facility is driven by the richest. This is consistent with findings from Burundi, 
although the magnitude of change is greater in the case of Rwanda (Bonfrer, Van de 
Poel, and Van Doorslaer 2014). More specifically, we find that women from the 
upper group are 18% to 24% more likely to deliver in a health facility in the 
treatment group compared to those of the control group. In other words, the 
proportion of assisted deliveries in treatment facilities could reach up to 74% in 
2008 for women of the upper group compared to 50% in control facilities. Women 
from the lower group with health insurance also experienced a positive increase in 
use due to PBF.  
Contrary to Priedeman et al. (2013), we find a significant impact of PBF on the use of 
modern contraceptives: in the treatment group, women from the lower group are 
10% to 11% less likely to use family planning (i.e. 21% use, compared to 32% 
among the poorest women in the control group). On the contrary, women from the 
upper group are 17% to 20% more likely to use modern contraceptives in the 
treatment group (i.e. 55% intake of modern contraceptives for the richest women of 
the treatment group, compared to 35% of those in the control group) (Table 4-11).  
Table 4-11: Estimated differential effects of PBF by wealth on service use (specification 3) 
  Lower group Upper group 
Family 
planning 
-0113** (0.052) to -0.087 (0.058) 0.174*** (-0.058) to 0.204*** 
(0.039) 
Birth at facility -0.005 (0.066) to -0.043 (-0.065) 0.185*** (0.043) to 0.241*** 
(0.066) 
4+ prenatal 
visits 
-0.007 (-0.054) to -0.013 (0.054) -0.004 (-0.053) to 0.010 (0.058) 
Prenatal care 
1st quarter 
-0.013 (0.050) to 0.004 (0.050) 0.038 (-0.047) to 0.060 (0.055) 
Curative care 0.012 (0.55) to 0.037 (0.051) -0.048 (0.057) to 0.029 (0.060) 
Preventive 
care 
0.081*** (-0.028) to 0.102** 
(0.047) 
0.089*** (0.029) to 0.160*** 
(0.050) 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Results thus support the hypothesis that, for most services, PBF favors efficiency at 
the expense of equity as the effect of PBF did not play equally on different income 
groups. PBF achieved efficiency gains by inciting healthcare providers to focus on 
the easier to reach, i.e. the less poor. Further, PBF was not effective in helping reach 
the poorest. This confirms evidence from the literature, using less rigorous 
techniques, that shows that PBF can be equitable only if it is targeting the poor 
(Loevinsohn 2008). This pattern in which health programs primarily benefit richer 
groups is typical and has been widely studied as an ‘inverse care law’ (Gwatkin 
2002b, Hart 1971 ).  
This chapter also brings new evidence on the impact of PBF on equity in access to 
basic health services for children. PBF alone has no impact on curative care for 
children but has a positive impact on the probability of getting preventive care for 
the upper and lower groups. One can thus assert that, of all services under study, 
PBF has the most equitable effect on preventive care at health centers. Children 
from the lower and upper group are respectively 10% and 16% more likely to 
benefit from preventive services in the treatment group compared to the control 
group. Further research is needed to better understand the synergies or 
competitions between different incentivized services as the impact found variations 
from one service to another.  
4.5.3. INTERACTION WITH HEALTH INSURANCE 
This chapter contributes in reducing the knowledge gap by providing evidence on 
the interaction of several strategies aiming at improving access to care (health 
insurance and PBF). As pointed out, different strategies were put into effect in 
Rwanda at the same time with the same purpose of raising the use of basic health 
services. The impact evaluation aimed to disentangle the impact of PBF. However, 
assessing synergies between the different initiatives is important to see whether 
they are mutually reinforcing or not.  
Results suggest a mixed effect of the interaction of PBF and health insurance 
according to the services and the wealth group concerned. As health insurance 
removes the financial barrier to health services (demand side) and PBF improves 
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the supply of health services, one can expect that the interaction of interventions is 
positive. Results confirm the hypothesis for institutional deliveries and curative care 
for children among the lower group (for which the cost of services is a major barrier 
to care). This suggests that the potential negative impact of PBF on equity in access 
disappears when a strategy such as health insurance removes the main barrier.  
The negative coefficient for the interaction of PBF and health insurance in the case 
of family planning for the poorest group probably reveals the existence of 
competing interventions aimed at increasing the intake of family planning service 
(free contraceptives, Imihigo) and the fact that insured women are primarily those 
that are not in need of family planning. Further research, using qualitative methods, 
is necessary to better understand this pattern in the particular context of Rwanda.  
4.5.4. STRENGTHS OF THE IMPACT EVALUATION DATA OVER A CROSS-
SECTIONAL NATIONALLY REPRESENTATIVE SURVEY 
Using data from the impact evaluation of PBF in Rwanda, we were able to isolate the 
distributional impact of PBF. We came to different results than those found by 
Priedeman et al. (2013) with DHS data. The strengths of the impact evaluation data 
reside in the fact that it allows for better identification, as the same individuals were 
interviewed before and after; hence, unobserved heterogeneity was captured. 
Further, the selection of households was guided by the purpose of the evaluation 
(e.g. focus on households with young children). 
Our results show the impact of limitations, highlighted by Priedeman et al. (2013), 
have on their estimates. They recognized that relying on DHS data, which is a 
nationally representative dataset, involved some constraints to the analysis: the 
exposure window was limited to 18 months (instead of 23); the survey designed 
resampled the 2005 clusters in 2007, and individuals were not re-interviewed; 
finally, no rural specific asset data was available to create an asset score, although 
the impact evaluation was conducted in rural areas.  
4.5.5. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The empirical results suggest that PBF can improve utilization of healthcare 
services, but that its impact varies according to the population and services 
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concerned. When utilization rates are low, such as for institutional deliveries and 
family planning, PBF can increase the demand for services. The results advocate a 
PBF model further tailored to target the most in need. One approach could be to 
introduce differential payment for PBF with higher levels of payments for poor and 
remote districts or identified poor groups. This would be feasible in Rwanda as 
poverty maps are developed in each sub-district in a participatory way (Niringiye 
and Ayebale 2012). Neighboring Burundi and the DRC have already put into effect 
such a differential approach (Witter et al. 2013).  
Further, when utilization of basic services is greater among the richest, demand side 
mechanisms should complement PBF to ensure that the poorest benefit from the 
strategy. It is therefore important to better understand demand side barriers to set 
up adequate incentives for the target population. In Cambodia for instance, PBF 
schemes were supported by health equity funds that target the most in need to 
ensure that they are not excluded from the health system. These health equity funds 
have been successful in ensuring greater access to care for the poorest and greater 
community participation (Jacobs and Price 2006, Noirhomme et al. 2007, Bigdeli 
and Leslie Annear 2009, Hardeman et al. 2004). Conditional cash transfers, as seen 
in Mexico and Brazil, can also be introduced and were tested in Rwanda. The 
evidence on conditional cash transfers indeed shows that they are effective ways to 
cut inequalities in access and ensure greater use of health services for the poor 
(Victora et al. 2003, Lagarde, Haines, and Palmer 2009).  
This chapter contributes to a call for more rigorous research. Using the same 
independent and control variables, with similar econometric techniques, results 
from the panel impact evaluation data differ from those produced using DHS data. 
Estimates from the DHS data were not able to capture unobserved heterogeneity as 
the pro-rich nature of PBF was not found.  
This chapter also provides some insight on the importance of specifications. The 
comparison of a simple linear model, seemingly unrelated regression equations and 
further specifications using clustering and fixed-effects enabled us to highlight the 
importance of specification on coefficients. Specification tests showed that the 
significance of coefficients did not change according to the models, but that the 
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magnitude of coefficients is sensitive to specification. One other important 
conclusion is that results in this chapter are robust as three different econometric 
approaches produced comparable results.  
4.6. CONCLUSION 
Over the last decade, the population of Rwanda has experienced improvement in 
health outcomes and access to care. Poor people have better access and use more 
services. Yet improvements benefitted the richest initially and more over time.  Two 
of the innovative health financing strategies designed by Rwanda; health insurance 
and PBF, have seen a positive impact on the demand and supply of healthcare 
services. Nevertheless, results support the hypothesis that, for most services, PBF 
favors efficiency at the expense of equity. Rwanda is an outlier in many respects. 
Twenty years after the genocide of 1994 that killed one fifth of its population, it is 
one of the few countries on track to reach the MDGs and beyond. Yet Rwanda is no 
exception in the way benefits of health programs reach the poor last. As inequalities 
in access to care persist, policy changes are needed to tailor PBF payments to better 
reach the poor. As a 2005 benefit-incidence analysis showed, a large share of public 
subsidies to the health sector benefited the richest, thus some reorientation of 
public spending toward pro-poor programs is always required (World Bank 2010). 
This study highlights potential pitfalls of PBF (at least as originally designed and 
implemented in Rwanda): PBF is not inherently pro-poor. Its effect on improving 
the welfare of the poor depends on its design, and the equity concern needs to be 
built early in the design of the program. Also PBF is unlikely to be the sole 
mechanism and is likely to be more effective if used in synergy with other programs 
such as health insurance or selected free healthcare. A number of African countries 
are indeed moving in that direction. Further research is necessary to test various 
designs and models of interactions in different contexts.  
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5. DO DECENTRALIZED INCENTIVE HEALTHCARE 
PAYMENTS INFLUENCE SPATIAL DISPARITIES? 
 
ABSTRACT 
Contrary to income-related health inequalities, those that are uncorrelated with 
income, such as spatial disparities, are often overlooked. Spatial disparities result 
from contextual factors such as geography, policies, institutions and economic 
development. Addressing these areas is critical to ensure access to basic services 
across territories, especially when mobility is limited. This chapter examines the 
combined contribution of PBF which resulted in the context of a wider fiscal 
decentralization strategy to dissipate spatial disparities in the utilization of basic 
maternal and child health services. It draws on data from a randomized control trial 
evaluating the impact of PBF in Rwanda between 2006 and 2008 when the country 
rolled-out both PBF and fiscal decentralization.  
This chapter, on the one hand, measures the evolution of spatial disparities 
(drawing on the coefficient of variation) between 2006 and 2008. Second, it 
examines the sources of such spatial variability in the utilization of basic health 
services overtime through a mapping exercise. Third, drawing on a regression-
based decomposition (Fiorio and Jenkins 2010) this chapter aims to identify the 
relative contribution of different features underpinning spatial disparities. To avoid 
losing too many degrees of freedom, this exercise groups potential determinants in 
three factors, namely; a Gini index to proxy district income inequalities; the per 
capita health budget allocated to districts to assess the contribution of fiscal 
decentralization; and, performance-based financing to identify those districts 
subject to PBF from the rest.  
Results show that overall reduction in spatial disparities and expansion of 
utilization of services between 2006 and 2008 in the country hide large variations 
between districts.  This is in line with some literature on developed and emerging 
economies. Disparities decreased between 2006 and 2008 for most services 
examined. Decentralization accounts for up to 12.5% of the decline in spatial 
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disparities and performance-based financing for up to 27%. Income inequality, as 
measured by the Gini index, showed little to no impact.  
Three policy recommendations are formulated. First, policymakers should not 
overlook regional inequalities as this can result in lower economic development, 
social unrest and poor health outcomes. Second, as contextual factors influence 
regional inequalities, policymakers should aim to narrow the gap between regions 
through adequate reforms and financing. Third, policymakers should consider PBF 
in its broader context and look at potential synergies with other reforms to gain as 
much as possible from the strategy.  
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) succeeded in bringing the world’s 
attention to the utilization of basic maternal and child health services in low income 
countries (LIC). Despite significant improvements, access to basic health services for 
women and children remains unacceptably low in comparison with levels observed 
in high income countries (HIC). Well known factors explain variations between 
countries, and financial, cultural and geographical barriers still hamper demand for 
basic services. On the supply side, poor infrastructure, a lack of drugs and 
equipment, insufficient resources as well as the misuse and shortage of healthcare 
providers result in insufficient and poor quality basic services.   
Within countries, inequalities are also a growing concern for LIC as the poor always 
experience lower access to basic health services compared with the rich (Barros et 
al. 2012). Most evidence of health inequalities in LIC concerns income-related 
inequalities and, to a lesser extent, urban-rural inequalities. Inequalities 
uncorrelated with income are often overlooked (Pradhan, Sahn, and Younger 2003). 
Regional inequalities (or more broadly, spatial disparities) can however be large 
and have a comparable or even greater impact than income-related inequalities. 
Spatial disparities result from geography, policies, institutions and economic 
development. Addressing these areas is critical to ensure access to basic services 
across the territory, especially when mobility is limited. Spatial disparities in health 
hamper progress in health outcomes but can also lead to economic and political 
instability and deserve significant attention.  
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Within countries, inequalities are a worldwide phenomenon. Westert and 
Groenewegen (1999) found large variations in hospital discharges in regions 
compared to the national average in eleven European countries. In China, Zhang and 
Kanbur (2005) found growing disparities in education and healthcare from 1981 to 
2000 between urban and rural areas, as well as between inland and coastal regions. 
These disparities were found to be responsible for social unrest and slower poverty 
reduction. In Tunisia regional inequalities for assistance during delivery have 
increased overtime (Boutayeb and Helmert 2011). Using three rounds of 
demographic and health survey data in Ethiopia, Skaftun, Ali, and Norheim (2014) 
found significant regional disparities for maternal and child health outcomes and 
services.  
Regional disparities are rooted in institutions, policies and economic development. 
Reforms, policies and economic choices at central or local levels either positively or 
negatively affect spatial disparities. The recent history of North African countries 
illustrates how regional social inequalities, that were at the origins of the Arab 
Spring (Ansani and Daniele 2012), can impact the economic and political spheres. 
Westert and Groenewegen (1999) found that spatial disparities in healthcare were 
smaller in countries with socialist or social-democratic governments. In China, 
regional inequalities in health have increased since the economic reforms (Zhang 
and Kanbur 2005).  
Regional inequalities in access to basic health services call for reforms aiming to 
harmonize utilization levels across regions. Decentralization is probably the major 
reform promoted in LIC to improve the performance of health systems. The 
objective is to rely on administrative reform to improve the efficiency and quality of 
services and to foster accountability in the health sector as the reform can 
incentivize local decision makers to achieve health objectives (Bossert 1998). Fiscal 
decentralization allows subnational units to employ health workers; in principle it 
creates more flexibility, but depends on local political and economic conditions 
(Soucat, Scheffler, and Ghebreyesus 2013).  
PBF is also implemented in many countries, particularly in Africa, to increase 
performance in healthcare delivery. There is a growing body of evidence on the 
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effectiveness of PBF on the supply of healthcare (Witter et al. 2012, Witter et al. 
2013). Its impact on inequalities has been studied in relation to age, sex, ethnicity 
and socioeconomic status in developed countries (Alshamsan et al. 2010), in 
relation to socioeconomic status in LIC (Loevinsohn 2008) but never on regional 
inequalities.  
To address this gap in the knowledge, this chapter focuses on the effect of PBF and 
decentralization on contextual inequalities which relate to “the broader political, 
cultural, or institutional context, for example the presence or absence of features 
that are intrinsic to places, such as infrastructural resources, economic policies of 
states, social and public support programs” (Kawachi, Subramanian, and Almeida-
Filho 2002).  
Specifically, this chapter examines the contribution of PBF and fiscal 
decentralization to spatial disparities using data from the randomized control trial 
evaluating the impact of PBF in Rwanda. It seeks to address the following research 
questions: 1) How do spatial disparities change overtime? 2) What is the source of 
spatial variability in the utilization of basic health services? and, 3) What is the 
contribution of contextual factors to spatial disparities? The analysis covers key 
maternal and child health services. PBF provides local decision makers with more 
autonomy and incentivizes providers to perform better. Therefore the hypothesis is 
that PBF narrows the gap between regions through a leveling effect and therefore 
reinforces the impact of fiscal decentralization. In the subsequent sections, 
background information on Rwanda is provided, followed by methods, results and a 
discussion with policy implications.  
5.2. BACKGROUND 
5.2.1. FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION 
The Government of Rwanda adopted the National Decentralization Policy in May 
2000 to promote good governance, poverty reduction as well as the efficient, 
effective and accountable delivery of services. After the first phase of administrative 
reform, the second phase (2006-2010) corresponding to fiscal decentralization, 
aimed to enhance effectiveness in service delivery by making human and financial 
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resources available at the district level (Rwanda Ministry of Local Government and 
Social Affairs 2001, Rwanda Ministry of Local Government Good Governance 
Community Development and Social Affairs 2008). Since 2006 and following fiscal 
decentralization, districts are now responsible for coordinating lower 
administrative levels in the delivery of services and districts receive part of the 
health budget. Budget transfers have progressively increased in size and scope and 
budget execution has improved showing that districts are able to cope with 
increased resources and responsibilities (World Bank 2010).   
5.2.2. HEALTH FINANCING REFORMS 
Three major health financing reforms have been implemented over the past 10 
years in Rwanda with a significant impact on the supply and demand for healthcare 
(Sekabaraga, Diop, and Soucat 2011). First, the 2005 national health insurance 
policy made health insurance compulsory for all citizens and resulted in better 
financial protection (Rwanda Ministry of Health 2009). Second, following the fiscal 
decentralization reform, health facilities are now autonomous, responsible for 
service delivery and they manage financial and human resources. Third, the country 
is the first to have implemented performance-based financing (PBF) in primary 
healthcare facilities at a national scale, after three years of piloting (Rusa et al. 2009, 
Soeters, Habineza, and Peerenboom 2006, Meessen, Kashala, and Musango 2007).  
5.3. METHODS 
5.3.1. DATA 
The database contains two rounds (baseline and follow-up) of household and health 
facility surveys collected in 2006 and 2008. It allows for estimations on the effect on 
spatial disparities of several reforms implemented at that time in Rwanda, including 
performance-based financing and fiscal decentralization. Although it would be 
interesting to assess regional inequalities countrywide, restricting the sample to 
districts that participated in the PBF impact evaluation gives a unique opportunity 
to generate sound evidence on the impact of PBF on spatial disparities.  
Data was collected from 166 primary healthcare facilities and 2,145 households in 
the catchment areas of these facilities. The analysis presented in this chapter uses 
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the household surveys which provide basic socio-demographic characteristics and 
information on the utilization of health services. The analysis is performed using 
three different samples: a sample for family planning analysis with married women 
aged 15-49, a sample where mothers are interviewed about their last pregnancy and 
a sample of children up to five years. The analysis focuses on five services and the 
decision to include them was driven by their importance in reducing maternal and 
child mortality and morbidity. First, the coverage of institutional delivery is one of 
the most important MDG indicators as it largely contributes to maternal mortality 
reduction; this service also received the largest financial incentive as part of the PBF 
strategy (Table 1-6). Second, benefiting from at least four prenatal care visits is an 
international standard aiming to reduce the risks of complications during 
pregnancy. Third, increased access to family planning is largely promoted in 
Rwanda to reduce unwanted pregnancies and fertility as well as cut infant and child 
mortality. Finally, the utilization of preventive and curative care in the four weeks 
prior to interview aims to assess measures taken to reduce the burden of disease of 
children under-five.  
As the focus of this chapter is disparities in the utilization of basic health services 
between districts, individual data was aggregated to compute district level averages 
for the two waves. As a result, there are 38 observations for each variable (one for 
each district per wave). Although this represents a small sample and having more 
waves would improve the statistical power of analyses, the sample is purposely 
limited to benefit from the strengths of the impact evaluation and measure the 
contribution of PBF to spatial disparities. The sample size still exceeds the rule of 
thumb minimum of 30 observations.  
5.3.2. STATISTICAL METHODS 
5.3.2.1. Regression analyses 
Before exploring spatial disparities, regressions are run using Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) and a difference-in-difference model to assess the impact of PBF on 
basic maternal and child health utilization. The use of a difference-in-difference 
model is justified by the fact that the randomization of the study somehow failed 
due to the decentralization process as explained in section 2.3.3. The difference-in-
difference model first calculates the mean difference between the baseline and 
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follow-up values of the variables of interest for the treatment and control groups; 
second, it calculates the difference between these two mean scores. This second 
difference isolates the impact of PBF. The regression specification of the difference-
in-difference model is:  
ititiiiit tTtTDDY    .   
where Y is the outcome of interest, T is the treatment variable (0= control; 1= 
treatment), t is the time dummy (0 = 2006; 1=2008), X is a list of time-varying 
individual characteristics and Ɛ is the error term. The coefficient of the interaction 
of T and t (DD) gives the estimate of the impact of treatment on outcome Y.  
Individual, household and health facility characteristics aggregated at the district 
level that proved to influence utilization (Basinga et al. 2011) were added in the 
specification as explanatory variables: primary education attainment of women (or 
mothers), average distance between the household and the facility, health insurance 
coverage and the proportion of public facilities in the district. For institutional 
deliveries and postnatal care, the average number of children per woman was also 
added in the regression.   
5.3.2.2. Coefficient of variation 
To describe spatial diversity in the utilization of basic health services overtime, 
coefficients of variation were computed for each service in 2006 and 2008. In 
contrast to standard deviation, which is an absolute measure of dispersion, the 
coefficient of variation (CV) is a relative measure. It is the ratio of the standard 
deviation δ to the mean μ and the higher the CV, the greater the dispersion will be: 
𝐶𝑉 =
𝜎
𝜇
 
The CV is particularly useful when comparing measurements across multiple 
variables as it allows direct comparison even when variables are measured on 
different scales.  
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5.3.2.3. Decomposition 
The decomposition identifies determinants of spatial disparities and quantifies their 
relative contribution. The absolute measure of variation (standard deviation) was 
decomposed to estimate what percentage of inequality is attributed to different 
covariates to assess to what extent contextual factors explain spatial disparities in 
maternal and child health service utilization.  
The traditional approach of decomposition that relies on the analysis of the 
mathematical properties of inequality indices is criticized on the grounds that it 
allows inequality accounting, but not causal analysis. As an alternative, a regression-
based inequality decomposition is proposed (Fiorio and Jenkins 2010). This chapter 
uses a regression-based approach, which was first developed for income-inequality 
decompositions, but is now used for regional analyses (Shorrocks and Wan 2005, 
Costa-Font 2010). The health output (yi) is measured as follows:  
𝑦𝑖𝑡= 
𝑚 𝑋𝛽 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
where X is a matrix of health output determinants and the vector β indicates the 
effect of each determinant on the measure of health service utilization. Using the 
above model, the following is estimated: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡= 
𝑚 ∑?̂?𝑚𝑥𝑖𝑡 +𝜀?̂?𝑡 
where ?̂? is the OLS coefficient and 𝜀?̂?𝑡 is the OLS residual. The decomposition of the 
inequality index sm is conducted as follows:  
𝑠𝑖𝑡
𝑚 =∑
𝛼(𝑦𝑖𝑡
𝑚)𝑥𝑖𝑡
𝐼(𝑦𝑖𝑡
𝑚)
 
where 𝛼(𝑦𝑖𝑡
𝑚) is a weight and 𝐼(𝑦𝑖𝑡
𝑚) is the total inequality in utilization of health 
services with bootstrapping standard errors (Costa-Font 2010).  
Three health output determinants are included in the right hand side of the 
regression to assess the contribution of policies and of contextual factors to spatial 
disparities. First, a Gini index is used to proxy district income inequalities. It 
measures the extent to which the distribution of income deviates from a perfectly 
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equal distribution. As data on household income or consumption was not available, 
a wealth index is estimated to proxy living standards using a principal component 
analysis (Filmer and Pritchett 2001). Second, using district budget data (Rwanda 
Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning 2006, 2008) and projections of district 
populations (Rwanda Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning and National 
Institute of Statistics of Rwanda 2014), a per capita budget was computed to assess 
the effect of fiscal decentralization as the reform put into effect district level budget 
transfers. Third, the interaction between performance-based financing (0 for control 
and 1 for treatment district) and the time variable is once again used to measure the 
contribution of performance-based financing.  
Robustness checks are conducted to verify how confident one can be in the results 
presented. The robustness checks particularly aim to assess the importance of 
population-based characteristics in regional disparities. District population density, 
sex ratio and median age were successively added as a fourth component in the 
decomposition.  
5.3.3. LIMITATIONS 
This study has a number of limitations, although it is the first to decompose spatial 
disparities in the utilization of health services in Rwanda and to estimate the 
contribution of major reforms such as fiscal decentralization and performance-
based financing. First, the analysis is not conducted on the entire country as 11 
districts are excluded. Spatial disparities may be underestimated as the analysis 
cannot capture urban-rural inequalities. Second, because the impact evaluation data 
was purposely chosen to rigorously assess the impact of PBF, the analysis is limited 
to two waves and the sample size is small. One can however be confident that 
results provide a good sense of regional disparity determinants. Third, as both 
waves are separated by two years only, the observation period is too short to 
observe long term effects of performance-based financing and of fiscal 
decentralization.  
5.4. RESULTS 
Before focusing on spatial disparities, this section begins by reporting upon overall 
utilization of basic maternal and child health services in Rwanda at the time of the 
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study. The evolution of spatial disparities (drawing on the coefficient of variation) 
between 2006 and 2008 is then presented before examining the sources of such 
spatial variability through a mapping exercise. Finally, results from the regression-
based decomposition show the relative contribution of different features 
underpinning spatial disparities.  
5.4.1. OVERALL UTILIZATION OF BASIC MATERNAL AND CHILD HEALTH 
SERVICES  
Utilization of basic maternal and child health services in the treatment and control 
groups were balanced at baseline as highlighted by Basinga et al. (2011). Utilization 
of maternal services rose significantly overtime: use of family planning rose from 
11% to 33% between 2006 and 2008, and, institutional deliveries from 36% to 60% 
with a higher coverage in treatment districts (65% in 2008 compared to 50% in the 
control group). The probability of a woman attending at least four prenatal care 
visits during pregnancy also rose from 16% to 32%. Improvements in the use of 
child health services are smaller: the percentage of children visiting a health center 
for curative care in the event of an illness rose from 25% to 33% while that of 
children benefiting from a preventive care visit rose from 11% to 15% (Table 5-1).  
Table 5-1: Average utilization of basic maternal and child health services (2006-2008) 
 2006 2008 
 Control Treatment Total Control Treatment Total 
Family 
planning 
13% 10% 11% 35% 32% 33% 
Institutional 
deliveries  
38% 35% 36% 50% 65% 60% 
4+ prenatal 
visits  
11% 19% 16% 24% 36% 32% 
Child curative 
care 
24% 26% 25% 31% 33% 33% 
Child 
preventive 
care 
13% 10% 11% 11% 18% 15% 
Source: Author (2015) 
Utilization of basic services also improved as a result of PBF. Table 5-2 highlights 
the positive impact of PBF on institutional deliveries (+14%) and Table 5-3 on 
preventive care for children (10%). Being a treatment district also positively affects 
the probability of a woman benefiting from at least 4 prenatal care visits (OLS only). 
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The coefficient associated with time (‘post’) confirms the above positive trend in 
access to family planning and institutional deliveries overtime (+25% for family 
planning and +30 to 40% for institutional deliveries).  
Table 5-2: Determinants of utilization of basic maternal health services at district level 
 Family planning Institutional deliveries 4+ ANC visits 
 OLS DD OLS DD OLS DD 
Treatment  -0.019 -0.022 0.038 -0.034 0.087** 0.066** 
 (0.021) (0.034) (0.034) (0.036) (0.034) (0.027) 
Post 0.256*** 0.253*** 0.402*** 0.308*** 0.066 0.039 
 (0.042) (0.054) (0.086) (0.078) (0.079) (0.078) 
Interaction  0.005  0.145**  0.042 
  (0.042)  (0.065)  (0.070) 
Obs. 38 38 38 38 38 38 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; DD: Difference in difference 
Table 5-3: Determinants of utilization of basic child health services at district level 
 Child curative care Child preventive care 
  OLS DD OLS DD 
Treatment  0.017 0.023 0.018 -0.03 
 (-0.028) (-0.045) (-0.023) (-0.028) 
Post 0.002 0.009 0.017 -0.039 
 (-0.059) (-0.07) (-0.038) (-0.037) 
Interaction  -0.012  0.097** 
  (-0.056)  (-0.041) 
Obs. 38 38 38 38 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; DD: Difference in difference 
5.4.2. EVOLUTION OF SPATIAL DISPARITIES IN UTILIZATION OF BASIC 
SERVICES 
The analysis of spatial disparities, measured by the coefficients of variation, reports 
two interesting patterns: first, there are important spatial disparities between 
districts in 2006 and 2008 for all services; second, inequalities decreased overtime, 
in particular for family planning, curative care for children, institutional deliveries 
and preventive care. Disparities slightly increased for prenatal care visits (Table 
5-4).    
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Table 5-4: Coefficients of variation of district level inequality in utilization of basic health 
services 
 2006 2008 Difference 
Institutional deliveries 0.40 0.28 -0.12 
Family planning 0.53 0.23 -0.31 
4+ prenatal care visits 0.47 0.50 0.03 
Curative care for children 0.43 0.19 -0.24 
Preventive care for children 0.56 0.49 -0.07 
Source: Author (2015) 
5.4.3. MAPPING OF SPATIAL DISPARITIES IN UTILIZATION OF BASIC 
SERVICES 
Mapping of spatial disparities confirms the existence of inequalities in utilization of 
basic services across districts in both waves (Figure 5-1 to Figure 5-10). For 
instance, utilization of institutional deliveries varies from 20% to 70% in 2006 and 
from 41% to over 90% in 2008 across districts.  
Figure 5-1: Modern family planning utilization 
(2006) 
 
Figure 5-2: Modern family planning utilization 
(2008) 
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Figure 5-3: Institutional deliveries (2006) 
 
Figure 5-4: Institutional deliveries (2008) 
 
 
 
Figure 5-5: 4 or more prenatal care visits 
(2006) 
 
Figure 5-6: 4 or more prenatal care visits 
(2008) 
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Figure 5-7: Utilization of child curative care 
(2006) 
 
Figure 5-8: Utilization of child curative care 
(2008) 
 
 
Figure 5-9: Utilization of child preventive care 
(2006) 
 
Figure 5-10: Utilization of child preventive 
care (2008) 
 
Source: Author (2015) 
5.4.4. DECOMPOSITION OF SPATIAL INEQUALITIES 
5.4.4.1. Descriptive analysis of contextual factors 
Spatial disparities in utilization of basic health services were decomposed using 
three potential explanatory factors: the Gini index, per capita district health budget 
and performance-based financing. Mapping of the Gini index (Figure 5-11 and 
Figure 5-12) shows large disparities between districts. The Gini index varied from 
29 to 63 in 2006 and from 10 to 72 in 2008.  
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Figure 5-11: Gini index (2006) 
 
Figure 5-12: Gini index (2008) 
 
Source: Author (2015) 
The per capita health budget significantly increased between 2006 and 2008 as a 
result of fiscal decentralization. Countrywide, variations in per capita district health 
budgets decreased significantly between 2006 and 2010 suggesting a positive effect 
of fiscal decentralization on the reduction of spatial disparities (Figure 5-13). The 
mapping of resources allocated to districts also shows that disparities existed but 
did not evolve over time (Figure 5-14 and Figure 5-15). 
Figure 5-13: Spatial disparities in per capita district health budget (2006-2010) in Rwanda 
 
Source: Author (2015) 
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Figure 5-14: District health budget (RwF p.c.) 
(2006) 
 
Figure 5-15: District health budget (RwF p.c.) 
(2008) 
 
Source: Author (2015) 
5.4.5. COMPONENTS OF SPATIAL DISPARITIES 
The main factors underpinning spatial variations in the utilization of services are 
fiscal decentralization (measured by per capita budget) and performance-based 
financing. Their effect depends on the type of service considered (Figure 5-16). 
Results on family planning are not reported as coefficients were not significant.  
Decentralization explains 8.5% of spatial disparity decline in institutional deliveries, 
10% in at least 4 prenatal care visits and 12.5% in the probability of a child visiting 
a health center in the event of illness. Performance-based financing accounts for 
27% of the decline in spatial variation for at least four prenatal care visits, 21% for 
child preventive care, 9% for institutional deliveries and 6% for child curative care. 
The impact of district level inequalities (Gini) is marginal (Figure 5-16).   
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Figure 5-16: Decomposition of spatial disparities 
 
5.4.6. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
As percentages associated with the residual (Figure 5-16) suggest that spatial 
disparities are also explained by factors not included in the model, robustness 
checks are run to measure the extent to which disparities can be explained by 
population-based characteristics. 
As Rwanda has one of the highest population densities in the region and a largely 
varying density across districts (from 2,124 to 178 inhabitants/km2) (Rwanda 
Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning and National Institute of Statistics of 
Rwanda 2014), district population density was added as a fourth component in the 
decomposition. Results suggest that regional disparities are smaller in more 
populated areas for all services except institutional deliveries (Figure 5-17). 
Robustness checks are also run using the median age in the district population and 
sex composition. As coefficients associated with those variables were not significant, 
results are not presented.  
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Figure 5-17: Robustness check for the decomposition of spatial disparities 
 
5.5. DISCUSSION 
This chapter focuses on spatial disparities in rural Rwanda between 2006 and 2008. 
It is an interesting period from a policy analysis viewpoint as the country started 
implementing both fiscal decentralization and performance-based financing in 
2006.  
This chapter adds to current knowledge in at least four ways: first, it provides 
evidence on spatial disparities in the utilization of basic maternal and child health 
services in rural Rwanda. Second, it adds to existing knowledge on the impact of PBF 
on the overall use of health services in Rwanda (Basinga et al. 2011)  and on the use 
of services by the poorest (Chapter 4) by analyzing the impact of PBF on spatial 
disparities. Third, this chapter brings empirical evidence to a mostly theoretical 
debate on the effect of decentralization on regional inequalities. Fourth, it analyzes 
the joint effect of PBF and decentralization on regional inequalities.  
5.5.1. UTILIZATION OF BASIC MATERNAL AND CHILD HEALTH SERVICES IN 
RURAL RWANDA 
The findings reported in this chapter confirm the positive trend in utilization of 
basic services in Rwanda documented by Sekabaraga, Diop, and Soucat (2011). 
However, in 2008, utilization of all services under study remained low: only one 
third of women used a modern family planning method or benefited from at least 
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four prenatal care visits during their last pregnancy, fewer than two thirds of 
women delivered in a health facility, and only one third of children under-five 
visited a health facility in the event of an illness. Results also confirm the positive 
impact of PBF on institutional deliveries and utilization of preventive care for 
children as demonstrated elsewhere  (Basinga et al. 2011). 
5.5.2. COMPONENTS OF SPATIAL DISPARITIES 
This chapter brings new evidence by reporting that overall improvements in 
utilization of services between 2006 and 2008 hide large variations between rural 
districts. Disparities however decreased between 2006 and 2008 for all services 
except prenatal care.  
The major contribution of this chapter lies in the decomposition of spatial 
disparities to better understand their contextual components. First, decentralization 
reduced spatial disparities for institutional deliveries, prenatal care and curative 
care for children. It had no impact on family planning and preventive care for 
children. Second, performance-based financing narrowed spatial disparities in the 
utilization of all basic health services except family planning. Third, the limited 
contribution of the Gini index suggests that between districts, inequalities do not 
influence service utilization. Rather, as documented in Chapter 4, within-district 
variations matter more. Interventions to address those inequalities should therefore 
aim to target the poorest households within communities rather than target a 
district as a whole.  
5.5.3. DECENTRALIZATION 
By bringing new empirical evidence, this chapter contributes to the debate on the 
effect of decentralization on regional inequalities. The decentralization theorem 
postulates that “in the absence of cost-savings from the centralized provision of a 
[local public] good and of inter-jurisdictional externalities, the level of welfare will 
always be at least as high (and typically higher) if Pareto-efficient levels of 
consumption are provided in each jurisdiction than if any single, uniform level of 
consumption is maintained across all jurisdictions” (Oates 1972). In other words, on 
grounds of economic efficiency, the decentralized provision of public goods with 
localized effects will enhance efficiency and is therefore desirable, in particular, if 
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needs are geographically unbalanced. Proponents of decentralization also argue that 
devolving healthcare delivery responsibilities to local levels improves technical and 
allocative efficiency as decentralized programs are designed according to local 
needs (Robalino, Picazo, and Voetberg 2001). Decentralization can also increase 
governments’ accountability in service delivery, reduce information asymmetries 
and develop local democracies (Costa-Font and Rico 2006).  
Decentralization can stimulate competition between regions.  Citizens of one region 
can compare their benefits to those of a neighboring region and judge their region’s 
performance. This can result in regions increasing or decreasing budgets allocated 
to health (Costa‐Font and Pons‐Novell 2007). Decentralization can induce welfare 
migration, a phenomenon observed when welfare recipients move from low-benefit 
to high-benefit regions to secure a better standard of living (Brueckner 2000). When 
welfare migration is limited, regional decision makers will have incentives to 
increase coverage.  Decentralization can lead to political competition as well. 
Partisan cycles can influence public expenditure, although this will depend on the 
types of public expenditure or the kind of government (Costa‐Font and Pons‐Novell 
2007). 
However, the theoretical debate highlights risks associated with decentralization. 
Local authorities can capture most of the benefits at the expense of the non-elite 
resulting in inefficient and inequitable cross-subsidization (Bardhan 2002). 
Decentralization can exacerbate existing disparities, since giving more power to 
regions can hinder uniformity in service delivery. Furthermore, as decentralization 
has implicit fiscal, political and administrative costs, poorer regions may face 
difficulties and the gap between regions may then increase. Indeed, decentralization 
is seen by some scholars as the denunciation of the equalization role of national 
governments (Gill 2004). They argue that centralized systems are the best way to 
redistribute resources in favor of poorer areas while decentralization favors richer 
communities.  
Results presented in this chapter support the hypothesis that decentralization 
reduces inequalities between regions. In line with the theory of fiscal 
decentralization, informal competition between districts and political competition is 
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likely to incentivize local decision makers to increase satisfaction levels of their 
population. Local decision makers granted with more responsibilities and resources 
were encouraged to put sufficient resources into their health system to ensure 
adequate service delivery. Decentralization may also have encouraged local 
authorities to improve efficiency in public spending and to use savings for other 
purposes. As for healthcare providers, they were incentivized to improve the quality 
of services to ensure patients will visit the facility again. Typical problems that 
exacerbate inequalities in the context of decentralization, such as the absence of a 
mechanism to transfer resources from richer to poorer areas or to ensure the 
availability of skilled personnel, were successfully addressed in Rwanda and 
facilitated the smooth implementation of decentralization.  
The evidence reported in this chapter is in line with evidence from some developed 
and emerging economies. For instance in Spain, healthcare devolution did not 
increase regional inequalities in healthcare outcomes and outputs (Costa-Font and 
Rico 2006). In fact, decentralization resulted in spatial interactions and competition 
between regions that had a positive impact on the level of public health expenditure 
(Costa‐Font and Pons‐Novell 2007). In Chile and Colombia, decentralization 
improved equity of resource allocation thanks to the utilization of a budget 
allocation formula, adequate local funding choices and equity funds. Poorer 
communities were encouraged to put more resources into health systems while 
wealthier communities did not increase spending, thus closing the gap between 
communities (Bossert et al. 2003). Finally, in a cross-country analysis, higher fiscal 
decentralization was associated with lower mortality rates, in particular in poorer 
countries, and better health outcomes (Robalino, Picazo, and Voetberg 2001).  
The Rwandan case thus contradicts evidence from China where regional inequalities 
coincide with the degree of decentralization (Fan, Kanbur, and Zhang 2011). In 
China, the poorest local governments reduced their investments in the health sector, 
cut welfare benefits and decreased financing of public infrastructure in rural areas 
as a result of decentralization (Zhang and Kanbur 2005).  
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5.5.4. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
As the literature review has pointed out, researchers and policymakers have a 
tendency to focus their attention on socioeconomic inequalities in access to health 
services in low and middle income countries, and to a lesser extent on urban-rural 
inequalities. Although it is critical to address such inequalities, policymakers should 
not overlook regional inequalities as they can result in lower economic 
development, social unrest and poor health outcomes. Recent history in Arabic 
countries shows that such inequalities can originate profound instabilities. In their 
analysis of regional disparities in North African countries, Boutayeb and Helmert 
(2011) note that the challenge for those countries, besides improving economic, 
social and health conditions, is mainly to reduce avoidable regional inequalities.  
Despite the limitations spelled out in section 5.3.3, the findings from this chapter are 
informative in many ways. Empirical results from Rwanda revealed the positive 
short term impact of decentralization on the reduction of spatial disparities. 
Increased district budget reduced variation in the per capita health budget as well 
as disparities in the utilization of basic maternal and child health services. These 
findings highlight the importance of contextual factors in regional inequalities and 
how policymakers can narrow the gap between regions through reform. By 
increasing budgets available to local decision makers, promoting competition and 
strengthening accountability in the use of public resources, decentralization can 
lead to a more efficient use of resources. As a result of decentralization, a leveling 
effect can operate and service delivery and utilization of health services can become 
more homogenous across regions. The case of Rwanda suggests that fiscal 
decentralization can narrow the funding gap between regions.  
Results from Rwanda suggest that PBF can narrow the gap between districts as it 
provides incentives, at district and health facility levels, to perform better. It also 
gives more autonomy to decision makers on the use of resources. PBF alone 
accounts for up to 27% of the decline of spatial disparities for basic maternal and 
child health services. As argued by Meessen, Soucat, and Sekabaraga (2011), 
performance-based financing therefore must not only be seen as a provider 
payment mechanism. Meessen, Soucat, and Sekabaraga (2011) state that if PBF “is 
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incorporated into a broader reform context, it can help address several structural 
problems facing health systems around the world, problems that have proven 
intractable for years”. The case of Rwanda illustrates that PBF, when combined with 
decentralization, can help achieve the objectives of decentralization. In Rwanda, PBF 
was even more effective than decentralization in narrowing spatial disparities. 
These findings should encourage policymakers to consider PBF in the broader 
context of reform and to explore potential synergies with other policies. The case of 
Rwanda also illustrates that PBF and decentralization work hand in hand as they 
pursue the same objective of improving efficiency in the use of resources by giving 
more resources and autonomy to local actors.  
5.6. CONCLUSION 
This study provides evidence on an unexplored aspect of performance-based 
financing that can benefit Rwanda as well as other countries implementing or 
planning to adopt this strategy. It complements the body of evidence on PBF that is 
mainly related to its impact on the quantity and quality of services delivered, and 
more recently on its impact on the utilization of services by poorer groups. This 
chapter is the first to explore the impact of PBF on another type of inequality, 
namely, regional inequalities or spatial disparities.  
Since the genocide of 1994, Rwanda has achieved tremendous progress rebuilding 
its health system and developing innovative health financing reforms that have put 
it on track to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (Binagwaho et al. 2014). 
Nevertheless, in 2006-2008, the country was confronted with large spatial 
disparities in service utilization of basic maternal and child health.  
In 2006, Rwanda engaged in large structural reforms aimed to improve efficiency in 
the delivery of health services. Decentralization and performance-based financing 
thoroughly transformed the health system. This chapter supports the hypothesis in 
that PBF and decentralization can significantly cut regional inequalities. Besides its 
primary objective of incentivizing healthcare providers to deliver more and better 
quality health services, PBF can reinforce the impact of broader reforms. As 
decentralization and PBF are increasingly being promoted in low and middle 
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income countries, this chapter encourages policymakers to explore synergies 
between those reforms to reduce regional inequalities. 
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PART 4: CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
The overarching objective of this thesis was to investigate the impact of 
performance incentives on health system performance. To date, published evidence 
on the impact of performance incentives mainly relates to high income countries 
(HIC) but the performance challenges faced by their health systems are not the same 
as those of low income countries (LIC). This highlights the need for more evidence 
from poorer settings. LIC are characterized by poor utilization of basic health 
services, a lack of financial and human resources, poor management capacities and 
broad inefficiencies in service delivery (Belli 2004). Performance-based financing 
(PBF) is increasingly promoted in LIC to overcome inefficiencies in service delivery 
but the evidence-base is insufficient (Witter et al. 2012). This thesis thus sought to 
contribute in closing a gap in the literature by providing sound evidence on one of 
the most unexplored aspects of performance-based financing in LIC to assist 
countries in designing evidence-based policies. Rwanda was chosen as a case study 
as it is the first country that implemented PBF on a national scale with an embedded 
rigorous impact evaluation that enables to isolate the net effect of PBF on several 
variables of interest.  
Since the literature suggests that efficiency gains from performance incentives may 
be achieved at the expense of other performance dimensions, this thesis aimed to 
assess whether PBF can raise productivity without hampering equity and 
responsiveness. PBF is currently at the center of a debate, and the major 
contribution of this thesis is to provide sound evidence on poorly documented 
aspects of the strategy. Opponents argue that there lacks evidence on the impact of 
PBF and that there is a bias in the literature with only positive results being 
published. Further, they state that PBF may generate perverse effects and hamper 
equity, however, these are not well documented (Ireland, Paul, and Dujardin 2011). 
Proponents on the contrary argue that the strategy can catalyze reforms and 
address health system inefficiencies, such as low responsiveness and inequality 
(Basinga, Mayaka, and Condo 2011, Meessen, Soucat, and Sekabaraga 2011).  
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This chapter and the following one summarize the results from the empirical 
chapters. It proposes policy recommendations for improving health systems’ 
performance in LIC with considerations for equity and responsiveness. Limitations 
and a future research agenda are also presented. 
6.1. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
6.1.1. OVERALL ANSWER TO THE RESEARCH PROBLEM 
To address the question ‘Can performance-based financing raise productivity 
without hampering equity and responsiveness?’ this thesis examined the impact of 
PBF on efficiency, which comprises productivity and responsiveness, and on equity.  
Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 argued that PBF has a positive impact on efficiency. First, 
PBF raises health workforce productivity through higher workloads and lower 
absenteeism. Second, these improvements in health workforce performance are 
accompanied by higher responsiveness to patients’ needs as health workforce 
performance dimensions are linked and influence one another.   
Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 demonstrated that the impact of PBF on equity is 
uncertain. PBF can deter equity in access for the poorest as they are more difficult to 
reach. However, when combined with a strategy that aims to reduce inequalities 
between households or regions, PBF reinforces the positive impact of such 
strategies and strengthens equity gains.  The thesis thus argues that PBF should be 
used to raise health systems’ performance and that synergies with other reforms 
must be developed to amplify their effect and avoid potential perverse effects of 
PBF, in particular on equity in access to services. Summaries by chapter are 
presented below.  
6.1.2. CHAPTER 2: DRIVERS OF PRODUCTIVITY GAINS 
Efficiency gains are generally put forward as the main reason for implementing 
performance incentive schemes in HIC and LIC. As a result, studies investigating the 
impact of PBF focus mainly on technical and allocative efficiency. Most publications 
on LIC and HIC (Witter et al. 2012, Greene and Nash 2009) report only descriptive 
analyses of efficiency gains achieved through changes in utilization (quantitative 
aspect) and productivity ratios and changes in process quality. Such approaches are 
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limited for a number of reasons: first, reporting that performance incentives 
succeed in doing what they were designed for is a limited finding, although it is 
informative for policymakers; second, the evidence base is now large enough to be 
confident that the strategy has a positive impact on efficiency which reduces the 
contribution to knowledge of any new study; third, it is unsatisfactory to report the 
success of a strategy if the contribution of contextual factors is not reported. By 
demonstrating the impact of PBF on health workforce productivity and looking into 
the drivers for productivity gains, Chapter 2 thus aimed to depart from existing 
evidence and contribute to knowledge by bringing innovative evidence that can 
benefit policymakers.  
Chapter 2 assessed the contribution of PBF to health workforce performance which 
can be measured through availability, competences, responsiveness and 
productivity (World Health Organization 2006); in particular, it estimated the 
impact on availability, measured by distribution and attendance at work, and 
productivity. Chapter 2 proposed a conceptual framework to understand the drivers 
of health workforce productivity. It explored links between availability of the health 
workforce, presence at work and productivity and quantified the contribution of 
PBF on changes observed overtime. Following the theory on incentives, Chapter 2 
argued that PBF could enhance health workforce productivity as a result of extrinsic 
motivation, but particular attention was given to intrinsic motivation as it influences 
each step identified by the conceptual framework, and thus productivity.  
Results support the hypothesis that PBF improves health workforce productivity. 
Productivity gains are not driven by staff expansion but by cutting absenteeism and 
placing a higher workload on staff. Productivity gains can be achieved through 
financial incentives, improved supervision and more responsiveness but potentially 
at the expense of a relaxed working environment. Chapter 2 thus argues that 
mechanisms should be put in place in parallel to extrinsic motivation mechanisms to 
ensure greater job satisfaction and working conditions, which are critical 
determinants of intrinsic motivation.  
These findings lend support to exploring new ways of improving the availability of 
healthcare services and utilization through higher workforce productivity. Although 
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there is evidence that utilization of healthcare services raises with the availability of 
staff (Chen et al. 2004) and traditional input-based approaches tend to argue for 
more staff being recruited to increase service utilization, Chapter 2 suggests that 
raising performance of existing staff can partially cover the shortage in the health 
workforce. In a context of resource constraints and staff shortage, the evidence from 
Rwanda shows that PBF can raise health workforce performance to increase 
productivity and deliver more services. This is in line with the principle of ‘more 
money for health and more health for the money’ supported by the international 
taskforce on innovative international financing for health systems. Making more 
inputs available for the health sector is not the only solution, particularly when it is 
underperforming. Efforts should be targeted in making the allocation of existing and 
additional funds more efficient (Taskforce on innovative international financing for 
health systems 2009).  
Increasing value for money is particularly critical in countries such as Rwanda that 
are confronted with large budget constraints and sustainability issues due to the 
heavy reliance on donors. Human resources for health generally represent the bulk 
of a recurrent budget for LIC which makes the wage bill unsustainable for the long 
term. Strategies are thus needed to overcome this problem and reduce the burden 
on the national budget. The case study on Rwanda has demonstrated that PBF 
succeeds in making health workers more present at work, which reduces resource 
wastage. It also improves their productivity and therefore succeeds in closing the 
gap between supply and demand for healthcare services.    
6.1.3. CHAPTER 3: PATIENTS’ PERCEPTION ON EFFICIENCY GAINS 
Responsiveness to patients’ needs is one of the four dimensions of health workforce 
performance (World Health Organization 2006) and Chapter 3 reported that LIC 
and HIC differ in the way they include this dimension in the delivery of services. LIC 
still pay little attention to patients’ satisfaction and the PBF scheme did not include 
it in the incentive mechanism. On the contrary, HIC are concerned with patients’ 
satisfaction which is powerful and can influence healthcare providers. Most P4P 
schemes in HIC tie part of the incentive schemes to patients’ satisfaction.  
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Efficient service delivery requires delivering quality health services: thus all P4P 
and PBF schemes measure quality of care (process quality) to estimate their impact 
on efficiency. Following Donabedian (1988), Chapter 3 argued that patients’ 
satisfaction is a critical part of quality evaluation and must be measured along with 
process quality (clinical indicators). The majority of studies from HIC and LIC do not 
report the impact of performance incentives on patients’ satisfaction although it is 
legitimate to verify that productivity gains are not achieved at the expense of 
responsiveness. For instance, healthcare providers that have pressure to deliver 
more services tend to spend less time with the patients, provide less of an 
explanation or neglect the infrastructure which can negatively impact satisfaction. 
Despite the risk of perverse effects, the literature review revealed that changes in 
health service quality are mostly measured from a clinical point of view in HIC and 
LIC. Chapter 3 thus innovated by offering a new perspective, providing patients’ 
view on efficiency gains achieved through performance incentives. Data from 
Rwanda collected from patients exiting primary healthcare facilities who were 
asked to rank their satisfaction with waiting time, cleanliness, availability of 
medicine, time with provider, privacy during examination, staff attitude, explanation 
from provider, cost of the medicine, cost of the service and overall service received 
was used. Satisfaction dimensions on clinical care were aggregated in one index 
using a polychoric correlation method while non-clinical satisfaction dimensions 
were kept as separate ordinal measures.  
Results support the hypothesis that PBF improves health workforce responsiveness. 
Productivity gains due to performance incentives (Chapter 2) were not achieved at 
the expense of patients’ satisfaction or perceived service quality. Improvements in 
productivity, availability and competences of the health workforce have a positive 
effect on satisfaction with clinical services, even if patients’ satisfaction is not tied to 
a reward. Providers benefiting from PBF can be incentivized to raise patients’ 
satisfaction with non-clinical services if they think it is associated with future 
financial gains. Chapter 3 concluded that low and middle income countries should 
build on the experience from high income countries to better listen to the patient 
voice in general, and in PBF schemes in particular. 
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The case study on Rwanda revealed that satisfaction with clinical dimensions is 
more important to patients than those with non-clinical dimensions. This is 
consistent with evidence from HIC where the patient-provider relationship 
outweighs satisfaction with other dimensions (Crow et al. 2002, Hall and Dornan 
1988). As performance incentives target healthcare providers’ behavioral changes, 
they potentially represent a powerful tool to raise providers’ responsiveness to 
patients’ needs and therefore increase patients’ satisfaction. Further research is 
needed to explore mechanisms through which one can influence providers to 
modify their behaviors and those through which patients’ perception of services 
evolve. As patients’ perception depends on individual and cultural factors (Hall and 
Dornan 1990, Crow et al. 2002, Sitzia and Wood 1997, Hekkert et al. 2009), 
performance-incentives must be tailored to the particular setting in which they are 
implemented and to the characteristics of the target population.  
6.1.4. CHAPTER 4: DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECT 
Healthcare service delivery in LIC is characterized by large inequalities in access to 
basic health services. Wealth related inequalities are the most documented, with the 
poorest quintiles using fewer healthcare services despite greater needs (Barros et 
al. 2012). In this context, all health system reforms should converge to cut avoidable 
inequalities.  
Among the potential perverse effects of performance incentives, the risk that the 
search for more efficiency jeopardizes equity is widely cited. Performance 
incentives rely on market-based mechanisms according to which the right 
incentives will lead to an efficient allocation of resources. Welfare economics 
however recognizes that the market can lead to a suboptimal allocation, in 
particular, in the presence of large externalities, as in the health sector. As supply 
oriented mechanisms, such as PBF, do not focus on the distribution of benefits, the 
potential tension between efficiency and equity (Okun 1975) stands for a major risk. 
In the health sector, policymakers generally rely on demand side strategies, such as 
health insurance or conditional cash transfers, to improve equity in access to 
services. Although these strategies have demonstrated their efficacy (Victora et al. 
2003, Lagarde, Haines, and Palmer 2009), simultaneously implementing incentives 
that aim to increase access to services for the entire population by boosting the 
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demand of basic health services on the one hand, and the supply of services on the 
other hand, requires an examination of how they interact. It is not optimal, from a 
policy angle, to consider that each strategy will achieve its objectives without 
impacting another. Chapter 4 thus demonstrates that the equity impact of measures 
targeting efficiency, such as PBF, must be documented. This is of upmost importance 
to avoid potential perverse effects.   
Chapter 4 expands on existing evidence from Rwanda on the positive impact of PBF 
on the utilization of basic health services (Basinga et al. 2011). It sought to explore 
whether the increase in utilization of basic maternal and child health services, in 
light of PBF, was equally distributed among wealth groups. As the literature 
suggests that targeting is necessary to ensure equity (Gwatkin 2009), the hypothesis 
was that PBF had no impact on equity in Rwanda, as the poor were not explicitly 
targeted; doubts remained on whether the strategy would be pro-rich. Chapter 4 
builds on two rounds of household surveys collected before and after the 
implementation of PBF in treatment facilities which provide information on service 
utilization. The population was categorized in two wealth groups (upper and lower), 
using a principal component analysis. Difference-in-difference regressions were run 
to isolate the net impact of PBF on the utilization of basic health services on the total 
population and on the two subgroups to identify any potential differential effects 
according to wealth status.  
Results show that, as its main focus is on supply side barriers, PBF leads to 
efficiency gains rather than equity improvements. PBF in Rwanda tended to focus on 
those easier to reach; generally the most affluent. It was less effective in reaching 
the poorest. When financial barriers to healthcare utilization are too high, as is the 
case for the lower group of women, PBF cannot affect utilization. When lower group 
women are insured, however (and thus the financial barrier disappears), utilization 
increases due to PBF. Chapter 4 argues that PBF programs should include built-in 
mechanisms targeting the most vulnerable. Further, it suggests that the impact of 
PBF should be understood together with the specific development of health 
insurance coverage and the organization of the health system.  
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In the absence of incentives to target the vulnerable, providers have the perverse 
incentive to cherry-pick patients that are easier to reach to raise utilization of 
services and thus their earnings, as reported in the literature (Gwatkin 2009). This 
is generally at the expense of the poorest as they live in more remote areas, further 
from their health facility and have less access to information. In that context, it is 
critical that policymakers explore synergies between strategies aimed to raise 
utilization of health services from the supply and demand sides to make sure 
perverse effects are controlled for. Demand side incentives could help raise demand 
for services among those that use them the least.   
6.1.5. CHAPTER 5: SPATIAL DISPARITIES 
Regional inequalities are a major impediment to equitable access to health services 
in LIC but they are not well documented; indeed, the effect of PBF on spatial 
disparities has never been explored. Chapter 5 highlights large spatial disparities in 
access to basic maternal and child health services in Rwanda reflecting inefficiencies 
in service delivery. Along with many governments of LIC, the government of 
Rwanda engaged in fiscal decentralization to improve service delivery of social 
services by making more financial and human resources locally available. With 
decentralization, local decision makers and managers of health facilities gained 
more control over decisions and could adapt strategies to the needs of their 
populations. Chapter 5 assesses how PBF interacts with fiscal decentralization and 
how it impacts regional inequalities in access to basic health services.  
Chapter 5 uses household level data aggregated at the district level on the utilization 
of basic health services and coefficients of variation to describe spatial diversity in 
the utilization of services overtime. Regression-based inequality decomposition 
(Fiorio and Jenkins 2010) enabled the identification of the determinants of spatial 
disparities in the utilization of basic health services and to quantify their relative 
contribution. More precisely, the contributions of the Gini index (to proxy income 
inequalities), per capita district health budget (to measure the effect of 
decentralization) and PBF were measured.  
Results revealed that by bringing decision making and resources closer to 
beneficiaries, decentralization has a positive impact on the reduction of spatial 
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disparities. PBF can contribute in dissipating spatial disparities in the utilization of 
basic health services. It reinforces the impact of decentralization and closes part of 
the gap between regions due to a leveling effect. Chapter 5 thus revealed that PBF 
can reinforce the impact of broader reforms. It concluded that policymakers should 
explore synergies between decentralization and PBF to reduce spatial disparities as 
decentralization and PBF pursue the same efficiency objective. The recognition that 
decentralization can reduce inequalities between regions is particularly important 
in the context of LIC as those inequalities contribute to the under-performance of 
health services. The mutually reinforcing effect of decentralization and 
performance-based financing confirms that decentralization improves efficiency in 
the use of resources. The theory of fiscal decentralization indeed suggests that it 
promotes informal competition between districts and incentivizes decision makers 
to increase satisfaction levels of their population. Decentralization also favors 
efficiency in public spending as local decision makers seek to generate savings for 
other purposes.  
As reported in the literature, PBF can generate a tension between efficiency and 
equity (Ireland, Paul, and Dujardin 2011, Okun 1975). PBF does not naturally 
improve equity in access and it can, in some instances, deter equity as the richest 
can be the main beneficiaries of an increased supply of services. This is a potentially 
negative finding, particularly for LIC, that policymakers implementing PBF should 
be aware off. Household wealth (that is to say - being a poor household in a 
community or living in deprived regions) has a direct causal effect on health 
(Deaton 2003, Marmot 2005, Pritchett and Summers 1996). Wealth related 
inequalities (due to income or regional disparities) hamper progress in health 
outcomes and contribute to a vicious cycle of bad health and poverty: factors related 
to poverty are also determinants of ill-health; and ill-health, malnutrition and high 
fertility are the main reasons for such impoverishment (Soucat and Yazbeck 2001).  
However, ways to avoid perverse effects on equity do exist. When combined with 
strategies that aim to overcome perverse effects, PBF can be a good reform catalyst 
as it amplifies benefits of other strategies. When combined with a strategy that 
boosts efficiency in service delivery and aims to cut inequalities (such as 
decentralization), it can reinforce the effect of the strategy. Similarly, it reinforces 
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the impact of health insurance, but cannot alone improve access to care for the 
poorest in the absence of financial protection. Further research on the contextual 
factors that facilitate the apparition of those synergies would help policymakers. 
6.2. ACADEMIC CONTRIBUTION OF THE THESIS 
The value-added of this thesis is at least threefold. First, it shows that one can use 
the results of an impact evaluation to perform a sound analysis and generate 
interesting findings that were not the primary objective of the impact evaluation. 
Often, impact evaluations in the health sector are used to measure the impact of an 
intervention on one single outcome of interest (e.g. utilization of a service, out-of 
pocket expenditures). The impact evaluation of PBF in Rwanda used in this thesis 
primarily aimed to quantify the impact of the financial incentives on the utilization 
of basic maternal and child health interventions at primary healthcare facilities. 
However, this thesis demonstrates that the different databases available (household 
data, individual data, facility data and patients’ interviews) can be used in an 
uncommon way to generate interesting findings, while still building on the strengths 
of the impact evaluation. This is an important lesson learned, as impact evaluations 
are costly and timely and their databases are generally underused. In a resource 
limited environment and given that the literature often highlights the need for more 
robust research, one should consider exploiting more of the existing databases.  
Second, one of the strengths of this thesis is its exploration of interactions between 
different interventions. Generally, research papers, for ease of interpretation or 
because of data limitations, tend to focus on the impact of one intervention 
regardless of the surrounding reform environment. This thesis aimed to 
contextualize as much as possible the implementation of PBF in a broader context. 
The most important interventions that could have affected outcomes of interest, 
such as decentralization and health insurance, were interacted with PBF. This 
generated interesting results beneficial to policymakers in LIC.  
Third, the thesis shows that borrowing from different disciplines can enrich the 
analyses. This thesis relied on various bodies of literature including economics, 
political economy, sociology, geography and psychology to capture the complexity of 
factors at stake throughout the chapters. Similarly, mapping, as well as a large array 
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of econometric techniques, was used to accommodate for the different subjects 
under study.  
6.3. LIMITATIONS 
6.3.1. DATA LIMITATIONS 
The first limitation related to the data is reported by Basinga et al. (2011) and also 
in the first chapter of this thesis. The original randomized design of the impact 
evaluation of PBF in Rwanda was compromised by the decentralization process as 
some facilities that were in the control group were reassigned to treatment group, 
thus shifting the study to a quasi-experimental status. Nevertheless, the analysis of 
baseline characteristics shows that any possible confounding bias in the estimates 
are unlikely as individuals and facilities remained comparable in the two groups. 
Second, the observation period of 23 months is not long enough to observe the long 
term impact on changes for some indicators. Changes observed could be larger with 
a longer treatment period; on the contrary, some observed changes could disappear 
with time as providers get used to an incentive. Some indicators that were found 
insignificant may also become significant after more time. It is, for instance possible, 
that the 23 month period was not enough for observing an effect on family planning 
or preventive care as more time is required to change people’s habits and raise their 
awareness and knowledge of available services.  
Third, the impact evaluation was conducted on 19 districts out of the 30 districts in 
Rwanda, so to exclude districts that previously piloted the strategy. Although this 
was a sound decision from a research design perspective, one cannot observe the 
impact of the strategy at a national scale. The impact evaluation excludes the three 
urban districts of the country (located in the capital city) and therefore data is 
limited to rural Rwanda. The analyses on regional disparities and wealth related 
inequalities in access to services are thus underestimating the size of the gaps in the 
country.  
Fourth, a related limitation deals with the generalizability of results for the country. 
As the analyses were performed on rural areas, findings may not be replicable to 
urban areas. For instance, the staff shortage in urban areas is not the same as in 
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rural areas. Similarly, as most rich Rwandans live in urban areas, one would 
probably find a much more unequitable impact of PBF on access for the poorest in 
urban areas. 
Fifth, a generalization of results from Rwanda to another country is difficult as 
Rwanda is an outlier in many respects. Rwanda is characterized by low corruption, 
well-grounded performance culture, large coverage of health insurance, rapid and 
successful implementation of fiscal decentralization and major improvements in the 
availability of healthcare providers at primary healthcare facilities, even in remote 
areas. This makes the country hardly comparable with any other on the continent. 
The strength of the evidence from Rwanda comes from the fact that it shows what 
can be achieved under favorable conditions. The positive outcomes from Rwanda 
should thus encourage other countries to follow in its path.  
6.3.2. DESIGN OF THE STUDY 
The analyses performed in this thesis were not the analyses for which the impact 
evaluation was conducted in the first place. It was not possible in some instances to 
use the difference-in-difference method that allows an estimation of the net effect of 
PBF controlling for other factors. In Chapter 3, errors in data collection at baseline 
did not allow using baseline data to assess the effect of PBF on patients’ satisfaction. 
Only data collected at follow-up was used assuming that satisfaction was 
comparable at baseline in treatment and control groups (which is true for the 
satisfaction of households). Chapter 3 is therefore unable to demonstrate the impact 
of PBF, but only causality. For the analysis of spatial disparities in Chapter 5, data 
had to be aggregated at the district level. As there are only 19 districts in the impact 
evaluation and two waves of observations, the total number of observations is 38, 
which is a small sample size. To ensure that results reported in Chapter 5 were 
robust, several robustness checks were run. The chapter concludes that one can be 
confident in the estimates.  
In addition to those limitations, one must remain aware of the potential downsides 
of randomized controlled experiments. Standard methods of impact evaluation may 
leave gaps between what we know about the effectiveness of an intervention, and 
what we want to know. Evaluations must question the intervention itself, what it 
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aims to address and whether it is the right intervention.  This requires us to 
conceptualize the case for the intervention to better identify policy objectives, 
constraints and the causal links through which the specific intervention yields its 
expected outcomes (Ravallion 2009). Although this thesis aimed to look at the 
surrounding factors of the intervention under study and at its unintended effects (as 
opposed to the stated outcome of interest of the impact evaluation), the fact that this 
thesis relies on secondary data analysis and that it was not possible to influence the 
design of the intervention did not enable the researcher to question the soundness 
of the intervention. More thinking about policy-relevant questions at the onset 
would have enabled a minimization of some of the downsides highlighted in this 
thesis, such as the inequitable impact of the strategy in some instances. 
A common criticism of impact evaluation (Woolcock 2013, Ravallion 2009) is that 
they focus more on internal validity, that is to say, on whether they have controlled 
for all factors so that valid inferences can be drawn about the impact of the 
intervention, rather than on their external validity. As for internal validity, the major 
concerns relate to controlling for a spillover effect and heterogeneity. The 
assumption that the impact of the intervention does not spillover to those in the 
control group is questionable as contamination of the control group is difficult to 
avoid. Results of impact evaluation also tend to assume a homogeneous impact 
across individuals receiving the treatment. This is however unlikely to be true as the 
impact may vary according to individual characteristics or preferences (Ravallion 
2009).  In this thesis, the heterogeneity of impact was taken into account due to the 
inclusion of the interactions in regressions. However, as some factors are 
unobservable, it remains imperfect.   
In the literature, the external validity of impact evaluation results is rarely discussed 
although it is crucial to know whether inferences can be drawn from the results for 
other projects in the same or different settings (Ravallion 2009, Woolcock 2013). 
One of the main objectives of an impact evaluation is that others can learn from the 
results of the evaluation and draw lessons for future interventions. This assumes the 
generalizability of results to everyone and all settings. To address some concerns 
about external validity, Woolcock (2013) argues that one needs firmer analytical 
foundations or “key facts” to better interpret results including “causal density” 
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which relates to the complexity  of an intervention and its constituent elements; an 
“implementation capability” which is the extent to which an organization can 
realistically implement the same intervention in a new context; and “reasoned 
expectations” which corresponds to the extent to which the stated impact is 
understood within the context of a grounded theory of change. In the case of 
Rwanda, section 1.6 has emphasized the particular political, social and reform 
contexts in which PBF was introduced in Rwanda. The external validity of results 
presented in this thesis is therefore uncertain for countries that may be 
characterized by a poor performance culture, a slow pace of reforms, corruption and 
poor access to health services, which is the case for most LIC. The results of this 
thesis are however interesting in that they show what can be achieved in a reform-
friendly environment. This can indeed give an incentive for other countries to 
accelerate the pace of reforms.  
To open the “black box” of the impact evaluation (Ravallion 2009), further analyses, 
using qualitative techniques, are needed to understand why the intervention had an 
impact in the case of Rwanda. Understanding the contextual factors that contributed 
to the estimated impact, such as the political, cultural, administrative and economic 
environment, would add value to the lessons learned from the impact evaluation. 
Using qualitative methods on top of quantitative techniques can contribute in a 
number of ways: it can help in generating hypotheses grounded in reality; it can 
help understand the direction of causality; it can help understand the nature of bias 
and measurement error; it can facilitate cross-checking and replication; it provides 
elements of context that help interpret quantitative findings and enhance 
generalizability of findings; and, it can improve the measurement of outcomes and 
find ways to measure the “unobservables” (Rao and Woolcock 2003). Although 
quantitative methods were appropriate in measuring levels and changes in impacts 
for analyses and data used in this thesis, they were less effective in helping us 
understand the process or mechanisms by which the observed impact was achieved. 
Integrating different approaches through mixed-methods could have brought 
significant insights for interpreting the results.  
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7. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based on the evidence generated in this thesis on the impact of PBF on productivity, 
responsiveness and equity in Rwanda, policy recommendations are formulated. 
They relate to the use of PBF in general, implementation arrangements as well as 
broader health system strengthening efforts.  
7.1. OVERARCHING RECOMMENDATION 
Health systems in LIC are plagued by under-performance. The supply of healthcare 
services is insufficient and of poor quality, demand for healthcare is inadequate, and 
access to services is hampered by financial and physical barriers. Besides, the health 
workforce that plays a pivotal role in the health system lacks motivation to improve 
service delivery (Mills 2014).  
The implication of the findings from this thesis is that advocating for more resources 
to be available to health systems is not enough.  Doing more with existing resources 
is necessary, both from a public health perspective and in convincing decision 
makers and the donor community that additional resources put into the health 
system will make a difference. This is the spirit of the Tunis declaration on Value for 
Money, Sustainability and Accountability in the Health Sector that was signed by 
African Ministers of Health and Finance in July 2012 (Joint Declaration by the 
Ministers of Finance and Ministers of Health of Africa 2012) which recommends to 
“improve efficiency in health systems, including equitable access to skilled health 
workers and the introduction of measures such as results-based financing and 
incentives to enhance transparency and performance and reduce wastage”.  
The health workforce is central in raising health systems’ performance. Increased 
motivation can raise performance in service delivery and reduce wastage as 
motivated healthcare providers can make a better use of inputs. A central question 
to raising a health system’s performance and to provide answers to this thesis is 
“how do we motivate healthcare providers?” Human resource management 
strategies put increasing emphasis on strategies that can influence workforce 
behavior. Of all these strategies, performance incentives are probably the most 
popular, both in HIC and LIC. However, performance incentives have potential 
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perverse effects, but the probability that they occur is unknown as most are not well 
documented (Ireland, Paul, and Dujardin 2011, Witter et al. 2012).  
This thesis argues that providers’ motivation improves with financial incentives and 
that PBF is an interesting tool to improve value for money and reduce wastage in 
LIC. These countries experience unacceptable levels of maternal and child mortality, 
although high-impact low-cost interventions exist. Underperformance of health 
systems is hampering progress. In the absence of an effective incentive mechanism, 
the underpaid and poorly motivated health workforce has little incentive to deliver 
better services. Provider payment mechanisms that focus on inputs rather than 
outputs have failed to raise performance. This thesis advocates a need to switch to 
output-based payment mechanisms, as this aligns healthcare providers’ objectives 
with those of the purchaser of health services or those of the patients. Performance 
incentives contribute in raising health workforce performance and improving the 
efficient use of resources for an improved service delivery.  
Greater health systems’ performance can be achieved through human resource 
management strategies that raise health workforce motivation. Financial incentives 
to healthcare providers can overcome many service delivery challenges in LIC. 
Performance incentives are however not a magic bullet and their success largely 
depends on the context in which they are implemented. The following specific 
recommendations aim to draw the attention of policymakers and healthcare 
managers to interventions that can maximize gains in health systems’ performance.  
7.2. SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS 
7.2.1. BORROW FROM PRIVATE SECTOR MANAGEMENT STYLE IN THE 
HEALTH SECTOR TO RAISE EFFICIENCY 
Historically, health sectors of HIC and LIC were exclusively public. They were fully 
financed by the government’s budget; provision of services was a monopoly of the 
government; and, the management of funds was handled by the public sector 
(Barnum, Kutzin, and Saxenian 1995). The absence of a separation of functions was 
justified on the grounds that health is a public good that cannot be left to the market. 
The economic theory supports the intervention of the state in the health sector for 
three reasons: first, for public goods or services with large externalities (involving 
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efficiency); second, in the case of poverty (involving equity); and, third in the 
presence of an insurance market failure (where both inefficiency and inequity arise) 
(Musgrove 1996). Progressively however, recognition of health systems’ 
inefficiencies have resulted in a slow but steady implementation of reforms aimed to 
introduce more competition between providers and raise efficiency in the use of 
resources, which characterize the private sector management style.  
Although most, if not all, global health systems have experienced reforms inspired 
by the market, a heated debate remains on whether the state should borrow private 
sector management styles for the health sector. This debate has been crystalized 
around unpopular reforms promoted by the International Monetary Fund under 
‘structural adjustment programs’. These programs were viewed as short-term 
austerities that would lead to long-term growth and development. However, these 
inter-temporal trade-offs were not acceptable in the health sector (Peabody 1996). 
However, the new wave of reforms is radically different since management styles 
are borrowed from the private sector to raise efficiency, but do not privatize the 
health sector. Reforms currently promoted in the health sector aim to achieve 
greater performance through hands-on professional management, standards for 
performance, control of outputs rather than inputs, competition in the public sector, 
use of private sector management practices and more discipline and efficiency in 
resource use (Hood 1991). Such reforms can strengthen efficiency in the public 
provision of services and help address challenges of health systems.  
Performance-based financing is part of that movement and this thesis demonstrates 
its positive impact on health system performance. The empirical results from 
Rwanda presented in section 0 reveal that with PBF, more outputs (health services) 
can be produced with the same inputs (human resources). Regression analyses 
using the WPI revealed no linear effect of PBF on the WPI but a nonlinear 
relationship as PBF raises workforce productivity through reduced absenteeism and 
higher workloads. Addressing the human resource shortage by recruiting more 
healthcare providers may thus not be the only way to increase the quantity of 
services delivered. The case study from Rwanda demonstrates that with PBF, 
efficiency gains, as recommended by Ministers of Finance and Health in the Tunis 
declaration, are possible. Other contracting arrangements can help address 
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inefficiencies in health systems in LIC. Contracting private sector entities to deliver 
services can increase access to services, whether that entity is non-for-profit or 
private (Mills 1998). It can also reduce the cost of services if contracting-out is used 
for non-clinical services, for instance (Lagarde and Palmer 2009). Contractual staff 
may also be a solution to incentivize healthcare workers to work in remote areas or 
to respond to a temporary shortage. The use of private suppliers can also improve 
supply chains and the availability of drugs for end users (England 2004, Schwartz 
and Bhushan 2004b).  
7.2.2. TARGET POOR REGIONS AND POOR HOUSEHOLDS TO MAXIMIZE THE 
IMPACT OF REFORMS 
Chapter 4 and 5 conclude that equity in utilization of healthcare services, which is 
an overarching goal of all health systems, cannot be reached unless strategies 
explicitly target the most vulnerable. The most common strategies aiming at 
improving access for the most vulnerable are health insurance, conditional-cash 
transfers and vouchers. Health insurance removes financial barriers to healthcare 
services and lowers the risk of catastrophic expenditures. Conditional-cash transfers 
and vouchers incentivize a specific population to use healthcare services.  
The analysis conducted in Chapter 4 revealed that in the absence of a specific 
mechanism to reach the poorest, PBF tended to focus on the most affluent in the 
population and that PBF alone was not able to remove financial barriers to 
healthcare services. Chapter 5 explored spatial disparities in access to basic health 
services and the interaction between PBF and decentralization and revealed that 
PBF in Rwanda reinforced the impact of decentralization and contributed to close 
the gap between regions through a levelling effect. As PBF can deter access to 
services for the most vulnerable (Chapter 4) and therefore cut the benefits of 
demand side interventions, reforms promoted in the health sector, in particular 
those aiming primarily to achieve efficiency gains, should include a particular 
consideration for equity to avoid perverse effects. Section 4.5.3 shows that in the 
case of Rwanda, the combination of health insurance and PBF could make a 
difference for the poor as they could benefit from the PBF strategy only if they were 
insured. Other options could be considered. First, PBF can be used to incentivize 
providers to deliver services to the most in need. The poorest and more vulnerable 
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are generally harder to reach, but with the right incentive, providers can develop 
strategies to ensure they use services. Those households can be identified through 
geographic targeting (e.g. poorer villages or poorer districts) or through income 
targeting (e.g. poorer households in each community). Targeting options are 
generally discussed in a broader context in LIC. The decision related to the method 
chosen for targeting goes beyond the health sector and has financial, equity and 
sustainability implications (Hanson, Worrall, and Wiseman 2007). Second, demand 
side incentives targeting individuals or households can be used in parallel of PBF to 
raise demand among those that are harder to reach and use fewer services. As the 
thesis suggests, incentivizing providers is not sufficient to raise utilization of poorer 
individuals, conditional cash transfers or other forms of demand side incentives 
could incentivize individuals to seek care (Lagarde, Haines, and Palmer 2009). 
Third, community demand side incentives can also leverage demand for services in 
deprived communities, villages or districts. Indeed, subsequent to the successful 
evaluation of PBF at primary healthcare facilities, Rwanda implemented a 
community PBF scheme targeting the poorest health centers and combining supply 
and demand side incentives to increase the number of pregnant women consulting 
primary healthcare facilities for prenatal care and institutional deliveries (World 
Health Organization Regional Office for Africa 2013).  
In addition to the above proposed innovative ways to improve equity in access to 
basic health services, continued investments in health systems are needed to ensure 
sufficient inputs to deliver quality health services, in particular, in the most deprived 
areas. The case study on Rwanda shows that large improvements in utilization of 
health services were accompanied by a massive recruitment of healthcare workers 
in rural areas and by increased financial resources to districts and health facilities 
through fiscal decentralization (Chapter 5). Further, autonomy of health facilities 
has enabled them to generate resources and manage inputs as they deem necessary, 
incentivizing them to maximize efficiency gains. Decentralization proved to be 
efficient in making the key inputs (financial resources and human resources) locally 
available, in incentivizing local decision makers to raise value for money and in 
raising the satisfaction of the population by granting better access to basic services 
(Costa-Font and Rico 2006). This reform, which goes beyond the health sector, can 
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thus be pursued to narrow the gap between regions. Significant enabling factors 
probably facilitated the success of the reform in Rwanda, such as the low corruption 
and performance culture.  
7.2.3. SEE PATIENTS AS CONSUMERS OF HEALTHCARE SERVICES 
Contrary to what is observed in HIC, patients’ satisfaction is often overlooked in LIC. 
The major difference between HIC and LIC lies in the fact that HIC are characterized 
by growing consumerism. Patients are seen as consumers that healthcare providers 
must satisfy to ensure they will visit again and hence increase their earnings. As a 
consequence, healthcare providers are concerned with patients’ satisfaction and are 
incentivized to raise responsiveness to patients’ needs.  
The empirical results from Rwanda presented in Chapter 3 suggest that even in the 
absence of measurement of patients’ satisfaction embedded in the PBF scheme, 
performance incentives can raise healthcare providers’ responsiveness to patients’ 
needs and patients’ satisfaction, thus demonstrating the existence of a link between 
responsiveness and health workforce performance. The literature review from HIC 
countries suggests that the impact of PBF on patients’ satisfaction could be even 
greater if explicitly targeted by the scheme.  
One of the reasons for poor utilization of basic health services in LIC is the lack of 
trust populations have in their health systems. Knowing that their voice counts and 
healthcare providers are held accountable would positively impact on how 
populations perceive health systems. In that context, LIC could build on the 
experience from HIC to measure patients’ satisfaction routinely, as any other 
measure of performance. Indeed, the new generation of PBF schemes now 
implemented in LIC includes a measurement of patients’ satisfaction. This generates 
an incentive for healthcare providers to be more responsive to patient needs and 
incentivizes patients to seek more care and to increase adherence to treatment.  
7.2.4. FAVOR EVIDENCE-BASED DECISION MAKING 
This thesis reports on the debate that exists between proponents and opponents of 
performance-based financing in Rwanda. Although the strategy is implemented in 
more than 20 countries in Africa, evidence on some critical aspects of the strategy 
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remains poor. The literature review also highlights mixed results that do not enable 
us to ascertain what impact performance incentives have on a given dimension.  
It is recommended that policymakers rely on more robust evidence to set up 
strategies. Unfortunately, policy debates are largely ideological as evidence is scant 
and of poor quality. In light of what Rwanda did for PBF, policymakers should seek 
to embed rigorous impact evaluations in the roll-out of any new strategy. Such 
evaluations are not necessarily costly and future gains in terms of efficiency and 
knowledge are worth the investment. Learning lessons from one’s experience as 
well as from other countries is important in avoiding errors and building on positive 
experiences. For instance, Rwanda organizes study tours for other African countries 
wishing to implement PBF.  
7.3. AGENDA FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
This section briefly highlights research areas worth exploring to complement the 
growing body of evidence on performance-based financing. First, it would be 
interesting to test and evaluate the impact of incentives to address health systems’ 
bottlenecks in LIC. For instance, one could test whether PBF can contribute in 
improving the availability of staff in remote areas, as this stands for a major 
impediment for efficient and equitable service delivery in LIC. Well-designed 
incentives may help to attract staff to work in remote facilities, although this 
phenomenon was not observed in Rwanda. One could however test if increasing 
PBF financial rewards in regions that suffer from the largest health workforce 
shortage would incentivize staff to work in remote areas. Assessing how financial 
incentives can raise healthcare providers’ responsiveness and thus patients’ 
satisfaction would also be highly beneficial as the evidence base is limited but the 
topic is of high interest. 
Second, some aspects of PBF still need to be explored. In particular, its cost-
efficiency is not documented, although it is a critical element for LIC that suffer from 
a lack of financial resources. Similarly transaction costs of PBF, which are 
necessarily high due to increased reporting, should be quantified to better assist 
policymakers in their decisions (Ireland, Paul, and Dujardin 2011). Positive spillover 
effects of PBF on health system performance (such as the reduction in disparities, 
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improved responsiveness and satisfaction) should however be taken into account 
when judging PBF against another strategy. Ireland, Paul, and Dujardin (2011) 
argue that the focus of research related to PBF should be on the reasons why and 
how the intervention is working, rather than whether or not it is working. Although 
this statement is too categorical as some important aspects related to whether PBF 
works need to be explored; as demonstrated by this thesis, it is true that 
understanding the underlying forces that support or prevent the successful 
implementation of PBF are needed. As PBF relies on changes in health workforce 
motivation to achieve specific targets, determinants of health workforce motivation 
in a given context are critical in understanding observed changes. Efficient 
implementation of the strategy would also not be possible without a certain level of 
financial and human resources that stand for the key inputs in the delivery of 
healthcare services. As demonstrated in Chapter 5, fiscal decentralization in Rwanda 
significantly contributed in cutting staff shortages and making resources available 
locally. Autonomy of health facilities was also a key determinant as they were free to 
use their resources (financial and human) as they deemed necessary.  
Third, qualitative research on PBF is needed to understand the underlying success 
or failure factors. This thesis shows what evidence can be produced on PBF using 
quantitative analyses. It also reports, through the literature review, that most 
evidence on PBF results from quantitative analyses because the most explored 
aspect of PBF is its impact on quantity and process quality of services. Knowing how 
healthcare providers perceive the strategy, how they cope with it and how it affects 
their intrinsic motivation and working environment would enable us to refine the 
bonuses and ultimately to achieve more efficiency gains. Similarly, Chapter 3 reveals 
that more evidence is needed on patients’ perception of PBF to ascertain that 
efficiency gains are not deterred by negative patient perceptions and thus a lower 
demand for healthcare services. Finally, qualitative research would help capture the 
effect of PBF on providers’ workloads and evaluate the magnitude of transaction 
costs.  
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Appendix 1: Overview of the main performance incentive schemes evaluated in low income countries 
Authors Country Description/ 
target of 
incentive 
Area(s) 
incentivized 
Payment Evaluation 
Methodology 
Finding 
Basinga et al. 
(2011) 
Rwanda Performance-
based financing  
in primary 
healthcare 
facilities to raise 
utilization and 
quality of basic 
health services 
14 maternal and 
child health 
services 
Payments to 
facilities based 
on the quantity 
of services 
conditional on 
quality. Average 
payment to 
treatment 
facilities given to 
control facilities. 
Randomized 
impact 
evaluation. 12 
districts serve as 
treatment group; 
7 districts are in 
the control 
group.  
Coverage of any 
prenatal care 
visits, institutional 
deliveries, and 
child preventive 
care increases. 
Quality of prenatal 
visit is also higher 
in treatment 
facilities 
Loevinsohn and 
Harding (2005), 
Eichler (2006), 
Bhushan, 
Keller, and 
Schwartz 
(2002) 
Cambodia 2 different 
models: 
contracting out 
contracting in. 
Other districts  
managed by 
Government 
without budget 
supplement 
Rural primary 
healthcare and 
district hospital 
services 
Contracting out: 
NGO contracted 
to provide a 
package of 
services to a 
district. 
Contracting in: 
additional $0.25 
per capita to use 
as staff 
incentives.  
Randomized 
controlled study 
with 12 districts 
as experimental 
units 
Larger 
improvements in 
prenatal care 
coverage in 
contracting out 
and contracting in 
districts. The poor 
have benefited 
disproportionately 
from contracting. 
Cost of contracting 
higher but led to 
savings in OOP.  
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Authors Country Description/ 
target of 
incentive 
Area(s) 
incentivized 
Payment Evaluation 
Methodology 
Finding 
Bonfrer, Van de 
Poel, and Van 
Doorslaer 
(2014) 
Burundi Incentives based 
on quantity and 
quality of 
services 
provided. 
Maternal and 
child health 
services. HIV, TB, 
malaria services 
On top of the 
quantity based 
payments, 
facilities receive 
a quality bonus 
ranging from 0 to 
25 percent. 
Compare 
treatment and 
control 
provinces using 
DHS data.  
 
Improved quality 
of care during 
prenatal care but 
no improvement 
in timeliness. 
Increase in 
institutional 
deliveries among 
the better off. 
Increase in 
probability of a 
child being fully 
vaccinated. 
Canavan, 
Toonen, and 
Elovainio 
(2008) 
Tanzania Target payments VCT,OPD, IPD, 
institutional 
deliveries, 
availability of 
essential drugs 
Intervention 
facilities paid 
fixed amount at 
start of year and 
equivalent value 
is available 
retrospectively if 
targets are met. 
Performance 
compared 
retrospectively 
with selection of 
government 
facilities. 
Mission facilities 
saw a decline in 
IPD, institutional 
deliveries and 
prenatal care 
compared to 
government 
facilities.  
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Authors Country Description/ 
target of 
incentive 
Area(s) 
incentivized 
Payment Evaluation 
Methodology 
Finding 
Loevinsohn and 
Harding (2005), 
Eichler (2006), 
Eichler et al. 
(2007) 
Haiti 3 pilot NGOs Primary 
healthcare 
Payment is a 
combination of 
fixed quarterly 
payments based 
on 95% of the 
estimated cost of 
producing the 
defined package 
and NGO can 
earn the 5% plus 
an additional 5% 
if all 
performance 
targets are 
achieved. 
In the pilot year, 
an independent 
firm was 
contracted to 
measure baseline 
and end of pilot 
period 
performance. 
Then 
performance 
targets are self-
reported by 
NGOs with 
random audits.  
All 3 NGOs 
exceeded the 
performance 
targets for 
immunization 
coverage. ORS 
increased in 2/3. 
Weak 
performance in 
ANC and 
contraceptive use. 
Availability of 
contraceptive 
increased.  
Loevinsohn and 
Harding (2005), 
Eichler (2006) 
Guatemala Government 
contracted NGOs 
to deliver a 
package of health 
services. 3 
models: a service 
delivery type of 
contract, a 
management 
contract and a 
control group.  
Rural primary 
healthcare in 
mountainous 
areas.  
Contracts with 
NGOs were fixed-
price at $6.25 
per capita per 
year.  
Controlled 
designs based on 
household 
survey 3 years 
after the 
contracting. No 
baseline data 
available.  
Results were not 
reported in the 
grey literature 
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Authors Country Description/ 
target of 
incentive 
Area(s) 
incentivized 
Payment Evaluation 
Methodology 
Finding 
Loevinsohn 
(2008) 
8 countries National TB 
programs 
provide TB drugs 
to private 
practitioners in 
exchange for 
compliance with 
national 
standards of TB 
care.  
TB Direct monetary 
incentive in 1 
case 
Mostly before 
and after 
designs.  
Working with 
private 
practitioners can 
achieve high rates 
of treatment 
success and 
increase case 
detection rates.  
Loevinsohn 
(2008) 
Afghanistan International and 
local NGOs 
contracted in 8 
provinces.  
Basic package of 
health services 
Performance 
bonuses if NGO 
achieves quality 
and coverage 
targets. 
Health facility 
assessments 
carried out each 
year by a third 
party. Quality 
index. 
Contracted 
facilities had large 
improvements in 
quality of care 
whereas quality 
worsened in 
facilities managed 
by Government. 
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Authors Country Description/ 
target of 
incentive 
Area(s) 
incentivized 
Payment Evaluation 
Methodology 
Finding 
Loevinsohn and 
Harding (2005), 
Loevinsohn 
(2008) 
India  2 contracts: one 
with NGOs for 
training, 
outreach and 
monitoring and 
subcontracts 
between NGOs 
and private 
providers for 
changing their 
proactive 
behaviors.  
Childhood 
illnesses. 
Training and 
follow-up aimed 
at improving 
case 
management. 
Intervention in 
10 villages 
NGOs were 
reimbursed on 
the basis of 
expenses.  
Before and after 
design in which 
household 
surveys were 
undertaken with 
the parents of 
children under 5 
who were ill the 
last 2 weeks. 
Large 
improvement in 
the management 
of childhood 
illnesses by 
private 
practitioners  
Loevinsohn and 
Harding (2005) 
Bangladesh NGOs train, 
supervise, pay 
and support the 
community 
nutrition 
promoters 
within the 
Bangladesh 
Integrated 
Nutrition Project 
Rural community 
nutrition 
services 
 Controlled 
before and after 
study with 6 
experimental 
and 2 control sub 
districts 
Reductions in 
rates of moderate 
and severe 
malnutrition were 
slightly greater in 
project areas 
compared with 
control. Significant 
improvements in 
other health 
services. Results 
achieved at a high 
cost. 
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Authors Country Description/ 
target of 
incentive 
Area(s) 
incentivized 
Payment Evaluation 
Methodology 
Finding 
Loevinsohn and 
Harding (2005) 
Bangladesh NGO contracted 
to provide 
outreach 
services and to 
operate health 
centers. 
Urban primary 
healthcare 
$0.65 per capita 
per year given to 
the NGO 
Controlled 
before and after 
study with 15 
contracts 
compared. 
Significant 
improvement in 
maternal and child 
health (except for 
immunization). 
NGO was able to 
provide more and 
better quality 
health services 
Loevinsohn and 
Harding (2005) 
Bolivia Management 
contract with 
NGO. 
Primary 
healthcare in El 
Alto district 
 Controlled, B&A 
design. Issues: 
reliance on 
reporting system 
data of unknown 
accuracy, poor 
availability of 
data, short 
periods of 
observation and 
comparison of 
only 2 districts.  
Deliveries 
increased by 41% 
compared with 
20% in the control 
district. Increase 
in outpatient 
services. 
Loevinsohn and 
Harding (2005) 
India   TB control in 
Hyderabad 
  Controlled 
design with only 
after data from 
recording system 
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Authors Country Description/ 
target of 
incentive 
Area(s) 
incentivized 
Payment Evaluation 
Methodology 
Finding 
Loevinsohn and 
Harding (2005) 
Madagascar and 
Senegal 
NGOs contracted 
to deliver 
community 
based nutrition 
interventions.  
Community 
nutrition 
services 
Cost per direct 
beneficiary was 
$48 in Senegal 
and $15 in 
Madagascar.  
In Madagascar, 
only project 
records on 
participants 
were available. 
In Senegal, 
before and after 
(17 months) + 
household 
survey on 
nutrition.  
Modest effect on 
malnutrition rates. 
Loevinsohn and 
Harding (2005) 
Pakistan NGO the Punjab 
Rural Support 
Program was 
given a 
management 
contract to run 
all the basic 
health units in 
Punjab 
Primary 
healthcare in 
rural areas in a 
poorly 
performing 
district of 
Punjab.  
NGO is given the 
same amount of 
budget as had 
previously been 
allocated for the 
Basic health 
units (BHU).  
Retrospective 
controlled before 
and after design 
with a nearby 
similar district 
serving as the 
control area.  
Coverage of 
preventive 
services is low in 
both districts and 
the rates of 
progress are 
similar.  However, 
contracting 
resulted in an 
improvement in 
BHU use, patient 
satisfaction, and 
reduced OOP for 
BHU services.  
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Authors Country Description/ 
target of 
incentive 
Area(s) 
incentivized 
Payment Evaluation 
Methodology 
Finding 
Peabody et al. 
(2010) 
Philippines Target payments Improved 
management of 
common 
childhood 
illnesses, patient 
outcomes and 
patient 
satisfaction 
Intervention 
designed as a 
study in public 
district hospitals 
3 groups: bonus 
payment for 
doctors meeting 
higher quality of 
care; increased 
enrolment into 
Phil Health 
insurance for 
indigent 
children; no 
change group 
Average number 
of monthly 
inpatients does 
not increase with 
bonus but 
increases with 
health insurance. 
Quality of care 
improved with 
PBF as well as 
patient outcomes.  
Quy et al. 
(2003) 
Vietnam Performance 
incentives 
Increased 
testing, 
treatment and 
referral of TB 
patients 
Fixed incentive 
payment for 
private 
practitioners 
invited to join a 
public private 
mix project 
No control group 
but information 
from other 
districts used to 
indicate the 
trend without 
the intervention 
Improvement in 
case detection in 
intervention areas.  
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Authors Country Description/ 
target of 
incentive 
Area(s) 
incentivized 
Payment Evaluation 
Methodology 
Finding 
Schwartz and 
Bhushan 
(2004a) 
Cambodia   Immunization 
with equity 
goals.  
  Focus on fully 
immunized 
children defined 
as the variation 
of the proportion 
of fully 
immunized 
children across 
different levels of 
household 
wealth in 
contracted and 
not contracted) 
areas 
Fully immunized 
children coverage 
increased for 
poorest and 
richest but the 
difference 
between rich and 
poor household 
decreased from 
9.1% point to 
5.7% before and 
after contracting.  
Soeters (2009) Burundi Performance 
incentives with 
variable bonus 
for quality 
Preventive care, 
management of 
conditions, 
patient 
education 
Performance 
incentives in 2 
provinces with 
fund holder 
organizations 
that negotiate 
contracts with 
individual health 
facilities, verify 
and pay for the 
performance.  
2 PBF provinces 
compared to 2 
provinces with 
input-based 
funding.  
Better 
performance for 
institutional 
deliveries and use 
of bed nets. PBF 
also generated 
improvement in 
quality of care. 
OOP increased in 
control areas.  
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Authors Country Description/ 
target of 
incentive 
Area(s) 
incentivized 
Payment Evaluation 
Methodology 
Finding 
Soeters et al. 
(2005) 
Rwanda Performance 
incentives 
OPD, deliveries, 
vaccination, 
family planning, 
prenatal care and 
bed net use 
Two provinces 
implemented 
different PBF 
method 
(different targets 
and payments) 
Comparison of 4 
provinces: 2 
implementing 
PBF, 1 supported 
by bilateral 
donor with no 
PBF, 1 with no 
donor support 
but more 
government staff 
OPD, family 
planning, measles 
immunization and 
institutional 
deliveries 
increased in 
treatment 
districts. Better 
quality score.  
Soeters et al. 
(2011) 
Democratic 
Republic of 
Congo 
Performance 
incentives with 
variable top-up 
for quality 
HIV, TB, 
deliveries, IPD, 
OPD, preventive 
care 
Bonus for 
quantitative 
targets. 15% 
bonus if all 
quality 
indicators met 
Two intervention 
districts funded 
by NGO 
implement PBF 
compared to 2 
districts with 
input-based 
funding from 
another NGO 
Positive effect 
only on 
knowledge of HIV 
and institutional 
deliveries. OOP 
increased in 
treatment areas.  
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Authors Country Description/ 
target of 
incentive 
Area(s) 
incentivized 
Payment Evaluation 
Methodology 
Finding 
Sondorp et al. 
(2009) 
Afghanistan EC, USAID, WB 
implement 
different 
contracting 
mechanisms 
(with NGOs). WB 
incorporates 
performance 
bonuses and 
flexibility to use 
funds. EC and 
USAID do input-
based 
reimbursements.  
Primary 
healthcare 
WB: output-
based; EC and 
USAID: input-
based 
Balanced 
scorecard 
including health 
worker 
satisfaction 
index, equipment 
functionality 
index, drug 
availability 
index, lab 
functionality 
index, staff 
received training 
last year, 
infrastructure 
index.   
All contracting 
schemes resulted 
in better access to 
services, better 
health outcomes 
and reduction of 
inequities among 
provinces. Better 
results in PBF 
NGOs 
Vergeer and 
Chansa (2008) 
Zambia Performance 
incentives 
IPD, deliveries, 
VCT, drug 
availability 
Mission hospitals 
and health 
centers paid for 
meeting targets. 
Control sites 
chosen 
retrospectively 
and non-
randomly 
Improvements in 
VCT in both 
groups. No change 
in institutional 
deliveries and 
ANC.  
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Appendix 2: Descriptive statistics from the satisfaction surveys (2008) 
 Control group Treatment group Total T-test of 
difference 
in means 
 Obs. mean SE Obs. mean SE Obs. mean SE 
Adult care           
Public 675 63%         0.018  664 66%         0.018  1339 65%         0.010          0.227  
Prescription 675 50%         0.019  664 54%         0.019  1339 52%         0.013          0.143  
Laboratory test 675 4%         0.007  664 5%         0.008  1339 4%         0.005          0.553  
Has primary education 675 39%         0.018  664 35%         0.018  1339 37%         0.013          0.158  
Male 675 40%         0.018  664 37%         0.018  1339 38%         0.013          0.035  
Age 675                      39      0.609    664             39       0.622 1339            39       0.435       0.935 
Has health insurance 675 95%         0.008  664 97%         0.005  1339 96%         0.005          0.007  
Prenatal care           
Public 666 64%         0.018  693 68%         0.017  1359 66%         0.013          0.107  
Drug prescription 666 6%         0.009  693 5%         0.008  1359 5%         0.006          0.594  
Laboratory tests 666 1%         0.004  693 2%         0.005  1359 1%         0.003          0.121  
Has primary education 666 43%         0.019  693 40%         0.018  1359 41%         0.013          0.222  
Age 666 28         0.248  693 28         0.231  1359 28         0.169          0.525  
Has health insurance 666 91%         0.010  693 93%         0.009  1359 92%         0.007          0.304  
Waiting time (hours) 666 2.25         0.065  693 2.43         0.072  1359 2.34         0.049          0.066  
Months pregnant 666 6.04         0.659  693 5.88         0.069  1359 5.96         0.047          0.111  
First prenatal visit 666 67%         0.018  693 67%         0.018  1359 67%         0.013          0.868  
Number of children 666 2         0.070  693 2         0.067  1359 2         0.048          0.568  
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 Control group Treatment group Total T-test of 
difference 
in means 
 Obs. mean SE Obs. mean SE Obs. mean SE 
Child care           
Public 505 63%         0.021  459 69%         0.020  964 66%         0.010          0.046  
Drug prescription 505 39%         0.021  459 52%         0.023  964 45%         0.016          0.000  
Laboratory tests 505 3%         0.007  459 7%         0.012  964 5%         0.006          0.001  
Has primary education 505 44%         0.022  459 44%         0.023  964 44%         0.160          0.957  
Male 505 9%         0.125  459 10%         0.014  964 10%         0.009          0.418  
Age of respondent 505 30.2         0.334  459 30.1         0.385  964 30.1         0.253          0.842  
Has health insurance 505 88%         0.014  459 91%         0.013  964 90%         0.009          0.102  
Age of the child 505 2         0.060  459 2         0.057  964 2         0.042          0.769  
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Appendix 3: Maternal health sample baseline (2006) characteristics 
 Lower group Upper group Total 
  Treatment Control   Treatment Control   Treatment Control   
  
Obs Mean SD Obs Mean SD  Diff.  P-
Value 
Obs Mean SD Obs Mean SD Diff. P-
Value 
Obs Mean SD Obs Mean SD Diff. P-
Value 
Health facility characteristics  
Public (=1) 415 0.70 0.09 432 0.60 0.10 0.10 0.500 205 0.63 0.10 238 0.70 0.11 -0.06 0.679 620 0.67 0.09 670 0.63 0.10 0.04 0.387 
Household characteristics 
Distance (km) 415 3.22 0.25 432 3.39 0.29 -0.17 0.657 205 3.29 0.29 238 3.42 0.30 -0.13 0.762 620 3.24 0.24 670 3.40 0.27 -0.16 0.666 
Number of household 
members 
415 5.10 0.14 432 5.26 0.15 -0.16 0.442 205 5.26 0.17 238 5.66 0.17 -0.39 0.124 620 5.2 0.11 670 5.40 0.12 -0.25 0.927 
Women's characteristics 
Married or live with a 
partner (=1) 
415 0.93 0.02 432 0.89 0.02 0.05 0.117 205 0.97 0.03 238 0.95 0.03 0.02 0.566 620 0.95 0.02 670 0.91 0.02 0.04 0.107 
Partner lives in 
household (=1) 
415 0.98 0.01 432 0.97 0.01 0.02 0.110 205 0.98 0.01 238 0.98 0.01 0.00 0.837 620 0.98 0.01 670 0.97 0.01 0.01 0.162 
Total number 
children alive 
415 3.37 0.16 432 3.55 0.16 -0.19 0.426 205 3.45 0.15 238 3.44 0.15 0.00 0.988 620 3.39 0.12 670 3.51 0.12 -0.12 0.755 
Total number 
pregnancies 
415 4.34 0.24 432 4.41 0.27 -0.07 0.855 205 4.26 0.20 238 4.17 0.19 0.09 0.759 620 4.32 0.18 670 4.33 0.20 -0.01 0.515 
Has primary 
education (=1) 
415 0.35 0.04 432 0.37 0.04 -0.02 0.762 205 0.34 0.05 238 0.33 0.05 0.01 0.902 620 0.35 0.03 670 0.36 0.04 -0.01 0.555 
Age<20 years (=1) 415 0.04 0.01 432 0.27 0.01 -0.23 0.382 205 0.01 0.01 238 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.649 620 0.03 0.01 670 0.62 0.01 -0.59 0.161 
Age>35 years (=1) 415 0.21 0.03 432 0.34 0.04 -0.13 0.537 205 0.25 0.03 238 0.26 0.03 -0.01 0.876 620 0.29 0.03 670 0.31 0.03 -0.02 0.713 
Health insurance (=1) 406 0.45 0.04 430 0.44 0.04 0.02 0.386 203 0.73 0.05 237 0.66 0.06 0.07 0.367 609 0.55 0.05 667 0.52 0.05 0.03 0.334 
Dependent variable (utilization) 
Institutional 
deliveries 
349   0.35  0.04  362   0.31  0.03  0.03 0.506 173 0.35  0.06  205 0.45  0.04  -0.10 0.189 522  0.35  0.04  567  0.36  0.04  -0.02 0.800 
4+ PNC visits 387   0.17  0.03  404   0.11  0.01  0.07 0.025** 200 0.20  0.03  232 0.13  0.03  0.08 0.094* 587  0.18  0.02  636  0.11  0.02  0.07 0.028** 
PNC 1st quarter 389   0.12  0.02  405   0.09  0.02  0.03 0.268 199 0.10  0.03  234 0.10  0.03  -0.01 0.872 588  0.11  0.02  639  0.09  0.02  0.02 0.547 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix 4: Family planning sample baseline (2006) characteristics 
 Lower group Upper group Total 
  Treatment Control   Treatment Control   Treatment Control   
  Obs Mean SD Obs Mean SD  Diff.  P-Value Obs Mean SD Obs Mean SD Diff. P-Value Obs Mean SD Obs Mean SD Diff. P-Value 
Health facility characteristics 
Public (=1) 503 0.67 0.09 546 0.64 0.10 0.04 0.779 246 0.65 0.10 297 0.71 0.11 -0.06 0.709 749 0.67 0.09 843 0.66 0.10 0.01 0.968 
Household characteristics 
distance (km) 503 3.36 0.23 546 3.34 0.25 0.02 0.946 246 3.36 0.27 297 3.39 0.28 -0.03 0.943 749 3.36 0.23 843 3.35 0.25 0.01 0.987 
number of 
household 
members 
503 5.03 0.18 546 5.10 0.19 -0.07 0.781 246 5.22 0.18 297 5.46 0.17 -0.24 0.350 749 5.09 0.14 843 5.23 0.15 -0.14 0.512 
Women's characteristics 
Married or live 
with a partner 
(=1) 
503 1.00 0.00 546 0.99 0.00 0.00 0.561 246 1.00 0.01 297 0.99 0.01 0.00 0.788 749 1.00 0.00 843 0.99 0.00 0.00 0.573 
Partner lives in 
the household 
(=1) 
503 0.99 0.01 546 0.97 0.01 0.02 0.026** 246 0.98 0.01 297 0.97 0.01 0.01 0.640 749 0.98 0.01 843 0.97 0.01 0.02 0.108 
Total number 
children alive 
503 3.34 0.19 546 3.33 0.20 0.01 0.481 246 3.32 0.12 297 3.38 0.11 -0.06 0.634 749 3.34 0.14 843 3.35 0.15 -0.01 0.957 
Delivered at 
health 
center/last 
pregnancy (=1) 
363 0.28 0.03 356 0.24 0.03 0.05 0.335 197 0.26 0.05 225 0.35 0.05 -0.09 0.335 560 0.27 0.03 581 0.28 0.03 -0.01 0.870 
Has primary 
education (=1) 
503 0.36 0.02 546 0.36 0.02 0.00 0.969 246 0.30 0.05 297 0.32 0.05 -0.02 0.765 749 0.34 0.03 843 0.34 0.03 -0.01 0.865 
Age in years 503 31.20 0.49 546 31.20 0.51 0.00 0.988 246 30.51 0.36 297 30.51 0.31 0.00 0.993 749 30.98 0.35 843 30.95 0.36 0.02 0.961 
Health 
insurance (=1) 
495 0.45 0.04 543 0.43 0.04 0.02 0.738 242 0.71 0.05 296 0.68 0.05 0.03 0.591 737 0.54 0.05 839 0.52 0.05 0.02 0.388 
Dependent variable (utilization) 
Family 
Planning 
503   0.08  0.01  546   0.09  0.02  0.00 0.833 246   0.11  0.01  297   0.19  0.03  -0.09 0.009*** 749  0.09  0.02  843  0.12  0.02  -0.03 0.154 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix 5: Child sample baseline (2006) characteristics 
 Lower group Upper group Total 
  Treatment Control   Treatment Control   Treatment Control   
  Obs Mean SD Obs Mean SD  Diff.  P-
Value 
Obs Mean SD Obs Mean SD Diff. P-
Value 
Obs Mean SD Obs Mean SD Diff. P-
Value 
Health facility characteristics 
Public (=1) 1035 0.67 0.09 1042 0.61 0.10 0.05 0.698 500 0.65 0.10 581 0.70 0.11 -0.05 0.759 1535 0.66 0.09 1623 0.64 0.10 0.02 0.899 
Household characteristics 
Distance (km) 1035 3.30 0.22 1042 3.29 0.25 0.01 0.986 500 3.27 0.28 581 3.26 0.30 0.01 0.979 1535 3.29 0.22 1623 3.28 0.24 0.01 0.979 
Number of 
household 
members 
1035 5.34 0.12 1042 5.42 0.13 -0.08 0.648 500 5.54 0.13 581 5.74 0.13 -0.20 0.296 1535 5.40 0.09 1623 5.53 0.09 -0.13 0.304 
Mother has 
primary 
education (=1) 
1035 0.99 0.00 1042 1.00 0.00 -0.01 0.357 500 1.00 0.00 581 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.945 1535 1.00 0.00 1623 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.333 
Child characteristics 
Age (years) 1035 2.35 0.05 1042 2.35 0.05 0.00 0.973 500 2.21 0.07 581 2.34 0.06 -0.13 0.235 1535 2.30 0.04 1623 2.35 0.04 -0.04 0.487 
Female (=1) 1035 0.51 0.01 1042 0.49 0.01 0.02 0.429 500 0.52 0.02 581 0.51 0.01 0.00 0.920 1535 0.51 0.01 1623 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.501 
Health 
insurance (=1) 
991 0.44 0.03 1012 0.42 0.03 0.02 0.708 487 0.69 0.04 563 0.65 0.05 0.04 0.591 1478 0.52 0.04 1575 0.51 0.04 0.01 0.770 
Dependent variable (utilization) 
Received care 
at health center 
in the event of 
illness 
476   0.20  0.03  478 0.22  0.03  -0.01 0.737 183  0.27  0.05  255  0.27  0.05  -0.00 0.987 659  0.22  0.03  733  0.24  0.03  -0.01 0.749 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix 6: Regression results for institutional deliveries 
  Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3 Specification 4 
 Lower Upper Total Lower Upper Total Lower Upper Total Lower Upper Total 
Treatment*post -0.019 0.186*** 0.074* 0.002 0.194*** 0.071* -0.043 0.208*** 0.063 -0.051 0.197*** 0.069 
 (0.061) (0.064) (0.043) (0.061) (0.063) (0.042) (0.065) (0.065) (0.045) (0.071) (0.064) (0.044) 
Wave=0 if 2006, Wave=1 if 2008 0.170*** 0.056 0.134*** 0.157*** 0.036 0.115*** 0.175*** 0.027 0.119*** 0.142*** 0.036 0.108*** 
 (0.043) (0.045) (0.030) (0.044) (0.045) (0.031) (0.045) (0.046) (0.032) (0.049) (0.045) (0.032) 
interaction between PBF and  insurance       0.135** -0.082 0.027    
       (0.061) (0.077) (0.047)    
Age < 20 years (=1)    0.149 -0.304* 0.052 0.153* -0.301* 0.052 0.149 -0.304* 0.051 
    (0.093) (0.172) (0.087) (0.091) (0.173) (0.086) (0.092) (0.173) (0.087) 
Age > 35 years (=1)    -0.042 -0.000 -0.029 -0.044 -0.001 -0.029 -0.046 -0.002 -0.029 
    (0.040) (0.043) (0.029) (0.040) (0.043) (0.029) (0.041) (0.044) (0.030) 
Has primary or more education (=1)    -0.056* -0.018 -0.039* -0.054* -0.019 -0.038* -0.054* -0.019 -0.039* 
    (0.030) (0.036) (0.023) (0.030) (0.036) (0.023) (0.032) (0.036) (0.024) 
Currently married/union (=1)    -0.004 -0.037 -0.008 -0.000 -0.037 -0.007 0.004 -0.036 -0.002 
    (0.056) (0.077) (0.045) (0.056) (0.076) (0.045) (0.058) (0.077) (0.045) 
Partner present (=1)    0.057 0.089 0.076 0.066 0.095 0.076 0.019 0.089 0.053 
    (0.087) (0.088) (0.062) (0.085) (0.089) (0.062) (0.095) (0.088) (0.065) 
Number of pregnancies    -0.018** -0.024** -0.022*** -0.018** -0.024** -0.022*** -0.021** -0.023** -0.024*** 
    (0.009) (0.010) (0.007) (0.009) (0.010) (0.007) (0.009) (0.010) (0.007) 
Health insurance (=1)    0.039 0.142*** 0.088*** -0.025 0.183*** 0.075** -0.022 0.143*** 0.086*** 
    (0.031) (0.039) (0.024) (0.042) (0.054) (0.033) (0.042) (0.039) (0.024) 
Public facility (=1)    -0.071** -0.111*** -0.089*** -0.072** -0.111*** -0.089*** -0.085*** -0.112*** -0.096*** 
    (0.030) (0.033) (0.022) (0.030) (0.033) (0.022) (0.032) (0.033) (0.023) 
Number of household members    -0.004 -0.006 -0.002 -0.004 -0.005 -0.002 -0.002 -0.006 -0.000 
    (0.010) (0.011) (0.008) (0.010) (0.011) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011) (0.008) 
Household-Facility distance (in Km)    -0.027*** -0.023*** -0.024*** -0.027*** -0.023*** -0.024*** -0.025*** -0.023*** -0.022*** 
    (0.008) (0.009) (0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.006) 
Interaction between  PBF and asset score          -0.634* -0.010 -0.005 
          (0.360) (0.018) (0.018) 
Observations 1,112 996 2,108 1,092 987 2,079 1,092 987 2,079 972 987 1,959 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix 7: Regression results for prenatal care during the first trimester 
  Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3 Specification 4 
 Lower Upper Total Lower Upper Total Lower Upper Total Lower Upper Total 
Treatment*post 0.009 0.022 0.006 0.003 0.026 0.005 -0.014 0.038 0.007 0.024 0.027 0.016 
 (0.049) (0.046) (0.033) (0.050) (0.046) (0.033) (0.050) (0.047) (0.034) (0.058) (0.046) (0.035) 
Wave=0 if 2006, Wave=1 if 2008 0.140*** 0.142*** 0.145*** 0.133*** 0.153*** 0.145*** 0.140*** 0.145*** 0.145*** 0.122*** 0.153*** 0.141*** 
 (0.034) (0.032) (0.022) (0.034) (0.033) (0.023) (0.034) (0.033) (0.023) (0.038) (0.033) (0.024) 
interaction between PBF and  insurance       0.048 -0.078 -0.005    
       (0.042) (0.058) (0.033)    
Age < 20 years (=1)    0.022 0.002 0.014 0.022 0.001 0.014 0.017 0.002 0.010 
    (0.066) (0.140) (0.061) (0.066) (0.142) (0.061) (0.066) (0.140) (0.061) 
Age > 35 years (=1)    -0.023 -0.030 -0.025 -0.024 -0.031 -0.025 -0.020 -0.031 -0.024 
    (0.028) (0.033) (0.022) (0.029) (0.033) (0.022) (0.029) (0.033) (0.022) 
Has primary or more education (=1)    0.013 0.074** 0.039** 0.014 0.073** 0.039** 0.004 0.073** 0.035* 
    (0.022) (0.029) (0.018) (0.023) (0.029) (0.018) (0.023) (0.029) (0.018) 
Currently married/union (=1)    -0.070 -0.042 -0.063* -0.068 -0.040 -0.063* -0.061 -0.042 -0.059 
    (0.044) (0.071) (0.038) (0.045) (0.071) (0.038) (0.044) (0.071) (0.038) 
Partner present (=1)    -0.054 0.041 -0.008 -0.051 0.046 -0.008 -0.089 0.041 -0.025 
    (0.065) (0.070) (0.048) (0.065) (0.070) (0.048) (0.070) (0.070) (0.050) 
Number of pregnancies    0.003 -0.008 -0.001 0.003 -0.009 -0.001 0.000 -0.008 -0.003 
    (0.006) (0.008) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.005) 
Health insurance (=1)    0.004 0.008 0.007 -0.019 0.045 0.009 -0.031 0.009 0.004 
    (0.021) (0.029) (0.017) (0.027) (0.037) (0.022) (0.027) (0.029) (0.017) 
Public facility (=1)    0.022 0.008 0.016 0.022 0.008 0.016 0.022 0.008 0.015 
    (0.022) (0.026) (0.017) (0.022) (0.026) (0.017) (0.023) (0.026) (0.017) 
Number of household members    0.008 0.000 0.003 0.008 0.001 0.003 0.012 0.000 0.005 
    (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) 
Household-Facility distance (in Km)    -0.005 -0.011** -0.008* -0.005 -0.011** -0.008* -0.004 -0.011** -0.007* 
    (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.004) 
Interaction between  PBF and asset score          -0.352 -0.004 -0.006 
          (0.250) (0.013) (0.012) 
             
Observations 1,184 1,039 2,223 1,165 1,030 2,195 1,165 1,030 2,195 1,047 1,030 2,077 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix 8: Regression results for 4+ prenatal care visits 
  Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3 Specification 4 
 Lower Upper Total Lower Upper Total Lower Upper Total Lower Upper Total 
Treatment*post -0.002 -0.018 -0.009 0.005 -0.010 -0.005 -0.007 -0.004 -0.006 -0.032 -0.008 -0.016 
 (0.051) (0.051) (0.035) (0.052) (0.052) (0.035) (0.054) (0.053) (0.037) (0.062) (0.052) (0.037) 
Wave=0 if 2006, Wave=1 if 2008 0.130*** 0.126*** 0.132*** 0.110*** 0.118*** 0.117*** 0.115*** 0.113*** 0.117*** 0.141*** 0.117*** 0.128*** 
 (0.035) (0.033) (0.023) (0.036) (0.035) (0.024) (0.036) (0.036) (0.025) (0.041) (0.035) (0.025) 
interaction between PBF and  insurance       0.032 -0.042 0.002    
       (0.047) (0.061) (0.036)    
Age < 20 years (=1)    -0.006 -0.134 -0.044 -0.006 -0.135 -0.044 -0.016 -0.135 -0.049 
    (0.066) (0.118) (0.058) (0.066) (0.118) (0.058) (0.066) (0.117) (0.058) 
Age > 35 years (=1)    -0.070** -0.018 -0.047** -0.071** -0.018 -0.047** -0.068** -0.019 -0.045* 
    (0.030) (0.036) (0.023) (0.030) (0.036) (0.023) (0.031) (0.036) (0.023) 
Has primary or more education (=1)    -0.000 0.012 0.005 0.000 0.012 0.005 -0.014 0.011 -0.002 
    (0.024) (0.030) (0.018) (0.024) (0.030) (0.018) (0.025) (0.030) (0.019) 
Currently married/union (=1)    0.003 0.021 0.008 0.004 0.022 0.008 0.014 0.021 0.015 
    (0.040) (0.068) (0.034) (0.040) (0.069) (0.035) (0.040) (0.068) (0.034) 
Partner present (=1)    0.096** 0.033 0.066 0.098** 0.036 0.066 0.075 0.033 0.054 
    (0.048) (0.077) (0.043) (0.049) (0.076) (0.043) (0.053) (0.077) (0.046) 
Number of pregnancies    0.014** -0.000 0.008 0.014** -0.000 0.008 0.011 -0.000 0.005 
    (0.007) (0.009) (0.005) (0.007) (0.009) (0.005) (0.007) (0.009) (0.005) 
Health insurance (=1)    0.025 0.063** 0.041** 0.010 0.083** 0.040* 0.016 0.063** 0.042** 
    (0.023) (0.030) (0.018) (0.030) (0.037) (0.023) (0.030) (0.030) (0.018) 
Public facility (=1)    -0.008 -0.030 -0.020 -0.008 -0.031 -0.020 -0.017 -0.032 -0.026 
    (0.024) (0.029) (0.018) (0.024) (0.029) (0.018) (0.025) (0.029) (0.019) 
Number of household members    -0.009 -0.007 -0.008 -0.009 -0.007 -0.008 -0.006 -0.007 -0.006 
    (0.008) (0.009) (0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.006) 
Household-Facility distance (in Km)    -0.011* -0.010* -0.010** -0.011* -0.010 -0.010** -0.014** -0.010* -0.011** 
    (0.007) (0.006) (0.004) (0.007) (0.006) (0.004) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) 
Interaction between  PBF and asset score          -0.115 -0.009 -0.008 
          (0.271) (0.014) (0.013) 
Observations 1,183 1,040 2,223 1,164 1,031 2,195 1,164 1,031 2,195 1,046 1,031 2,077 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix 9: Regression results for use of modern contraceptives 
 Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3 Specification 4 
 Lower Upper Total Lower Upper Total Lower Upper Total Lower Upper Total 
Treatment*post -0.076* 0.116*** 0.018 -0.134*** 0.172*** 0.034 -0.101* 0.174*** 0.054 -0.082 0.175*** 0.069* 
  (0.039) (0.043) (0.028) (0.052) (0.055) (0.037) (0.055) (0.057) (0.039) (0.061) (0.055) (0.039) 
Wave=0 if 2006, Wave=1 if 2008 0.235*** 0.163*** 0.218*** 0.206*** 0.065 0.136*** 0.191*** 0.064 0.126*** 0.154*** 0.065 0.118*** 
  (0.029) (0.031) (0.020) (0.041) (0.042) (0.028) (0.042) (0.042) (0.029) (0.046) (0.042) (0.029) 
interaction between PBF and  insurance       -0.100** -0.012 -0.068*    
       (0.045) (0.070) (0.038)    
Age    -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
    (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) 
Has primary or more education (=1)    -0.006 0.014 -0.003 -0.007 0.013 -0.003 -0.013 0.013 -0.006 
     (0.023) (0.033) (0.019) (0.023) (0.033) (0.019) (0.023) (0.033) (0.020) 
Currently married/union (=1)    -0.024 0.382*** 0.188** -0.016 0.383*** 0.192** 0.141*** 0.384*** 0.284*** 
     (0.151) (0.032) (0.089) (0.150) (0.032) (0.089) (0.029) (0.032) (0.030) 
Partner present (=1)    -0.085 0.053 -0.035 -0.092 0.055 -0.035 -0.088 0.054 -0.026 
     (0.069) (0.091) (0.056) (0.069) (0.092) (0.056) (0.075) (0.091) (0.058) 
Number of pregnancies    -0.016** -0.014 -0.015** -0.016** -0.014 -0.015** -0.015** -0.014 -0.015** 
     (0.007) (0.010) (0.006) (0.007) (0.010) (0.006) (0.007) (0.010) (0.006) 
Health insurance (=1)    0.031 0.011 0.034* 0.079** 0.016 0.067** 0.048 0.011 0.030 
     (0.023) (0.035) (0.019) (0.033) (0.051) (0.027) (0.033) (0.035) (0.019) 
Public facility (=1)    0.029 0.039 0.028 0.031 0.039 0.028 0.025 0.037 0.035* 
    (0.022) (0.030) (0.019) (0.022) (0.030) (0.019) (0.022) (0.030) (0.019) 
Total number alive child    0.011 0.017 0.011 0.011 0.017 0.011 0.009 0.017 0.009 
    (0.010) (0.018) (0.010) (0.011) (0.018) (0.010) (0.009) (0.018) (0.009) 
Number of household members    0.010 0.011 0.015* 0.010 0.011 0.015* 0.011 0.011 0.016** 
     (0.010) (0.015) (0.009) (0.010) (0.015) (0.009) (0.009) (0.015) (0.008) 
Household-Facility distance (in Km)    0.005 0.008 0.006 0.006 0.008 0.007 0.009 0.008 0.009* 
     (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) 
Delivery assisted by a skilled attendant    0.020 0.042 0.039** 0.026 0.042 0.040** 0.024 0.042 0.042** 
    (0.025) (0.030) (0.020) (0.025) (0.030) (0.020) (0.026) (0.030) (0.020) 
Interaction between  PBF and asset score          0.345 -0.010 -0.001 
          (0.264) (0.014) (0.015) 
Observations 1,706 1,566 3,272 1,059 966 2,025 1,059 966 2,025 942 966 1,908 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix 10: Regression results for curative care for children 
  Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3 Specification 4 
  Lower Upper Total Lower Upper Total Lower Upper Total Lower Upper Total 
Treatment*post 0.048 0.02 0.039 0.063 0.004 0.027 0.035 0.024 0.027 0.016 0.006 0.017 
  (0.048
) 
(0.056
) 
(0.035) (0.05) (0.057) (0.039) (0.053) (0.06) (0.039) (0.06) (0.057) (0.038) 
Wave=0 if 2006, Wave=1 if 2008 0.055* 0.061* 0.072**
* 
0.014 0.024 0.024 0.027 0.013 0.024 0.044 0.024 0.036 
  (0.032
) 
(0.037
) 
(0.024) (0.034) (0.039) (0.026) (0.034) (0.04) (0.026) (0.039) (0.039) (0.026) 
interaction between PBF and  insurance      0.006 0.078* -0.093 0.006    
       (0.037) (0.046) (0.062) (0.037)    
Age    -
0.022*** 
-0.009 -
0.016*** 
-
0.023*** 
-0.009 -
0.016*** 
-
0.021*** 
-0.008 -0.015** 
     (0.007) (0.009) (0.006) (0.007) (0.009) (0.006) (0.007) (0.009) (0.006) 
Sex    0.029 -0.064** -0.013 0.031 -0.065** -0.013 0.024 -0.064** -0.021 
     (0.023) (0.028) (0.018) (0.023) (0.028) (0.018) (0.024) (0.028) (0.018) 
Mother has primary or more education 
(=1) 
   -0.02 0.04 0.007 -0.019 0.039 0.007 -0.024 0.042 0.007 
     (0.023) (0.029) (0.018) (-0.023) (0.029) (0.018) (0.024) (0.029) (0.019) 
Household-Facility distance (in Km)    -0.015** -0.013* -
0.014*** 
-0.015** -0.013* -
0.014*** 
-0.016** -0.013* -
0.015*** 
     (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) 
Health insurance (=1)    0.154*** 0.204**
* 
0.179*** 0.117*** 0.245**
* 
0.179*** 0.112*** 0.205**
* 
0.180*** 
     (0.023) (0.031) (0.024) (0.031) (0.039) (0.024) (0.033) (0.031) (0.019) 
Number of household members    -
0.018*** 
0.004 -0.008 -
0.019*** 
0.004 -0.008 -0.016** 0.004 -0.006 
     (0.007) (0.008) (0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.005) 
Interaction between  PBF and asset score          -0.505* -0.018* -0.014 
            (0.292) (0.01) (0.011) 
              
Observations 1,469 1,150 2,619 1,370 1,074 2,444 1,370 1,074 2,444 1,215 1,074 2,289 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix 11: Regression results for preventive care for children 
  Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3 Specification 4 
  Lower Upper Total Lower Upper Total Lower Upper Total Lower Upper Total 
Treatment*post 0.077*** 0.098*** 0.093*** 0.092*** 0.092*** 0.092*** 0.081*** 0.098*** 0.092*** 0.064** 0.093*** 0.092*** 
  (0.025) (0.025) (0.017) (0.026) (0.025) (0.019) (0.028) (0.026) (0.019) (0.031) (0.025) (0.018) 
Wave=0 if 2006, Wave=1 if 
2008 
-0.023 -0.029* -0.030** -0.018 -0.011 -0.018 -0.013 -0.015 -0.018 -0.006 -0.011 -0.019 
  (0.017) (0.017) (0.012) (0.018) (0.018) (0.013) (0.019) (0.019) (0.013) (0.021) (0.018) (0.013) 
interaction between PBF and  
insurance 
     0.008 0.033 -0.038 0.008    
       (0.019) (0.025) (0.031) (0.019)    
Age    -0.037*** -0.045*** -0.040*** -0.037*** -0.045*** -0.040*** -0.034*** -0.045*** -0.039*** 
     (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) 
Sex    0.015 0.008 0.012 0.015 0.008 0.012 0.014 0.008 0.011 
     (0.012) (0.013) (0.009) (0.012) (0.013) (0.009) (0.013) (0.013) (0.009) 
Mother has primary or more 
education (=1) 
   -0.007 0.014 0.003 -0.007 0.012 0.003 -0.012 0.014 0.002 
     (0.012) (0.013) (0.009) (0.012) (0.013) (0.009) (0.013) (0.013) (0.009) 
Household-Facility distance 
(in Km) 
   -0.005 -0.007** -0.006*** -0.005 -0.007** -0.006*** -0.006* -0.006** -0.006*** 
     (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
Health insurance (=1)    0.019 0.027* 0.015 0.003 0.046** 0.015 0.005 0.028* 0.020** 
     (0.013) (0.016) (0.014) (0.018) (0.021) (0.014) (0.019) (0.016) (0.01) 
Number of household 
members 
   -0.002 0.003 0 -0.002 0.003 0 -0.002 0.003 0 
     (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) 
Interaction between  PBF and 
asset score 
         -0.211 -0.008** -0.009** 
           (0.15) (0.004) (0.003) 
              
Observations 3,200 2,762 5,962 2,964 2,595 5,559 2,964 2,595 5,559 2,660 2,595 5,255 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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